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**MAKING WOODROW WILSON,
PRESIDENT**

THE
ANNALS



W. D. U. Combs

Making Woodrow Wilson President

By

WILLIAM F. McCOMBS

Chairman, DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Edited by

LOUIS JAY LANG

Editor, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS COLLIER PLATT

NEW YORK

FAIRVIEW PUBLISHING COMPANY

1921

TO THE
ASSOCIATION



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466228

Printed in the United States of America

FOREWORD

WILLIAM FRANK McCOMBS was born at Hamburg, Ashley County, Arkansas, December 26, 1876. His father, William Faulkner McCombs, was a native of Kentucky. His mother was Mrs. Frances Pugh McCombs, a native of Alabama. There were three sisters, Corinne, Ethel and Addie, and two brothers, Robert and Ashton.

While the father tilled a 17,000 acre rice plantation, young McCombs learned his A B C's at his mother's knee and from a private tutor. As a mere child he suffered a fracture of the hip through a fall. As a result of this accident, he was permanently lame.

His preliminary training for college was obtained in the Webb Preparatory School at Belle Buckle, Tennessee. He entered Princeton University in 1894, graduating with the class of '98.

Mr. McCombs was of medium height, while leaning upon his ever present cane. He shot up to six feet when provoked. In youth his hair was auburn. It was tinged with gray when he attained the age of two score years. The hair was brushed back from a high forehead. His eyes were gray, the nose was long, the nostrils frequently dilated. The mouth was firm; the lips thin; the jaw square; the ears small; the face clean cut and of an intellectual type.

Mr. McCombs, throughout his career, avoided pyro-

FOREWORD

technics. He was dogged in his determination and cool in a crisis. He was no compromiser, but fought to a finish. His life's achievements were embraced in the brief span of 44 years, his death occurring on February 22, 1921.

The genesis of this book was in a visit of the editor to William F. McCombs, nearly three years ago. At that time, Mr. McCombs, prostrated by illness, recited many incidents which appear in this volume. The editor was so impressed that he begged the privilege of writing them.

Mr. McCombs answered, "Not now. The story would be misunderstood. Let's get together after I recover and map it out". A few weeks later, it was agreed that we should collect all available material and prepare it in book form. Death intervened before the task could be completed.

Mr. McCombs wrote about one hundred thousand words, terminating at a point in the Democratic Convention when Champ Clark needed only a few votes to become the Presidential nominee. There was, in addition, much detached material. Because of Mr. McCombs' illness and death, he was unable to finish the work he had undertaken.

The editor has been compelled to supply many details with which he became familiar through an intimate friendship of nearly seventeen years. An effort has been made throughout this book to utilize all the material that Mr. McCombs had prepared, and to distinguish this from the material supplied by the editor.

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PREFACE

This book depicts a double tragedy. The chief actors were Princeton University men. One was an instructor; the other was his pupil. Enthralled by the artful intellectuality of the instructor, the pupil conceived and executed the idea of making him President of the United States.

The President not only spurned his political maker, but treated as outcasts, many others who sacrificed their near-all to elevate him to the office of America's chief executive. The President-Maker went to an early grave. The President was repudiated by the American people. Retribution came but a few months before the President-Maker gave up his life.

“Whoso diggeth a pit, shall fall therein. And he that rolleth a stone, it will return upon him.”

— PROVERBS 26: 27.

LOUIS JAY LANG

Princeton '81

INTRODUCTION

I would have little reason for writing this book were it not more than a mere discussion of a man's life. I have no desire to be Woodrow Wilson's biographer. I have been urged to write, because of my personal contact with his political career, and because of my knowledge of the events connected therewith.

I knew Mr. Wilson twenty-six years. I sat under him at Princeton University. I know how he became Governor and twice President. I was manager by personal appointment of Mr. Wilson's prenomination Presidential campaign. I was Chairman of the Democratic National Committee of 1912 which conducted the campaign that resulted in his election. I was intimate with his conduct for his entire official career. I write, not as an enemy of Woodrow Wilson, but as an opponent of the subversion of the American constitution and the destruction of our system of Government, through vanity and greed for individual power.

I consider Woodrow Wilson one of the most remarkable developments of modern times. Brilliant in mind, and a master of history and rhetoric, I would not call him learned. He was actuated always by the purpose of the moment. He was an opportunist. Suave of manner, he constantly strove to advance himself. He saw only himself — and only his personal

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individual exaltation. He played the game as an expert whist player — always to win — never to lose. Winning was his passion.

He was brutal in victory. He was the first to run when threatened with defeat, There is evidence of this in his begging me to withdraw his name as a Presidential candidate at the Baltimore convention of 1912, when Champ Clark was leading him slightly.

Had I yielded to his panic at that time, there would have been no President Wilson.

Mr. Wilson was insensible of political obligations. He recognized no debt to the giver. He was adroit in conduct, and skilled in the use of language. His English was a model of classicism. His strength lay in his cleverness of expression. His oratorical outbursts were at times dazzling. One became intoxicated with the veneer of his intellectuality.

The Wilson ideal was Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist — not Thomas Jefferson, the Democrat. Like Hamilton, he believed in a limited monarchy — a life tenure for the President. He was an advocate of the British Government system. He taught it at Princeton University. While President, he regarded himself not only as President, but Premier. Had he dared, he would have prorogued Congress as the King of England prorogues Parliament.

It was during the Paris Peace Conference that he proclaimed himself Premier of the United States. His was the most audacious proclamation ever emitted by an American President. He overrode Congress and made it a creature of his whims. His juggernaut

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crushed those who dared oppose him. He imperiously strode a world-wide stage. He was fortunate in that there is no American constitutional provision for the retirement of the President from office during the term for which he is elected when repudiated by popular vote. This alone saved him from earlier oblivion.

Mr. Wilson absorbed a great and powerful party,—the Democratic Party. It has been more often out of, than in, power, but it always set a continuity of principle. Long before his first inauguration for President, I found that the Democratic Party must cease to exist except as a vehicle for his will. No man in history ever survived who had the boldness and the audacity to employ his practices and probably no one ever will.

M. U. Coombs

PART I

WOODROW WILSON

I

PRINCETON EPISODES

THE AUTHOR ENTERS PRINCETON — FINDS WILSON “COLD, DISTANT, INTELLECTUAL” — MCCOMBS PREVENTS UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S ENFORCED DEPOSITION BY GROOMING HIM FOR GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY — “TO LET HIM DOWN EASY” — ELECTED, WILSON REPUDIATES BARGAIN TO MAKE JAMES SMITH, JR., UNITED STATES SENATOR — MCCOMBS PREDICTS WILSON WILL BE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN THE fall of 1894, I went to Princeton University. Never having been in the East, I had a great feeling of loneliness. In addition, I was not satisfied that Princeton was the place for me, my first choice being Harvard. My family, however, having more prescience than I did, preferred Princeton. I acceded to their wishes.

Some time in October of that year, I became a member of the Southern Club, an organization of about a hundred. Shortly thereafter the Club held a meeting. Woodrow Wilson, but recently called to a professorship, was invited to speak. After the meeting, as we came out of the door, I happened to fall in with him. We walked across the campus together.

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I accompanied him to his home. The point of contact between us was, that we were both from the South.

I made inquiries about Princeton. We discussed the relative merits of various institutions. He told me that if he ever became a professor anywhere else than Princeton, he would go South. Being fresh from the South myself and somewhat provincial, the idea impressed me greatly.

For the next two years I came in contact with Professor Wilson occasionally. My admiration for his intellect grew, although he always impressed me as a cold and distant person, with a sort of affected warmth.

During the last two years of my course at college I elected to take all Professor Wilson's courses, which included Jurisprudence, Politics, and English Common Law. His lectures on Jurisprudence and Politics, to my mind, far excelled any courses given in the University. Jurisprudence and Politics involved the theoretical side of the law. The course in English Common Law involved concrete and definite principles. It is not surprising that Professor Wilson, when he was admitted to the Bar, did not continue in the practice. His disposition would be against the detail of preparation and the turmoil and struggle of actual litigation in Court.

On the whole, I think I got more from Professor Wilson's courses than from any others, with the possible exception of Professor Bliss Perry's courses in English and Aesthetics.

After leaving Princeton, I went to the Law School

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at Harvard, and later to New York to practice. I saw little more of Professor Wilson until he was elected President of the University,— chiefly by those in the Board of Trustees, including Moses Taylor Pyne, James W. Alexander and others, with all of whom he later differed.

The burden of the original complaint in the Board of Trustees at Princeton against University President Wilson was that he announced policies and programmes totally irrespective of the Board of Trustees, which was contrary to all of the traditions of the University.

Mr. Pyne and others had been largely responsible for the later development of the University and had contributed vast sums for its support. Mr. Pyne lived in Princeton. He actually gave much of his time to the personal supervision of its activities. Theretofore, as in the majority of the educational institutions of the country, the Board of Trustees had laid down the policies and programmes of the University and had arranged its financial resources. The President was presumed merely to co-operate as the chief administrative officer of the University. Thus the schism began, and this a little over a year after Professor Wilson became President of the University.

In 1908 Mr. Wilson, unknown to the Board of Trustees, announced a programme which involved the abolition of the student clubs of Princeton and the division of the University into a group of units called Quads, after the English fashion. To each Quad was to be assigned a certain number of students without

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reference to their preference in the matter. They were to dine together and necessarily to be thrown together. This was Mr. Wilson's idea of the establishment of a more complete democracy.

The objections to the plan, naturally, were the destruction of property values of several hundreds of thousands of dollars invested in the Student Eating Clubs, and the enormous expense in connection with the establishment of Quads. A further objection was that the Quad system must fail, because men who are uncongenial will not accept association. Compulsion would result in the attendance at meals only of persons who might possibly be socially congenial.

Nevertheless, the plan had its elements of strength. While I did not agree with Mr. Wilson's idea of the Quad system, I did agree with the general idea of further democratizing Princeton and of breaking up the cliques.

The fundamental difficulty in the matter, however, was that Mr. Wilson had elaborated and published an entire plan without consultation with the constituted authorities — the Board of Trustees.

I was in Princeton when the matter reached a fever point. I called on the President. I suggested that he might work out his plan if he called his Board of Trustees more into consultation. This he agreed to do. But, in some way or other, at the time, his nature rebelled against it.

Later on, and after the discussion of the Quad System had been taken up among the Alumni, the question of a Graduate School arose. Everyone favored a

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Graduate School. Colonel William Cooper Procter, of Cincinnati, offered to provide the funds. The question arose as to its location. A majority of the members of the Board of Trustees and Dean West were in favor of its location at some distance from the campus, in order that the graduate students might not be disturbed by the enthusiasm of the under-graduates. Mr. Wilson favored the idea of erecting the Graduate School on the campus. To my mind the location was totally immaterial so long as we were able to avail ourselves of the gift of Mr. Procter.

Over the location of the Graduate School, however immaterial as it may seem to the average reader,— and indeed it has never seemed anything else to me,— the discussion grew to such proportions and the feeling of hostility against Mr. Wilson became so great, that it was only a question of time until he would be forced by the majority of the Board of Trustees to surrender the Presidency. I had kept in close touch with Princeton affairs since graduation. I had, as an officer of the Princeton Club of New York, advised Mr. Wilson thoroughly as to the situation, and had stood in the position of acting, at least in New York, as the link between him and the Alumni.

In 1909, Mr. Wilson, as President of the University, was invited to make a speech at the Princeton Club of New York. The President of the Club, who had been opposed to him, was on that evening, fatefully or otherwise, not present. When Mr. Wilson came into the clubhouse, he received an exceedingly cold reception, especially from the older men. Being

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an officer of the Club, I met him at the door and took him in. Noticing that he was not to receive a very cordial reception, and that the attitude was one of patent hostility, I took him through a narrow hall, so that he would not have to pass through the main body of the audience, and conducted him to the platform from which he was to speak. The Vice President of the Club in his introduction said, merely:

“We have with us this evening, the President of the University, Mr. Wilson”.

The Vice President and I were the only other persons on the platform.

After the speech I went up and shook hands with the President. We paused for a moment to see if others would follow. The older men, among whom were several trustees, did not come up. The younger men disliked to volunteer. I conducted Mr. Wilson out by the same secret passage, and into the open lobby of the Club as the members were filing out. Not over twenty from the gathering of two hundred shook hands with him.

I suggested to Mr. Wilson that we go up to the grill room of the Club, where a buffet supper was being served,—including liquid refreshments. I was sure that this supper would attract the younger men, and that a better opportunity could be had there to make things a bit more comfortable for him. I left him in the hands of a group of half a dozen younger Alumni. He appeared painfully conscious of his position.

Then I went to the officers of the Club, and various members of the Board of Governors, all of whom were

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on the Anti-Wilson side of the issue, and stated that he was the guest of the Club, invited by action of the Board of Trustees; that whatever they thought of him, they owed him the courtesy of cordial treatment so long as he was in the Club; that when he departed, they were at liberty to act as they pleased. I further said, that, unless this was done, I would resign as an officer of the Club.

Whereupon, most of the officers and Governors went up and greeted him formally. I think it was the coldest meeting of any sort that I ever attended.

In April, 1910, it became apparent that Mr. Wilson was to be deposed from the Presidency of Princeton University. I thought such action would produce a serious split in the body of the Alumni and cut off a tremendous support from the University itself. In the second place, I did not see anything in the situation at that time to warrant such action.

I remember one night, at the Princeton Club, saying to two friends on the Board of Trustees, that in Wilson we had one of the intellectual giants of the continent. Even if he lacked amiability to the suggestions of the Board of Directors, and had acted arbitrarily at times, I thought much should be written off against genius and that an entente could still be established.

My suggestion met with no response whatever. The Board of Trustees was thoroughly committed, pro and con. The only man who had been in the situation who could have brought about peace was Cornelius C. Cuyler, a banker in New York, a member of Mr. Wilson's class and friendly with all fac-

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tions. Mr. Cuyler died the summer previous. I have always thought that had he lived he could have laughed the matter out of existence, as it should have been.

In May, 1910, it became more obvious than ever that Mr. Wilson was to be dismissed at the June commencement. I happened to be in Princeton during that month. I suggested to two members of the Board of Trustees, hostile to him, that it would be a good thing if Mr. Wilson were nominated for Governor of New Jersey on the Democratic ticket.

Former United States Senator James Smith, Jr., of New Jersey, was casting about for a candidate outside the organization, who could win. Colonel George Harvey was very enthusiastic about Professor Wilson. He enjoyed the confidence of Senator Smith.

In my conversation with the two Princeton trustees referred to above, I said, "Why not let Wilson down easy by getting him the nomination for the Governorship of New Jersey on the Democratic ticket"?

These trustees were very powerful men. They took the suggestion very heartily. I said no more.

The next I knew, it was common gossip of New Jersey that Wilson would be the candidate. A hundred times newspaper men have inquired of me whether these two Princeton trustees and others did not actually put up the \$75,000 required by Senator Smith for the Wilson campaign fund, and whether, as a matter of fact, Cleveland Dodge and others did not refund the \$75,000 when Wilson broke with Smith.

In any event, at the commencement in 1910, there was an underground rumor that Mr. Wilson might be

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relieved of his duties in another way than by formal action of the Board at that time.

I went to Europe. Returning in September, on making inquiries, I found that the idea of the nomination of Mr. Wilson had gained great headway, especially among what were termed the Reactionaries in New Jersey. Subsequently, a meeting was held at the Lawyers' Club in New York at which his nomination was virtually agreed upon. This meeting was attended by Mr. Wilson, George Harvey, James R. Nugent, Robert S. Hudspeth, representing Senator Smith, Robert J. Thompson, former Congressman Eugene Kinkead, Robert Lindabury and Milan Ross.

Mr. Wilson agreed to run for Governor. Senator Smith controlled a majority of the delegates to the convention which met at Trenton October 10, 1911.

The Progressive element in New Jersey violently opposed the nomination of Mr. Wilson. Among them were William Hughes and Mayor Gregory of Orange. Some gentlemen from Newark, where Senator Smith resided, were at the doorway of the Convention Hall. They refused admission to Progressive delegates. A number of personal encounters ensued.

Mr. Wilson was nominated easily. He made his speech of acceptance. He embarked upon his campaign under the management of Senator Smith, James R. Nugent and Colonel Harvey.

The Progressive candidate for Governor was George L. Record. The Republican candidate was Vivian Lewis.

Ample funds were provided for the campaign,

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\$75,000 being raised by Senator Smith and his friends. Mr. Wilson made a magnificent stumping tour and was elected by a plurality of over forty-nine thousand.

After his nomination, on October 10th, I sent the Governor-Elect the following telegram:

“The People of New Jersey are to be congratulated on your nomination for Governor, and Princeton has produced the next President of the United States.”

In writing that telegram, I had in mind the very great probability of Democratic success through the country, of a Democratic lower House in Congress, and the general feeling that the Taft Administration was falling into a state of collapse. I had also in mind the fact that Mr. Wilson would prove intellectually superior to any candidate who might be elected as Governor from any of the states, and that his tours of campaigning could be turned to such an account that he would attract the attention of the entire country.

His election was so impressive that it received very general notice; but the vast majority of people throughout the country viewed it as an experiment in higher education. Tersely, their general sentiment might have been expressed in the phrase:

“Watch the Professor”!

After his inauguration, Mr. Wilson immediately proceeded to his programme.

Everything went along very amiably until the question of the election of a United States Senator came up. Under the then very effective primary law an informal primary had been held a year before. Only two men participated, both of whom were relatively

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unknown,—James E. Martine and Frank M. McDermitt. Very few voters paid any attention to the law at all, considering it practically a dead letter. It did not provide that it should be binding on the Legislature.

Soon after Governor Wilson took office, there were rumors that Senator Smith desired to be elected Senator. It was understood, also, that Colonel Harvey would stand. No mention was made of James E. Martine, who had received a majority of the votes in the informal primary.

Mr. Wilson came out squarely against Senator Smith, but expressed no preference as to candidates. The Smith legislative forces were gathering. It seemed that he would be elected under ordinary circumstances.

Then Governor Wilson took the position that the primary candidate, even though the election was informal, should be the choice of the party. At the same time, he saw the necessity of winning away from Senator Smith the organization that was behind him. He thereupon brought leaders into consultation and made appointments that were satisfactory to them. Gradually Smith's power was withdrawn from him, and in a short time he had lost control of his organization, his influence being practically limited to Essex County. Mr. Martine was elected.

II

GENESIS OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

WILSON ASKS McCOMBS TO MANAGE HIS PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY —
“LET THE PROPHET FULFIL THE PROPHECY” — McCOMBS
EMBARKS WITH MEAGRE FUNDS — WILSON'S FIRST SPEECH
SHOCKS HIM — McCOMBS INTRODUCES McADOO TO WILSON —
“EVERYBODY IS AGAINST WILSON”! SAID McADOO — STATE
CHAIRMAN NUGENT'S “WILSON — LIAR — INGRATE” SPEECH
CAUSES HIS OUSTING.

TOWARD the latter part of February, 1911, I saw Governor Wilson. I discussed with him the proposed Employers' Liability Act. In New York, I had been very keenly interested in the subject and had studied it very thoroughly. He requested that I give him a brief and any suggestions that I had to make. I went to Trenton and took the matter up with him.

On his desk, I noticed huge piles of unanswered letters. I said to him: “You must be getting a lot of mail”. He said: “Yes, those are invitations from various places to speak, and I don't know what to do with them”. I then reminded him of the telegram concerning his probable chance of being President which I had sent to him in the previous October. He said: “Yes, I remember it well, but I think that the

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Smith incident has put me out of commission with organized politics in this country. My course in the Legislature has been such as to make people afraid of me”.

I told him that the first was a serious obstacle, but if I gauged the temper of the time correctly, the latter could be overcome. Then I said: “I should like the prophecy of my telegram fulfilled”. His reply was: “The prophet should fulfil his prophecy”. I said: “If you desire, I should be quite willing to do so”. The Governor assented.

I looked at a number of his letters. They were mainly from Civic organizations in the East. I said: “These will never do. The movement to make a man President of the United States must start in the West, and come East”.

I returned to New York and laid down a plan of campaign. My first move was to organize a speaking tour for the Governor through the middle and far West. It did not seem desirable that he appear to be canvassing for the office. I selected the following cities for his speech-making: Kansas City, Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and Portland. I laid the plan before him. He assented. I then had suggestions made to Princeton alumni, or friends, in these various cities, that he be invited to speak before civic and commercial bodies, and that no speeches be made before political bodies.

Invitations were readily extended. It was planned that the Governor should go west immediately after the adjournment of the Legislature. Meanwhile, I

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got in touch with various friends throughout the country, chiefly Princeton men, and made inquiry as to whether they would be willing to support, financially, a Wilson campaign for the Presidency. I got many responses, but little money. In the end, I was compelled to underwrite the trip to the West myself. Later I received some donations to offset my advances.

I was busy in Court the day Mr. Wilson left. I did not have a chance to confer with him. But I told the publicity man to say to Mr. Wilson that on his western tour I did not think it advisable to incorporate in his speech anything about the Initiative, Referendum and Recall. I did not know his views on the subject, but I thought that either position he took would be a great political injury. Furthermore, I thought that it was not necessary to bring it into a Presidential campaign. These issues were local and state matters.

The publicity man, either fearing to make suggestions to the Governor or forgetting it, did not give him the message. In any event, in Kansas City, during a speech before the Knife and Fork Club, he came out for the Initiative, Referendum and Recall, but not the recall of judges. His position was very sweeping and applicable to all states and all conditions, according to the text of the speech. When I read the speech I was very much alarmed. I knew that the views expressed therein were contrary to that which he had taught in college. I knew, also, that such doctrine would set the more or less conservative states against him. This included the great and popular states in the East and in the South. As I anticipated, the speech immedi-

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ately aroused the greatest hostility. That and the Smith incident became powerful weapons in the hands of our opponents. So far as Smith was concerned, it was contended that, having accepted the Gubernatorial nomination largely at Smith's hands, the Governor should at least have kept his hands off the United States Senatorship, the more so in view of the fact that the primary had been an informal and innocuous affair.

From Kansas City, Governor Wilson went to Denver. There the meeting had been arranged largely by Mr. S. H. Thompson, of the class of 1897 at Princeton,—now Deputy Attorney General. I did not know what Mr. Thompson's politics were, but I knew he was my friend, and that I could trust him to arrange a proper meeting. This he did. At the time of the visit to Denver, Governor Wilson was invited to address a meeting there at the celebration of the Tercentenary of the Bible. His speech was magnificent. I immediately had thousands of copies of it printed and sent to every clergyman in the United States. My idea was, that, from thousands of pulpits, this address would be commented on and that Mr. Wilson's name would be heard all over the United States. Prior to the time of his election as Governor, knowledge of Mr. Wilson's existence was confined, in a large measure, to academic circles and to the few who heard him as an after dinner speaker on a limited number of occasions, chiefly in the East.

In the main, the tour turned out to be a great success, with the exception of the unfortunate declaration for the Initiative, Referendum and Recall. This

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declaration produced a distinct setback in the East. It did not help very much in the West.

Up to this time only three persons had taken part in the financial campaign,— Walter L. McCorkle, of New York, who donated a small amount; Walter Hines Page, afterward Ambassador to England, who found my press agent for me and contributed, I think, \$100, and myself. Upon a further call, Mr. Page told me he felt that he could not respond. Nevertheless, I felt that the campaign should go on.

I concluded that, inasmuch as the political organizations throughout the country, in the main, would be hostile to Mr. Wilson, and inasmuch as those Democrats who were possessed of means would not support organized politics in supporting him, I must lay down a campaign that differed materially and fundamentally from any Presidential campaign ever previously conducted.

It seemed necessary that public sentiment should be built from the ground up, so that in the end states would be compelled to choose delegates who would be instructed for Mr. Wilson. If uninstructed, they would support him at some time in the convention, or, if hostile, would at some juncture be compelled, by popular uprising, to vote for him. The theory of such a campaign had, as its basis, a continuous publicity reaching the individual himself, irrespective of his putative power in politics. With this in mind, I established the Wilson Headquarters at 42 Broadway, New York City, with experienced publicity men in charge.

A majority of the newspapers throughout the

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country had become very hostile and seemed to print as little about him as they possibly could. This plan was then inaugurated. We took a list of every Democratic newspaper in the United States and printed a large page. We called it a clipping sheet. It was a statement of excerpts from the best things said about Mr. Wilson in the various papers. These sheets went on for a long time daily. Extracts from these clipping sheets began to be taken by the various small papers throughout the country.

People became aware of the existence of Wilson Headquarters at 42 Broadway. Then letters began to come in floods asking for more information about Mr. Wilson. These letters were answered individually. The name of the inquirer was put in an index. The western speeches of the Governor were published with the exception, I must admit, of the Referendum speech, and were circulated broadcast to all inquirers. This publicity also went to the various political leaders in every county throughout the country.

During the summer of 1911, while the initial stages of the publicity were going on, I took a motor trip through New England. I visited, personally, many Democratic leaders. At the Waumbeck Hotel, Jefferson, New Hampshire, I met Louis Wiley, business manager of the *New York Times*. I also met there Andrew Freedman, of New York, and William L. Ward, the Republican leader of Westchester County, New York. At the risk of boring them, I did not permit them to talk about anything except Mr. Wilson. Mr. Ward, who seemed to take a friendly interest in

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me personally, but who did not like the Wilson idea at all, made many valuable suggestions out of his long experience. Of Mr. Wiley I made a complete convert, and later on, throughout the entire prenomination fight, he rendered valiant and valuable suggestions. I say valiant, because Mr. Wiley's paper never declared itself for Mr. Wilson until a very critical moment in the Convention itself.

While in Maine, I went to see Mayor Fitzgerald, of Boston. My idea was not so much that I would get him committed, as that I would plant the Wilson germ in him for future purposes. Upon meeting Mr. Fitzgerald, I told him that I had come to talk about Governor Wilson to him and began to lead him to a secluded spot. Not for Fitzgerald! He stood in the middle of the hotel lobby. I commenced on him with quiet tones. He responded in such a way that everybody in the hotel could hear. Presently, at least two hundred people were standing around, listening to the merits of Governor Wilson's candidacy. His final statement was: "The time is not ripe. We must look over all the candidates carefully". Meanwhile, newspaper men were attracted and Mr. Fitzgerald paid me the compliment in public of saying that I was a very live wire.

I returned to New York. The day following I went to luncheon with William Gibbs McAdoo, afterward Secretary of the Treasury. I had known Mr. McAdoo for five or six years. Three years previous to the luncheon I was on the Nominating Committee of the Southern Society to recommend to the Society a Pres-

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ident, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer. I personally espoused Mr. McAdoo for the office of President. In doing so I went counter to the precedent of the Society of many years' standing, that the Vice President should succeed the President. Walter L. McCorkle was then Vice President. I thought under the circumstances that Mr. McAdoo would be preferable. I personally secured a bare majority of the Nominating Committee and Mr. McAdoo's name for President went before the Society. A rather bitter fight was made on him, but he was elected. It being the custom to have the President succeed himself, Mr. McAdoo was elected a second year. The third year I was again on the Nominating Committee and reversed another precedent of the Society. I urged Mr. McAdoo for the Presidency for a third term. The Nominating Committee again nominated him by a majority. There was another fight on the nomination, but he was elected. I am afraid that this action caused me the temporary loss of some very old friendships in the Society. Happily, I have regained them.

At the luncheon at the Lawyers' Club, that I have referred to, Mr. McAdoo brought up the question of an application to the Public Service Commission of New Jersey, to regulate the traffic of the railroads terminating at points in Jersey City, Weehawken and Hoboken. Mr. McAdoo feared that the ferry service would be unprofitable and that the Hudson tubes would fall heir to the ferry receipts. He requested a conference with the Governor. I had previously introduced Mr. McAdoo to Governor Wilson. In

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September I asked Mr. McAdoo if he could not espouse Mr. Wilson's candidacy and assist in raising some funds. He said everybody that he knew was against Governor Wilson, and that the financial condition of the Hudson tunnels was such that he did not feel he could do much.

Meanwhile, I had sent out letters to all of the Princeton Alumni that I thought would contribute, and had received a fairly satisfactory return. Cleveland H. Dodge, a classmate of Mr. Wilson's at Princeton, had up to September contributed about ten thousand dollars. Edward Sheldon, also a classmate of the Governor, gave one thousand dollars. There were a few scattering contributions.

During the summer, knowing that Governor Wilson had a small political acquaintance, I motored down to Sea Girt, the Summer Capital of New Jersey. I took as many men as I could with me. From these visits I learned a valuable lesson, to wit: That Mr. Wilson appealed only to those men who were keenly and actively interested in the discussion of public questions. Those who took a deep interest in party politics and party success came away disappointed. The latter type of man I never took to see Mr. Wilson up to the day of his nomination.

I had been told that early in the summer of 1911 Senator Smith had made a quite extensive trip, visiting his political friends and presenting his grievances against Mr. Wilson. He had been in politics for many years; he had vast political and business connections; his influence was great. From the average point of

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view it would seem that this opposition would make Mr. Wilson's nomination impossible.

A fortunate incident occurred. James R. Nugent, leader of Essex County, and supposed to be Senator Smith's *alter ego*, was chairman of the State Democratic Committee of New Jersey. One Saturday evening, on the Jersey coast, Mr. Nugent gave violent expression of his feelings toward the Governor. He called him a liar and an ingrate, with elaborate oratorical and vituperative trimmings. I was at Sea Girt the following Sunday. It occurred to me that the extreme indignity offered to the Governor of New Jersey was ample reason for the deposition of Mr. Nugent. Furthermore, it would demonstrate to the country the character, at least, of that part of the opposition to Mr. Wilson. The Governor, his Secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and I, went into conference in the library and laid out a plan by which we could get sufficient votes from the State Committee to depose Nugent. The key to the situation seemed to be Edward E. Grosscup, who up to that time had Smith-Nugent leanings. We succeeded in capturing Mr. Grosscup and had the votes. A meeting was called and Mr. Nugent was deposed. It is not necessary to state that due publicity was given to this incident, not only through the newspapers, but by very wide circulation through our clipping sheets in New York. In a very large degree I have always considered that those unhappy remarks of Mr. Nugent nullified the previous Smith incident. In addition to the impropriety of the matter, the political desirability of it was patent.

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Up to the time of this incident there was no Wilson organization for the Presidency in New Jersey or outside of it, except what was being done from 42 Broadway, and what I was doing myself. The Jersey Democratic organization, having fasted for many years under Republican rule, was very busy getting accustomed to a Democratic Governor and a Democratic régime, and the proper distribution of Democratic patronage.

III

McCOMBS IN COMMAND

BEGS WILSON TO HELP HIMSELF—WILSON REPLIES: "SEE HUDSPETH"!—HUDSPETH "TOO BUSY"—HARMON "LOGICAL" NOMINEE—McCOMBS AIMS TO DEFEAT HIM, CLARK, UNDERWOOD, AND BRYAN—WILSON PEEVISH ABOUT SPEAKING WHEN REVOLT FACES HIM IN HIS OWN STATE—PENNSYLVANIA AND WEST VIRGINIA AMONG FIRST STATES CAPTURED—BUT PENNSYLVANIA WAVERS BECAUSE OF WILSON'S "RALICALISM".

IN SEPTEMBER of 1911, feeling that the drain on my time and my resources was too great, I went to see Governor Wilson. I asked him if he could not suggest a group of New Jersey men to handle his campaign in conjunction with myself. My contention was, that handling a campaign, and financing it at the same time, was too much of a drain for any man to stand. He made the suggestion that Robert S. Hudspeth, National Committeeman from New Jersey, whom he had weaned away from the Smith forces by a very adroit letter, might be of assistance.

I invited Judge Hudspeth to come to luncheon with me. He expressed great admiration for the Governor, but told me that he had a large practice and clients who drew on his time so steadily that he could not give

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any continuous effort to it. I went again to Governor Wilson and asked him for other suggestions, but could get none. As a matter of fact, the New Jersey Democracy was then coming out of a state of atrophy and was not the virile, wide-awake organization that it subsequently became.

About this time, through Judge Ball of Delaware, I was able to make the acquaintance and friendship of a man who turned out to be one of the ablest and most consistent supporters of the Wilson propoganda—Willard Saulsbury, afterward United States Senator. Mr. Saulsbury had a very large experience in Delaware politics, chiefly in fighting the dominant organization down there, led by Andrew Gray. Mr. Saulsbury had been ambitious for office, but, as he contended, his aspirations as a Democrat had been impossible for a long time, because Delaware had become a pocket borough of the Republican Party. I knew Mr. Saulsbury to be a lawyer of very great ability, who through his many years of political struggle had become a resourceful and indomitable fighter.

Upon meeting Mr. Saulsbury I suggested that he and Judge Ball, who was a Princeton man, go to Princeton, and meet Governor Wilson, whose residence was there during his entire term as Governor. Mr. Saulsbury, at once, saw possibilities in Mr. Wilson. Upon his return to Wilmington, he wrote me to the effect that, in his judgment, Mr. Wilson was the man for President, and enclosed an exceedingly welcome contribution. The resources of the campaign at

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that time, as they had been before and subsequently, were always exceedingly in doubt.

About the same time I met Jerry B. Sullivan of Iowa, one of the Democratic leaders of the state, but a member of the minority wing of his party. I had previously found out that Judge Martin J. Wade and the State Chairman were not inclined to favor Mr. Wilson's cause for the standard reasons that had been alleged against him. It became apparent to me, therefore, that I must take the minority wing of the party and do the best I could with it. Mr. Sullivan put me in touch with the leaders of his wing of the party, and I won a very valuable ally in Louis Murphy, the editor of an influential Democratic paper.

The usual process of taking Mr. Sullivan to see the Governor was carried through. Mr. Sullivan was very much attracted to Mr. Wilson and promised his support. I did not know then, as I knew later, the very great advantage which the dominant organization in the state had, regardless of its character. However, had I known it, I should have been compelled to take up the minority cause, if for no other reason than that I could not get the majority. The minority would, at least, be most helpful in the circulation of literature concerning Mr. Wilson and creating popular sentiment in his behalf.

No headquarters had hitherto been opened by either of the respective candidates for the Presidency, except for Governor Wilson and Governor Harmon. Up to the time that headquarters were opened for Governor Wilson, except for sporadic statements here and there,

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it was generally admitted that Governor Harmon was the logical nominee for the Presidency. Governor Harmon had a long and distinguished public career. He had been a member of Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet; he had won two successive contests for the Governorship of Ohio; he was respected throughout the country. The feeling was, that Mr. Bryan should not receive the nomination in 1912 at least.

Governor Harmon had the conservative strength of the country behind him. But for the entry of Mr. Wilson, I have no doubt that Harmon would have been nominated in Baltimore in 1912, practically by default, with the possible opposition of the Bryan wing of the party. No doubt this would have proved ineffectual because of the steady opposition of the great states of the East and the Middle West to Bryan's candidacy. The nomination, at least, would have been similar to that of Mr. Parker at St. Louis in 1904, with a more united and inspirited party behind him, consequent upon the success of the party in 1910 in the lower House and its necessary strengthening.

The first victory for Mr. Wilson was in Pennsylvania. There were two factions,—the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh factions. The Philadelphia faction was supposed to be affiliated with Joseph M. Guffey. A. Mitchell Palmer, of Stroudsburg, and Vance McCormick were the leaders of that branch of the party in the rest of the state. Their branch was in the ascendancy.

Mr. Wilson's achievements had been spread in Pennsylvania very carefully. Each faction of the

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party became anxious to steal a march on the other. By a fortunate chance, both factions endorsed him. If any doubt had existed on either side, and if the tactical play of the situation had varied in the slightest degree, I seriously question whether either of them would have given the endorsement. However, it stood, and it gave us a splendid leverage for the rest of the country.

The October primaries for the nomination of the members of the Senate and Assembly in New Jersey were rapidly approaching. The Smith-Nugent forces in Essex County began operations for the control of both branches of the Legislature or to secure for their leaders a veto power in these two bodies. Essex County alone, if Smith and Nugent prevailed there, could bring about this chance and compel a recognition of their power.

The County of Essex is the second largest county in the State of New Jersey and is entitled to eleven members of the lower House. Of the Senators it has one. Mr. Wilson's prestige was in the balance. The question arose as to whether opposition nominees should run in the primaries and whether the Governor should speak in Essex County. I was strongly of the opinion that opposition nominations should be made for the effect upon the rest of the state, and that the Governor should speak at the same time in Newark.

The nominations were made. At the last moment Governor Wilson refused to speak in Essex County, although he spoke in the rest of the state — so deep was his disgust with Senator Smith. The refusal

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struck me as very bad policy and exhibited a certain degree of pettishness.

At this time, also, New York and other places were called upon for speakers. It was most difficult to get Democratic speakers for New Jersey because the average speaker from other states occupied a potential position in his party, and he did not feel like going into New Jersey because of an implied endorsement of Governor Wilson. Some member of the organization, in Hudson County, suggested Dudley Field Malone for an Irish meeting. I had never met Mr. Malone. I called him up. He was a young, likeable sort of chap, who had a good amount of rhetoric and could stir a crowd. After I had talked to him he expressed his willingness to go. I sent him over. He made a number of speeches, meeting Governor Wilson on several occasions. Senator James E. Martine came back to the state and campaigned.

The result of the primary was what might have been logically expected. Had Governor Wilson gone into Essex County, he might have saved two or three nominations there. It was further clear that, whatever the result of the elections might be, Mr. Wilson had lost absolute mastery of the Senate and House and that his programme must consequently be shortened. This, however, was not an unmixed misfortune. The really constructive measures that were necessary for the welfare of the state had been passed in the previous session. Only bills of minor importance were necessary in the subsequent session.

The primary incident was used with some effect over

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the country, as an argument that the Democracy had repudiated Governor Wilson. But the edge of it had been turned and its influence was more or less transitory. We kept the press bureau very busy sending out the clipping sheets and explanations.

By this time letters from individuals all over the country came in torrents. By January 1, 1912, we had two hundred and forty thousand personal correspondents.

About the fourth of November, 1911, an event of passing importance arose which compelled me to shift my forces considerably. The leading publicity man had been following a policy of self-exploitation. He was in communication with people in various states who not only could not do our cause any good, but did it positive harm. Funds which I intrusted to him for Headquarters' purposes had been so mixed up that his milk bills became confused with our printing bills. In casting about for a new head of publicity, I asked the recommendation of Mr. McAdoo, knowing that he was an artist of artists in procuring publicity. He recommended to me his confidential publicity man, Byron R. Newton. I looked up Mr. Newton's record and had some slight misgivings. However, I took him on. Meanwhile, I increased the publicity force at 42 Broadway very largely, in order to meet the increased requirements of the circulation of publicity. The demands were so great that we increased the frequency of the publicity sheet and began a correspondence upon a more wholesale principle. I, myself, was in constant conference with people from all over the

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country. I usually dictated political correspondence from eight at night until two in the morning.

During November, I first met Colonel John T. McGraw, of Grafton, West Virginia, a member of the National Committee and well seasoned in Democratic politics. Like Mr. Saulsbury, Mr. McGraw had distinctly had his ups and downs in politics. He was an able, alert, and ambitious man with an unusual knowledge of current events. McGraw was of the poetic, temperamental class of Irishmen, always ready for a fight.

His business brought him frequently to New York, and I always took occasion to have breakfast with him at the Holland House and talk Wilson. Mr. McGraw, as a result of the Watson-Chilton election to the Senatorship, to one of the places for which he was an aspirant, had rather fallen into the minority in West Virginia. But his influence in the National Committee was large. That was a body in which Mr. Wilson was very notably weak. He knew no one in it. None of his friends had any association with them. Finally, I brought Mr. McGraw in contact with Mr. Wilson. They discussed issues delightfully, and never party politics. Subsequently, Mr. McGraw agreed to join me. A warm friendship sprang up between us and I acquired a charming and effective associate.

During the latter part of 1911, two other names began to be mentioned for the Presidency,— Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Oscar Underwood, of Alabama, Leader of the Democratic majority in the House. Mr. Clark's

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candidacy was not regarded very seriously at this time. Mr. Underwood's strength was greater. He had been a leader in enacting the Democratic Tariff Bill in the lower House, was regarded as a remarkably sane man and an efficient general in commanding the forces of that House. Both had had long experience in Congress, were thoroughly familiar with the problems before the country, and had a very broad political acquaintance. In the East and in the conservative states of the South, Mr. Underwood was particularly strong.

Before January, it may be said that as far as the East was concerned Mr. Underwood was decidedly the favorite, second to Mr. Harmon. Mr. Wilson's strength was concentrated in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The leaders of the latter state were becoming somewhat uncomfortable, and were beginning to regret their endorsement because of the general charge of radicalism against Mr. Wilson, and what I have called the standard reasons which had been set forth against him.

IV

WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY

DISOWNS COLONEL HARVEY, EDITOR OF HARPER'S WEEKLY — THE COLONEL CEASES TO SUPPORT GOVERNOR'S CANDIDACY — MCCOMBS FAILS TO PATCH UP WILSON'S QUARREL WITH HARVEY AND COLONEL WATTERSON — WATTERSON DENOUNCES WILSON AS INGRATE AND AUTOCRAT — HE BEFRIENDS HARVEY — MCCOMBS DEFENDS WILSON, BUT REGARDS THE DISPUTE AS VERY INJURIOUS TO THE WILSON CANDIDACY — WILSON SCOFFS AT THIS.

IN OCTOBER, 1911, I learned that Colonel Henry Watterson, of Louisville, was in New York and called on him personally at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Colonel Watterson had been supporting Mr. Wilson's candidacy. In addition to his political feeling in the matter, he had a sort of family connection. I found Colonel Watterson very delightful, as usual, and simply overflowing with political information. Then it was that I told him of the nature of contributions which I was getting, and the fact that the amount of money coming in was very limited.

Colonel Watterson suggested that his friend, Thomas F. Ryan, might take a financial interest in the campaign. He told me that Mr. Ryan was practically retired from public life; that he had no inter-

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ests to conserve, and that one of the wishes of his life was to see a Democrat elected. He argued, earnestly, the necessity of considerable sums of money for the campaign, and offered to go to Mr. Ryan and talk to him about it.

I replied that everything he said about Mr. Ryan was probably true; indeed, that I believed it to be true; but that some time the question of the contribution might come up and that, regardless of Mr. Ryan's personal character, I believed that the public had formed an unfavorable opinion, and that Mr. Ryan's contribution would be of injury to our cause. Colonel Watterson was undoubtedly a little irritated with me, and at what he considered my amateurish attitude. Nevertheless, I deemed it expedient to stand by my judgment.

All of this time, Colonel George Harvey, who had been of such tremendous assistance in procuring the nomination and furthering the election of Mr. Wilson for Governor, had been supporting him consistently and ably for the Democratic Presidential nomination. Of all the men in public life or semi-public life in America, I have regarded Colonel Harvey in the front rank. His power of analysis and of expression is not exceeded by any writer in America. He had gone through one or two Presidential campaigns, being at one time William C. Whitney's chief lieutenant. I thought the support of *Harper's Weekly*, which he was editing, of great value. In any event, it was to my mind not in the least injurious. I was glad to have its support. But Colonel Harvey's paper was sup-

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posed to be dominated by the Morgan interests,— a fact which I did not and do not believe, because the financial interests of New York were unquestionably opposed to Mr. Wilson. Notwithstanding that fact, Colonel Harvey's support was consistent and continuous.

On December 18, 1911, Governor Wilson came to New York. He met Colonel Watterson, then editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, and Colonel Harvey at the Manhattan Club. Much has been written and said of the Harvey-Watterson-Wilson episode. I think this is the correct gist of it all:

Mr. Wilson was coming to see me. On his way, he dropped into Colonel Watterson's apartment at the Manhattan Club. There he found Colonel Harvey.

Harvey had, for a long time, written articles and printed letters from various people supporting Mr. Wilson for the nomination. The purpose of the meeting was a discussion of the general situation. It did not go along smoothly. The Governor had evidently conceived the idea that the support of *Harper's Weekly*, the bonds of which were supposed to be owned by Mr. J. P. Morgan, was not helping him.

Colonel Harvey had heard of this. He said toward the close of the meeting: "Governor Wilson, I want to know whether you consider that the support of *Harper's Weekly* is injurious to you."

The Governor bluntly answered: "I think it is", and immediately left the room.

That set Colonel Watterson on fire. Colonel Harvey, naturally, was indignant.

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Governor Wilson came immediately to my apartment, and at the end of the discussion casually said: "I think I may have offended George Harvey a little to-day, when I told him that the support of his paper was injurious to me". He was about to dismiss the subject, when I said:

"Governor, I am amazed! Our strings already are pretty weak. We need help in all directions. While Harvey's paper, itself, may not be especially helpful to you because of its limited circulation, I do not think that it is injuring you a bit. 'And it is now highly important that we keep every friend we have'".

"Oh"! he said, "I don't think it makes much difference".

Within a few days I was informed from Charlotte, N. C., that Colonel Watterson had, in a conference, violently commented on the event and the dismissal of George Harvey, his friend.

The Colonel intended, through the *Courier-Journal*, to set out his opinions of Wilson and renounce Wilson forever. Meanwhile, I had heard that Colonel Harvey intended to take down the flag from the foremast of the Wilson campaign.

I immediately went over to Princeton and told Governor Wilson what Harvey intended to do. The late Mrs. Wilson, a very sweet and emotional woman, burst into tears. The Governor was ashen pale. He finally asked me if I could get hold of Harvey and straighten it out. There was deep snow on the ground. It was impossible to travel that night. Therefore, I

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used the telephone to Deal, N. J., where Colonel Harvey resided.

I told Colonel Harvey's secretary that I wanted to see the Colonel at once to make a complete explanation and retraction in the case of his controversy with Governor Wilson. I told him I wanted to talk on the telephone with Colonel Harvey, and that Governor Wilson also wanted to talk.

I was informed Colonel Harvey was very hoarse and out of voice. The next day I made the same attempt. I was told by the secretary that Colonel Harvey was still hoarser, and was not permitted to speak to anyone. I knew the game was up.

I was astounded at Governor Wilson's attitude. From a political point of view, I thought he had made a mistake. He had certainly committed an error from a personal point of view, for I could see, in the incident, all of the indications of a tremendous cry of ingratitude, especially so far as Colonel Harvey was concerned. For, be it remembered, that as far back as 1906 Colonel Harvey had spoken in impassioned terms of the availability of Mr. Wilson for the Presidency. This was four years before he was even nominated for Governor of New Jersey.

The impelling reason for Governor Wilson making this statement to Colonel Harvey and Colonel Waterson was, that some letters had been received from the West making pointed inquiry as to whether Colonel Harvey's support was not Wall Street support. Statements were made in some Western newspapers that this meant Wall Street support. I saw

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the letters and the clippings, and they did not impress me very much. They made Governor Wilson, however, very restive and very nervous. It was impossible to tell what would come out of the situation. I trusted to Colonel Harvey's reticence and discretion. I felt, however, that Colonel Watterson was likely to feel the matter very deeply and that it would not be long before we would hear from him, as we did.

I got hold of what Harvey was going to print in *Harper's Weekly* about the affair. It was very dignified and very conclusive. Here it is under date of January 17, 1912:

"TO OUR READERS:

"We make the following reply to many inquiries from the readers of *Harper's Weekly*:

"The name of Woodrow Wilson, as our candidate for President, was taken down from the head of these columns in response to a statement made to us directly by Governor Wilson, to the effect that our support was affecting his candidacy injuriously.

"The only course left open to us, in simple fairness to Mr. Wilson, no less than in consideration of our own self-respect, was to cease to advocate his nomination.

"We make this explanation with great reluctance and the deepest regret. But we cannot escape the conclusion that the very considerable number of our readers, who have co-operated earnestly and loyally in advancing a movement which was inaugurated solely

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in the hope of rendering a high public service, are clearly entitled to this information”.

This incident produced a distinct shock all over the country. I went to Washington at once and conferred with Senator Gore, Representative Hughes and Thomas J. Pence.

January 18, 1912, the expected statement from Colonel Watterson appeared in all the papers. It was peculiarly Wattersonian. Its sentiment was most difficult to overcome. The only way to answer it was to analyze it. This my confreres and I did.

Colonel Watterson wrote:

“Regretting that I must appear either as a witness or a party to the misunderstanding that has arisen between Colonel George Harvey and Governor Woodrow Wilson, I shall have to speak with some particularity in order to be just, alike to the public and the principals.

“The conference between us, in our apartment at the Manhattan Club, was held to consider certain practical measures relating to Governor Wilson’s candidacy. Colonel Harvey stood toward Governor Wilson much as I had stood five and thirty years ago toward Mr. Tilden. This appealed to me. Colonel Harvey had brought the Governor and myself together in his New Jersey home eighteen months ago, and as time passed, had interested me in his ambitions.

“I was hoping that I might find in Governor Wilson another Tilden, in point of intellect and availability. I yet think that Colonel Harvey made no mistake in

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his choice; but the circumstances leading to the unfortunate parting of the ways between them leads me to doubt whether in character or temperament,—it may be merely in the habits of a life time,—Governor Wilson is rather a schoolmaster than a statesman.

“I have from Colonel Harvey and Governor Wilson statements according to the memory of each, touching what did actually happen, and what was spoken on the occasion named. These do not materially differ. They coincide with my own recollection. Nothing of a discourteous kind, even of an unfriendly kind, passed during the interview of over an hour.

“From the first, however, there was a certain constraint in Governor Wilson’s manner, the absence of the cordiality and candor which should mark hearty, confidential intercourse, intimating the existence of some adverse influence. His manner was autocratic, if not tyrannous.

“I did not take this to myself, but thought it related to Colonel Harvey; and when Colonel Harvey, apparently overcome by Governor Wilson’s austerity, put the direct question to Governor Wilson, whether the support of *Harper’s Weekly* was doing him an injury, and received from Governor Wilson the cold rejoinder that it was, I was both surprised and shocked.

“I had myself, as far back as last October, suggested to Governor Wilson, that in view of his supposed environment, it might be well for Colonel Harvey to moderate somewhat of the rather aggressive character of *Harper’s Weekly* in the Wilson leadership. I am

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not sure that I had not said as much to Colonel Harvey. But that Governor Wilson, without the least show of compunction, should express or yield to such an opinion, and permit Colonel Harvey to consider himself discharged from the position of trusted intimacy he had up to this moment held, left me little room to doubt that Governor Wilson is not a man who makes common cause with his political associates or is deeply sensible of his political obligations. Because, it is but true and fair to say, that, except for Colonel Harvey, he would not be in the running at all.

“Colonel Harvey was grievously wounded. He had been fighting Governor Wilson’s battles for many years, and had idealized his chief. Although I was given no reason to suppose myself included in the disfavor which had fallen upon Colonel Harvey, I experienced a sense of something very much like indignation. But on reflection, I could not rid myself of the impression that Governor Wilson had been receiving letters from Kentucky written by enemies of mine, who seek to use his name and fame to gain some ends of their own, warning him against me and that to all intents, I sat in the same boat with Colonel Harvey.

“I am in receipt of Governor Wilson’s averment to the contrary. I wish this had reached me earlier. I have, during three weeks of newspaper importunity, refused to print a word upon the subject, in the hope that no publicity might be required, and that some understanding could be reached. I have reason to believe that Colonel Harvey withheld his statement for the same cause, and with the same hope. It being

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no longer possible to suppress the matters at issue, this full statement which I make most reluctantly, seems needful to a full and impartial knowledge by the general public, but more especially by the mass and body of Democrats who are so earnestly seeking a leader in this coming contest."

On the 19th day of January, I made the following reply to Colonel Watterson:

"With reference to the alleged Wilson-Harvey incident, it seems to me, that Colonel Watterson has said, in a statement, all that needs to be said. It appears, therefore, that as far back as last October, he himself suggested to Governor Wilson that Colonel Harvey's support through *Harper's Weekly* might be injurious, and that he probably told Colonel Harvey himself the same thing. It would seem that Colonel Watterson had convinced the Governor of the truth of his opinion, and had at least impressed Colonel Harvey with the probability of its truth. Else, Colonel Harvey would not have propounded the question".

"It is passing strange that Colonel Watterson should feel concerned that the Governor, in private conversation with himself and Colonel Harvey, should, in answer to a pointed question, give frank expression to the very views that Colonel Watterson himself entertained, and which he communicated to the Governor, and probably to Colonel Harvey. In October last, also the very month in which he made these suggestions to Governor Wilson, Colonel Watterson said in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, editorially:

"Two things seem tolerably sure to the surmise of

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
the *COURIER-JOURNAL* — if Woodrow Wilson is nominated for President, it will be through the force of an irresistible pressure of public opinion. And if he is defeated for the nomination, it will be by some organized agency well backed with money. No Democrat of modern times has come into the running — Samuel J. Tilden alone excepted — with half at once of the equipment and the claim of the New Jersey Governor.

“The tears that are being shed over the passing incident are wrung from those who have hitherto been the most conspicuous opponents of Governor Wilson. Witness the frequent quoted statement of Mayor Dahlmann of Omaha, Nebraska, who has for months, not only been openly opposed to Governor Wilson, but who has been the aggressive champion of another candidate (Bryan). The same applies to others who have indulged in lachrymose expressions. This, of course, is to be expected, whenever any man develops a decided lead for the nomination.

“The gist of the issue, as I see it, is whether one friend, in private conversation with another, should, in answer to a plain question, resort to flattery or dissimulation, or whether he should state the truth as he sees it.’ ”

The Governor had asked me to answer the effusions as they came out, and I did, as stated. The statements were given out to the newspapers. I immediately went down in the lobby of the hotel, at Washington, and to my surprise saw Colonel Watterson reading the statements. In order to show that there was no personal animosity in the matter I extended my hand.

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WATSON



HENRY WATTERSON

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He shifted the statements from his right hand to his left and we both shook hands, I must say, rather grimly, but politely, and I left him. The next day, as I recall, Colonel Watterson said he had nothing more to say until he was challenged by some responsible person.

In the latter part of August, 1913, upon my arrival in Paris, I learned that Colonel Watterson was there. I went to his hotel. I sent up my card. The Colonel came down stairs. Instead of shaking hands, he embraced me and said: "There is no feeling between us, my boy, is there"? "No, Colonel. There never was", I replied. We spent two very delightful days together. I remember the Colonel saying to me: "My boy, don't stay here in France. You will be too far from your friends".

Let me say something here also about George Harvey. His whims may lead him into many exaggerated positions, but he is a man's kind of a fighter, and not afraid of his convictions.

When I got back to the campaign after a brief illness in September, 1912, I called up George Harvey, and I told him that I wanted him to draw a curtain before that part of his mind that related to any acrimony or bitterness toward Wilson, and to come in and help me make the first Democratic President of the United States in twenty years. This was not a time for any man who had ever been any kind of a Democrat not to "come up into the color", as they say in the West. Harvey, immediately, and at his own cost, took a suite of rooms at the Waldorf, and devised much

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helpful publicity, or suggestions for publicity, which I would pass along to Josephus Daniels. He was incognito, but effective.

I cannot write this book without an aversion to the facts in the case of Harvey. Afterwards, he went many ways and expressed in his journal most ably written, intense opposition to the President's views. I disagreed with many of them. I told him often that he chased rabbits on occasions, and made them look like lions. But on the whole, his helpful criticism of Mr. Wilson's two administrations was the boldest, the most trenchant, the most direct of any expressions printed or oral, even including the opposition in the Senate and the House.

But Mr. Wilson, by nature, cannot brook opposition. He has a fear of strong men. He would rather let himself be reflected in weak men who would do his bidding, and flatterers who were about him for personal gain. So overboard went George Harvey. He might as well have made up his mind the day of the election of Mr. Wilson, as Governor, that he was through.

If George Harvey had wished to be United States Senator from New Jersey (and I am told there was some little feeling between him and James Smith, Jr., on that point), he would have been more brutally treated than Smith, because Smith had still the control of the organized Democracy of the state.

V

ENTER COLONEL HOUSE

"WILSON IMPOSSIBLE; NAME BRYAN OR CULBERSON AND YOU AND I WILL CONTROL THE UNITED STATES", SAYS THE COLONEL TO McCOMBS — COLONEL SHIES AT REQUEST FOR MONEY — VIEWS WILSON NOMINATION FROM LONDON — WATTERSON CALLS FOR "A COURT OF HONOR" — PENFIELD'S \$10,000 — SENATOR GORE PROVES TO BE A FRIEND.

SENATOR BENJAMIN TILLMAN and Colonel Watterson later took up the cudgels in the Wilson-Harvey quarrel. Colonel Watterson offered to refer the whole of the facts in the matter to a Court of Honor, especially the financial side of it.

I had a perfectly definite idea to what Colonel Watterson was referring.

In December, 1911, Mr. Josiah Quincy, of Boston, who had been a warm admirer and consistent supporter of Governor Wilson, told me that his friend, Frederic C. Penfield, afterward Ambassador to Austria, might become actively interested in Mr. Wilson. Mr. Penfield had received an honorary degree from Princeton, had had diplomatic experience in Egypt, had been an author on various diplomatic subjects, was a gentleman of leisure, except for occasional writing, and was a man of means. Mr. Penfield also had experience in

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one of the Cleveland campaigns, in the Publicity Department.

Mr. Quincy suggested that I should meet Mr. Penfield. I was very glad to do so. Later we had a very pleasant luncheon at the New York Yacht Club. At that time I argued the merits and political potentialities of our candidate. It was evident that Mr. Penfield was impressed. At this luncheon the question of contributions was in no way mentioned nor the rewards for any support that might be given.

On January 6, 1912, a mass meeting was to be held in Carnegie Hall for the purpose of advocating the abrogation of the Russian Treaty. Before that time I met Mr. Penfield again. He suggested that he would like to renew his acquaintance with Mr. Wilson. He also suggested the propriety of inviting the Governor to dine with him prior to going to the meeting. He asked if I would call up Mr. Wilson to inquire if it would be agreeable before Mr. Penfield extended the invitation.

I communicated with the Governor. I told him of Mr. Penfield's potentialities. He accepted Mr. Penfield's invitation to dine.

The dinner was most successful. Mr. Penfield proved an excellent host and Mrs. Penfield a charming hostess. Those present at the dinner were Governor Wilson, Colonel Watterson, Commodore E. C. Benedict, one of the closest personal friends of former President Grover Cleveland, Mr. Quincy, and myself. Governor Wilson was in high fettle and delighted the whole dinner party with his admirable stories.

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We proceeded to Carnegie Hall. I had labored with him exceedingly to go there at all. Governor Wilson made a remarkable speech, but when he got on his feet I could see that he was glad he was there, and, being familiar with his moods, I could tell that he was going to make a tremendous impression.

After the speaking was over, Mr. Penfield took me aside and handed me an envelope, telling me nothing of what was in it. I took it quite casually, thinking that it might be a note of some sort. He suggested that I might be tired and that it would be best to open it next morning. As I was having breakfast in my apartment, I opened the innocent-looking envelope and found two checks of \$5,000 each. He called me up that day and said:

“I should like to help actively, but I must go to Europe. I gave you the envelope last night to employ as good a man as I am to assist you”.

This was indeed a tremendous relief, as my finances were becoming very slim. I had no assurance that I would be able to meet even my weekly payroll.

Colonel Watterson and Mr. Quincy, I found, had talked over the matter of the contribution with Mr. Penfield. Colonel Watterson, with some reason, thought that he induced the giving of the subscription. Upon Colonel Watterson suggesting the Court of Honor, I would have at once made a public statement demanding it. But I knew that Mr. Quincy had been actively interested. My reason for not demanding it was this:

Shortly after the Penfield dinner, Mr. Quincy, who

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was of counsel to some mining companies, was indicted for fraudulent use of the mails. As soon as the indictment was handed down, Mr. Quincy immediately came to me and went over the whole matter. I was perfectly assured of his innocence. Nevertheless, the indictment stood. Unfortunately, an indictment against a man often has as much effect, so far as reputation and standing in the community are concerned, as if he were actually convicted.

Mr. Quincy was subsequently thoroughly vindicated in the Courts.

This incident, in itself, should be the most conspicuous warning to district attorneys not to recommend indictments to grand juries unless they are more than morally certain of a conviction. Reputations of innocent and honest men have been blasted wholesale by the overzeal of prosecuting officers who, under the law, are distinctly quasi-judicial officials. But under the circumstances, we could not embrace the opportunity of going before the Court of Honor.

I have a very deep affection for Colonel Watterson, and I could not but think that this was one of the lapses which any man of thorough integrity and sound judgment is likely to fall into on occasions of stress.

But let me revert to an interesting and very difficult event of December.

As is well known, Mr. Carnegie created a trust some years ago, among the provisions of which was, that any teacher in our American colleges who had performed a service of twenty-five years, automatically, upon retirement, should receive from the fund a

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certain fixed sum. Mr. Wilson had retired from his Professorship at Princeton in the autumn of 1910 and had completed twenty-five years of service. Almost immediately upon his retirement he applied for the pension allowance, which was \$3,000 a year.

The papers first exploited this matter about the 10th of December, 1911, and also the fact that it had been disallowed by the Trustees of the fund. An explanation of the matter was very difficult to make. It could only be upon the grounds that Mr. Wilson was not a man of large means; that he had a family to support, and that his salary as Governor would hardly meet the ordinary requirements of living in his new position.

But the fact remained that the pension was to be granted by Mr. Carnegie; that Mr. Carnegie was a man of great wealth, derived from the manufacture of steel, and presented elements of the great play upon the Homestead strikes, and upon Mr. Wilson's connection with capital. It was indeed a blow. The only thing to do with it was to let it rest where it was, with the probability that it would blow over. The inspiration of the attack was well known to me. But an attack is never overbalanced by fact. The circulation of the incident became nation-wide and drove many people from the Wilson cause.

Along in December, 1911, the psychological time seemed to have arrived for a public appearance of Governor Wilson upon one of the issues brought out before the people. The Payne-Aldrich Bill was a piece of patchwork and had aroused the resentment of

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a large part of the American people. The back of the Taft Administration had been broken by the passage of that Act. Mr. Taft's political future was ruined by his signature to the Bill. At that time I was a Governor of the National Democratic Club, so I got in touch with my friend, John R. Dunlap, who was also a Governor of the Club, and arranged that an invitation be extended to Mr. Wilson to speak on the Payne-Aldrich Act on January 3, 1912. I urged him to prepare his speech in advance and get it out several days before the event so that I might give it to the Associated Press. Governor Wilson always had a horror of preparing formal speeches to be sent to the press associations far enough in advance to get country-wide circulation. This objection was the continual exasperation of our headquarters. I knew that compliance with the idea meant a large publicity, free of charge; and that non-compliance meant a slight publicity and an added expense to our Bureau to get publicity by private circulation.

On this occasion he prepared a very scholarly address and gave it to the Publicity Department in ample time. My secretary went to the meeting to see what changes should be made if he altered the speech. To our surprise, Governor Wilson delivered a speech totally different from the one he had prepared, but on the whole far more masterly. After its delivery, there was no doubt on the soundness of his attitude on the tariff from the point of view of the Democratic Party. I instructed our headquarters that a large number of

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the speeches be printed for circulation throughout the country.

Shortly before this meeting I was, as usual, casting about for contributions to the campaign, a matter that constantly worried me, because I had no fixed source or sources of supply.

I had gotten in touch through correspondence with Thomas Love, of Texas, and had broached the question to him of his getting some funds in Texas to carry on the work. He wrote to me that they would probably have difficulty in Texas itself in financing the campaign for Governor Wilson, but that a Texan resided in New York at the Gotham Hotel who might espouse our cause. At that time the Texan was supposed to be for Mayor Gaynor. If I could bring him around to the Wilson support, Love thought I would undoubtedly get a contribution.

This man was Colonel E. M. House. Because Colonel House became so prominent in the Wilson Administration, I shall digress and tell a little about him. Next to the President of the United States, I doubt if anyone has been more inquired about as to who he was, and when he was, and where he was, than Colonel E. M. House, of Texas.

Colonel House was the son of an Englishman who went to Texas to reside. He took out citizenship papers and made his children citizens of the United States. House's activities seem to have been in banking in Austin and in the purchase of various tracts of land in Texas. Colonel House was always a weak man physically and never engaged in any apparent

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occupation. He went to Cornell, but did not finish with his class, which would have been the class of '91.

He had few associates and was very reticent, taking very little interest in the social life of his city. He did, however, invite the Governors and other officials to his home and the more important professors of the University. Nobody ever knew him as being active in anything in Austin, although he looked after his farm and his tenants. After he returned from Cornell he spent part of the year in Austin, most of the year in New York, and the rest of the year along the New England coast. In New York he spent a quiet, studious kind of life, almost alone.

After we had made arrangements for the Texas campaign in the primaries, I was told by Colonel T. H. Ball to see a Colonel House, at the Gotham Hotel, New York City. The Texas people who were for Mr. Wilson, and who had charge of the organization down there, said, when I asked if they could not produce further funds to move into some of the other primary states, such as Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin and Nebraska, that they had reached the limit of their contributive power. They stated, however, that there was a Colonel House living at the Gotham who had a substantial income. If I could enlist him in the Wilson cause he might give me some money.

At that time I did not know where to turn for funds, and as we were in dire need, on Colonel Ball's information I called House up, addressing him as Colonel and asked for an interview. The meeting was arranged.

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I dropped into the Gotham Hotel one afternoon in November, 1911, and made myself known as the manager of Mr. Wilson's campaign.

I found a quiet little man with strange cat-like eyes, a broad forehead and a thin face.

He spoke in particularly low manner, almost as one would speak to another in a cathedral. A number of books lay upon his table. There were novels, books on current events, books on essays and books on psychology. Colonel House presented the appearance of a dilettante, passing his life in the calmness of his apartment, not caring anything about matters of particular importance. When he saluted me he had a novel in his hand.

We sat down and looked at each other rather quizzically. He seemed to be timidity itself. He almost obsequiously offered me a cigar. He took a cigarette. His appearance was that of a poor debtor who was trying to think up some impossible excuse for not paying a bill long overdue. Somehow, it ran through my mind, that he knew I was coming after money. I also thought that his excuse would be that he was too poor. I tried to set the little man at ease in the best way I could.

We had discussed mutual acquaintances in Texas for awhile. And only after about twenty minutes of desultory conversation, we got on the Presidential matter. He said he had not thought much about that, but that from the papers it seemed that Mayor William J. Gaynor, of New York, and Jesse I. Grant, of California, might well turn out to be the candidates for

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President and Vice President, respectively. He claimed no particular enthusiasm about either. I, however, having a very practical purpose in mind, continued to hold House to Woodrow Wilson and the reasons why he should be nominated and could be elected.

I told him of his friends in Texas who had avowed themselves for Governor Wilson and repeated my oft-spoken argument as to Governor Wilson's availability. After about an hour I realized that I had another engagement and told him I would drop in some other time.

The conversation ended without reaching any conclusion. I went away with the impression that I had met a little man of ill health who spent most of his time trying to cling to life and some of its pleasures, and who was quite willing to subordinate everything to this. He did not impress me as a man having any particular notions, and certainly no executive ability. He seemed to take his grasp of things merely from current reading. His views of men were such as one gained as they passed by on Fifth Avenue. I certainly concluded that there was not much in House, but I still had in my mind that the Wilson campaign was bankrupt.

In two or three days I went back. I said to him that I would very much like to have him meet Governor Wilson. He gladly assented. Meanwhile, I made inquiries about him in Texas. My reports were that he was a man worth something more than a million dollars; that he had virtually retired from business; that he had taken a silent part in politics in Texas for

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many years, and that he was usually to be found with the winner.

I have said that I called him Colonel. He protested and told me that he had never liked the title inasmuch as he had merely been on the staff of one of the Governors of Texas. But I must confess that my mind was on Mr. House's contribution rather than on Mr. House as a political factor.

Soon after that, Governor Wilson was in town. I volunteered to take him to call on Mr. House. The conversation on this visit was very pleasant. Later on I dined with Mr. House and told him of the proposed meeting of January 3d. He suggested that Mr. David Houston, afterward Secretary of Agriculture, be brought into conference with Mr. Wilson on the subject of the Tariff. This was arranged at the meeting at which Mr. House and myself were present, in addition to Mr. Houston and Governor Wilson.

Inasmuch as Texas had forty votes at the Convention and its psychological influence would be great on the states bordering upon it, I had decided to make a very determined set for the delegates there. Mr. House was spending the winter in New York and I frequently conferred with him upon that situation. The actual leaders in the movement in Texas were Cato Sells, now Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mr. Love and Mr. Thomas Ball. It appealed to me that Mr. House keep me thoroughly advised as to the personnel of Texas politics and rather guide me in making suggestions. This was his participation in the Pre-nomination Campaign.

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Early in May, 1912, I motored with Mr. House to his country place at Beverly, Mass. He was going to Europe within a week. I remained with him two or three days and discussed the situation. As I was about to depart, he said to me:

“If I am any judge of political events, Governor Wilson’s candidacy is impossible. When you get to Baltimore, however, you will have a very great influence in the selection of candidates. At the psychological moment, bring Senator Culberson forward. He may have the support of Mr. Bryan”.

I told him that I still had faith in Governor Wilson’s nomination, and that my position was such that I could not at any time abandon him. I felt it would be considered an act of treachery if I should trade his delegates off at the Convention in the interest of any other man.

Mr. House remained in Europe until the latter part of August. Soon after his return, he addressed a letter to me in which he said that Governor Wilson had not sent for him and that Mr. McAdoo, who was in charge of the campaign during my illness, would pay no attention to him, although he had personally gone to headquarters. I wrote to Governor Wilson and suggested that Mr. House was back from Europe and that he might be of distinct service. I also suggested that he send for Mr. House. In the rush of things, apparently, Governor Wilson overlooked the suggestion. A few days later, Mr. House appealed to me again. I sent word both to Mr. McAdoo and to

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Governor Wilson that Mr. House be called into consultation.

When I returned to the campaign, Mr. House had secured his consultation and appeared every day at headquarters. I was told that the President was laying considerable store by him and that he had been and was a sort of "observer" of headquarters, whatever that means. Mr. House never contributed.

Early in January, 1912, it became evident that we must move on Washington and get as much Congressional support as possible. I could see that we were not getting adequate publicity in the newspapers and decided to go to Washington and look into that matter.

Upon arriving at the Willard, I called up William H. Hughes, then in the lower House, and asked him to come and see me. I asked him to recommend to me the very best newspaper correspondent in Washington. He said:

"I can recommend a man to you, but you may not like him. He is a big, easy-going, strapping Southerner, and you may not want too much of the South in this matter". I could see no objection to the South as long as it had the force behind it. Then he remarked: "I have in mind a man who can go and kick a Senator in the shin and shake the truth out of him. He is liked by every member of Congress, regardless of party".

This was Thomas J. Pence.

Pence opened our Publicity Bureau. The New York Headquarters became devoted to conferences and to sending out the ordinary publicity; the Wash-

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ington Headquarters was largely devoted to sending out Congressional publicity.

We obtained the most valuable acquisition that I know of in the entire campaign in Senator Thomas P. Gore. Senator Gore, as everyone knows, is blind, but he thinks, lives and sleeps with politics and public questions. His very infirmity gives an added ability for certain sides of politics. He never forgets a name or a voice. There is no man on this continent who is more accurately familiar with the personnel of politics. If he has ever heard the name of a political leader, state, county or precinct, in the entire country, he remembers it forever. I found him a perfect encyclopedia of political information. He was a genius for political organization down to the finest detail. He was the most affectionately loyal person with whom it has ever been my pleasure to come in contact. Senator Gore worked incessantly to the end. He was optimistic always. It was to him, more than any other person, that I turned in the most difficult moments.

VI

LAUNCHING OF THE 1912 CAMPAIGN

WILSON'S LETTER TO JOLINE, "KNOCKING BRYAN INTO A COCKED HAT", ALARMS HIS MANAGER — A RACE OF WRITERS TO ANSWER IT — BRYAN MOLLIFIED AND "SHAKES" WITH WILSON — MCCOMBS WINS BIG ADVANTAGE FOR WILSON IN SELECTION OF BALTIMORE FOR CONVENTION CITY — MCADOO, MORGENTHAU AND ELKUS "DROP IN".

DURING 1910 and 1911, in addition to the great Congressional triumph, Democratic Governors had been elected in the normally Republican states. Things looked well for the Democracy. It was decided, in celebration of the glorious victories, to have a great dinner at Washington on Jackson Day, January 8, 1912. I learned that the prospective candidates for the Presidency, together with other distinguished men, were to be invited to speak. It was apparent to me that it was Mr. Wilson's great opportunity to compare himself with his rivals.

I had heard all the men speak who were mentioned. I knew that Mr. Wilson was vastly superior in oratory. The gathering was to be the most notable that the Democratic Party could produce. Members of the National Committee from all the states were to be

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there. In fact, the leaders of the Democracy from everywhere were to be present.

Mr. Wilson received an invitation, of course. He was on the point of declining, on the ground that it would seem obvious that he was a candidate for the Presidency. I saw no reason for disguising the fact, but it was most difficult to make him see my point of view.

Finally I told Representative Hughes of the Governor's state of mind. He was amazed beyond words. He got in touch with Mr. Wilson and finally convinced him. It was most fortunate that he did, for Governor Wilson's oration was a tremendous success, as he far outranked any person who spoke. When he sat down there was a great ovation. After the applause was over, Roger C. Sullivan, of Illinois, lifted his glass to Governor Wilson and said: "He'll do"!

Mr. Sullivan at the time was committed to no one. I regarded his action as a great portent. I felt in my heart that he would ultimately be for Governor Wilson, though he had to thread his way through the maze of practical politics.

The forty-eight hours prior to the dinner were very depressing indeed, from the point of view of the Wilson campaign. I received an intimation early on the morning of the 7th that the newspapers had a letter from Governor Wilson to Mr. Adrian H. Joline that would be of the most serious consequence to his campaign. Through confidential sources I got a copy of it, which read:

LAUNCHING OF THE 1912 CAMPAIGN

“PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
PRESIDENT’S ROOM.
Princeton, N. J.

April 29, 1907

“My dear Mr. Joline:

Thank you very much for sending me your address at Parsons, Kansas, before the Board of Directors, of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company. I have read it with relish, and am in entire agreement. Would that we could do something, at once, dignified and effective, to knock Mr. Bryan, once for all, into a cocked hat.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON”

Mr. Adrian H. Joline

An immediate call over the telephone was made for the Governor. He could not remember writing the letter. He could not vouch for its authenticity. I knew that it was to be published. Its seriousness, from a political point of view, was obvious.

Mr. Bryan had, up to that time, not frowned upon our candidate. This letter, if true, would unquestionably offend him. It would indicate an alliance or sympathy on the part of Governor Wilson with Mr. Joline and his associates, who were identified with large banks and other financial interests.

Governor Wilson and I conferred. We discussed a reply and how it should be made. The nature of the reply was momentous. It might mean the buckling up of the entire Wilson campaign or it might cause a general deflection of the Progressive wing of the Democratic Party from him, for at that time the

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Governor had no standing with the so-called Conservative wing.

Mr. Wilson wrote in longhand a tentative statement to be incorporated in his speech. In effect, the defense was that he had done what he thought was proper at the time. There he stopped. I knew that this would not do. I got in touch with Senator James A. O'Gorman, of New York. After we had argued, Governor Wilson asked my secretary, Maurice Lyons, to read his reply aloud. After it was read, the Governor was silent for about five minutes. He requested Mr. Lyons to typewrite it. When in form and again read, I disapproved of it. Finally the Governor and I separately wrote what we considered amended adequate replies. He read mine. I read his. Neither suited. We then set ourselves to more writing. After an hour and a half, Mr. Wilson wrote out a statement in which he attempted to justify his change of mind:

"A man may even change his mind. It is nothing to be ashamed of, to change your mind about some conclusion you may have reached on insufficient information.

"A man may even write a letter, just so it is a frank expression, and you have nothing to be ashamed of. The letter may even be printed. It may sometimes prove inconvenient. But if it is a frank expression, there is nothing to be ashamed of.

"The man who refuses to change his mind, when he finds he is wrong, ought to be blown apart by dynamite, so that his parts can be properly and normally readjusted".

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Meantime, Mr. Pence and I fully discussed the seriousness of the situation. My first thought was of Bryan. Reaching him before he got to Washington was highly important. Mr. Pence found that Mr. Bryan was in Raleigh, N. C. We concluded that we would get in touch with Josephus Daniels, who likewise was there.

It seemed best to inform Mr. Daniels, frankly, that the attacks on Governor Wilson always appeared in reactionary papers when Mr. Wilson was about to speak, with the purpose of blanketing his utterances. Such attacks were a serious blow to progressive democracy, of which both Governor Wilson and Mr. Bryan were exponents. It would be impossible to express the relief that I felt when assured that Mr. Daniels would take this position with Mr. Bryan. When the happy reply to Mr. Bryan was worked out, I requested Mr. Pence to go to the station and meet Mr. Daniels and Mr. Bryan. Mr. Daniels was his friend. I wanted to know, at least, how Mr. Bryan looked, if I could not get what he said. Not until Mr. Pence reported that Mr. Bryan looked sunny and cheerful did the high tension disappear.

Mr. Wilson's reference to Mr. Bryan at the Jackson Day dinner was in a most happy vein. Mr. Bryan's was in a vein equally happy. Mr. Bryan took a big man's point of view. He grew in my estimation tremendously.

The Jackson Day dinner was the occasion for a meeting of the National Committee in order to select a place for the National Convention. Three cities

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desired it,—Chicago, St. Louis and Baltimore. National Committeemen who supported Mr. Wilson were few, but we held the balance of power. Eastern and Southern states preferred Baltimore. Middle states, which leaned toward Mr. Clark, preferred St. Louis or Chicago. Western states had no preference.

I decided that Baltimore would be the best place from a Wilson point of view. We could move a large number of supporters from New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland into Baltimore, and that would have a psychological influence on delegates. We also had the very strong support of the *Baltimore Sun*. It was clear that these influences might be of great value in a close contest in the convention.

I could not afford, publicly, to express my preference. What the Wilson people wanted was likely to provoke an adverse majority in the National Committee. I spread word to our friends in the Committee that I thought Baltimore preferable. I pledged them to secrecy as to their intentions.

The National Committeeman from Maryland, Fred Talbott, exceedingly anxious to have Baltimore selected, came to me early in the morning of the Committee meeting. He solicited my support and demonstrated the advantages from a Wilson viewpoint. Mr. Talbott was for Wilson's nomination. But the case was of such great delicacy that I told Mr. Talbott I was not ready to express a preference.

However, Baltimore easily prevailed. Chicago and St. Louis appeared to be very dangerous from the Wilson aspect. St. Louis was in Mr. Clark's logical

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territory. His supporters would be there in great numbers. This likewise applied to Chicago, and there Mr. Wilson had practically no newspaper support. Mr. Hearst, who was for Clark, owned a paper that might have very great influence on the delegates.

A certain psychology of every national convention is produced from the outside. Delegates are perhaps unaware of it. This was notably true of the Democratic convention of 1896, at Chicago, which I attended. Mr. Bryan was nominated. I had attended six or seven national conventions, both Republican and Democratic. I had a fixed impression that the atmosphere of the place in which the convention is held is of tremendous importance in the selection of the nominee.

Another interesting occurrence took place at the National Committee meeting. A. Mitchell Palmer, one of our ardent supporters, contested the seat of James M. Guffey, of Pittsburgh. Guffey had long been a member of the National Committee. He had been a very important factor in Democratic councils. Mr. Palmer and Vance McCormick came to me with their briefs. Naturally, I was greatly predisposed in Mr. Palmer's favor. I was sure that Mr. Guffey would never be with us. I was also sure that Mr. Guffey had a legal right to the seat. I could only say I was with him in spirit. I, therefore, thought I should make no recommendations to our friends in the Committee. They were about equally divided. Mr. Bryan took a proxy. He made a very severe attack on Mr. Guffey. It was without avail.

Before the Jackson Day dinner I had established

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headquarters at Washington and had communicated with our friends throughout the country to meet me there. They came in large numbers. We analyzed conditions, laid plans and selected leaders. Among others with me was Henry Morgenthau, afterward Ambassador to Turkey.

Rabbi Wise, a very brilliant orator and influential man among the Hebrews in New York, had been attracted to Governor Wilson. He wrote to our headquarters for literature that he might prepare an article about him. I subsequently met Mr. Wise. I raised the question of securing prominent Hebrews who might be of financial as well as political assistance to us. He selected his friend, Henry Morgenthau, who had been very prominent in Hebrew circles in New York. He had practically retired from business, was a man of high ideals, and was quite willing to devote large sums from his private fortune in furtherance of them.

Mr. Morgenthau was very much impressed with Mr. Wilson's speech of January 6th on the Jewish Passport Question, and likewise with his speech at Washington. He gave me a pledge to contribute \$5,000 a month to the Wilson campaign. This was indeed a great relief. It was a great gratification to have his support in New York. He proved to be an indefatigable worker. Later another Hebrew of high ideals joined me, Abram I. Elkus. He not only contributed largely from his private maintenance, but was exceedingly active in every direction

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up to the day of the nomination and throughout the summer campaign.

Governor Wilson had no more genuine and enthusiastic supporters than Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Elkus. Mr. Elkus was always willing to lay aside his private business for a public ideal. His very large experience in public affairs made him a valuable associate.

With the Jackson Day dinner over, we perfected an organization. I had been able to confer, personally, with leaders from almost every state. Flesh-and-blood contact enabled us to work with a better understanding. The Wilson campaign was then launched in a very concrete manner. It had received a great impetus. Its largest asset, however, still was the Governor's popularity.

At this period Mr. McAdoo had appeared on the scene for the first time. We had not made any great headway then among the Democratic organizations, but we had made headway among the newspapers.

The question of money was still a very troublesome one. The selection of delegates to the National Convention by primaries was rapidly approaching, but before discussing this I will return to phases of our publicity.

VII

PUBLICITY AND STRATEGY

HOW McCOMBS APPRISED THE VOTERS WHO AND WHAT WILSON WAS — SECOND CHOICE CHANCES IN THE CONVENTION ENHANCED BY KEEPING OUT OF "FAVORITE-SON STATES" — BRYAN'S OHIO TOUR FINANCED — NINETEEN WILSON DELEGATES ELECTED IN BUCKEYE STATE — EVEN BREAK IN OKLAHOMA — CAMPAIGN FUND LACKS \$36,000 — McCOMBS BORROWS MORE MONEY — CHARLES R. CRANE MAKES HIS FIRST DONATION, \$5,000.

[THE Rural Free Delivery had changed the general methods of politics. The United States had become more of a reading public. People in remote districts read monthly and weekly magazines. Daily newspapers were delivered at doors quickly. I thought that we should have support among monthly and weekly magazines. Mr. McClure, of *McClure's Magazine*, was approached for an article on Woodrow Wilson. He assigned Burton J. Kendrick to prepare it. This article was reproduced in pamphlet form. We sent more than half a million copies throughout the United States.]

[Walter H. Page, editor of the *World's Work*, and I arranged that Bayard Hale write four articles on Mr. Wilson. The Governor was consulted. I read proofs. The last article dealt with the Prince-

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ton University controversy. Mr. Hale handled opponents of Mr. Wilson very viciously. When I saw the proofs, I protested that the article be toned down. I was receiving contributions from Princeton alumni. Many had not favored the Governor's side. This article, as originally drafted, would renew the Princeton schism and cut off our contributions. It would also make many violent opponents for Wilson. After much controversy the article was toned down. I purchased large quantities of magazines from Mr. Page.

Mark Sullivan, of *Collier's Weekly*, rendered valuable services until he heard the call of the Bull Moose.

In the fall of 1911 I bought the Trenton *True American*. Cleveland H. Dodge and (be it said in whispers) Mr. George W. Perkins, Bull Moose leader, held the dominating interest. We got out a Woodrow Wilson issue. The *True American* was sent largely to Democratic papers for clipping purposes. We sent the paper to every fifth Democratic voter in a state. This was in furtherance of my general plan to build the Woodrow Wilson campaign from the bottom up rather than from the top down. }

I determined that it was inadvisable and impracticable to make a fight for delegates in states in which there were prospective candidates. These were Alabama (Mr. Underwood); Indiana (Mr. Marshall); Missouri (Mr. Clark); Ohio (Governor Harmon); Massachusetts (Mr. Foss); Connecticut (Governor Baldwin), and North Dakota (Mr. Burke, if he decided to run). I conceived that it would be better to abandon these states out of courtesy, as resentment

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might be created among the followers of the Presidential candidates in those states. It might spread to other states. At Baltimore the great struggle would begin and I knew we must have friends on second choice. However, I sent confidential messengers into states to find out our friends and prepare for second choice at Baltimore.

I had a personal agreement with the Harmon manager in Ohio that I would not come into the state, but, of course, would keep in touch with our friends there.

Governor Harmon, during the course of his term, had provoked decided hostility. It came mainly through the Bryan-Baker factions. It also included people who sought office and did not get it.

Baker and the followers of the late Tom Johnson opposed Governor Harmon, perhaps, on the principle that they did not consider him radical enough. Representative Lentz, Harvey Garber, ex-National Committeeman, and former State Chairman Finley were ardent Bryanites.

The Bryan people asked me if I would assist in financing a speaking trip of Mr. Bryan through Ohio. That involved the possibility that Mr. Bryan was to campaign for himself. But there was a distinct anti-Harmon feeling in Ohio. While I refused to organize it, I concluded that I would aid the Bryan excursion. I gave Mr. Garber \$4,000. It helped to consolidate opposition to Mr. Harmon.

I did not stipulate that the assistance of Mr. Bryan should result in assistance to Mr. Wilson. I knew

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the sentiment in Ohio was stronger for him than it was for any candidate. If the opposition got together, as I calculated it would, Mr. Wilson would come to Baltimore with considerable strength. The Ohio primaries developed the fact. Nineteen Wilson delegates were selected out of a total of forty.

The Clark campaign developed aggressively early in January. Mr. Clark was a "native son". His managers determined that the first state to select their delegates should be Missouri, their candidate's home. Many Missourians advised, strongly, that Governor Wilson become a candidate in that state. I declined to consent. Mr. Clark's supporters controlled the state organization. Mr. Clark became practically the unanimous choice. Mr. Folk, who, rumor had it, was looking toward the Presidency with the implied support of Mr. Bryan, agreed to support Mr. Clark.

The next contest was in Oklahoma. Mr. Clark was exceedingly well and favorably known in that state. There was some Harmon support. It readily disappeared. The contest narrowed to one between Mr. Clark and Mr. Wilson. The Wilson contest was led by Senator Gore. The Clark contest was led by Senator Robert L. Owen and Charles W. Haskell, former Governor and former Treasurer of the National Committee. The Oklahoma contest was not a state-wide primary; it was a contest for delegates selected in each county.

The battle was a draw. We were fortunate that it so resulted. The Clark forces were exceedingly well organized. Mr. Clark had the advantage of living

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in a neighboring state. He had the advantage, also, of a tremendous acquaintance. Governor Wilson knew less than half a dozen people in the entire state.

Kansas was the next state in order. It was necessary that we make a determined stand there. Difficulties were more obvious than those of Oklahoma; the state bordered on Missouri, and Mr. Clark had many justly valued friendships there. He had been speaking in the state for years. He had come in their hour of need; indeed, in their hour of hopelessness.

A decided handicap was to be overcome. Nevertheless, some of the strongest men in the state were with us. These were Homer S. Martin, State Chairman; George H. Hodges, Governor; Frank Watson, William Orr, Hugh P. Farrelly and Frank Comisky. Martin, who afterward became Vice Governor of the Philippines, and I planned the campaign.

Senator Gore and I advised Governor Wilson to speak at Topeka on Washington's Birthday, taking his hazards on a defeat.

Opposition to Governor Wilson had become highly concentrated. It was rumored that to prevent his sweeping the country in the primaries, an arrangement had been made that the country should be divided among the other three leading candidates in their respective strongholds,— Mr. Underwood in the South, Mr. Harmon in the East, and Mr. Clark in the West. I shall not comment on the truth of this "Triple Alliance". It has never been demonstrated to me. I do not believe the gentlemen had the slightest knowledge of the existence of any such entente.

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In Kansas we were met with a most vehement attack on Governor Wilson. It was based upon his *History of the American People* and his alleged slight to Southern Europeans who came to America. This was given the widest circulation and it was harmful.

Kansas having gone against us, and Wisconsin being the next state, it was necessary to make a determined effort there.

In the previous fall, I had met Joseph E. Davies, National Committeeman, on his return from Europe. He did not know much about the situation. After a protracted talk he decided to espouse the Wilson cause. He put me in personal touch with his partner, George Aylward, now District Attorney at Madison, and Frank B. Shutze, now Postmaster at Milwaukee. These were the Wisconsin pioneers.

I determined that everything possible should be done in Wisconsin to stem what I considered the rising tide for Speaker Clark. From headquarters we sent tons of literature to the Democrats in Wisconsin.

We covered the state thoroughly with the Trenton *True American*. I also gave Mr. Davies \$15,000 — a mighty sum for us in those times — to carry on the campaign. It was more than a mighty sum in view of my personal situation. I had incurred a personal indebtedness on behalf of the campaign of more than \$36,000. At this juncture, Thomas J. Pence said to me at Washington:

“You need not worry about the Wisconsin publicity, ‘The Old Man of the Sea’ (Senator Gore) and I will mix the poison”

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Senator Gore organized a campaign down to the precincts in Wisconsin. The LaFollette Campaign Committee, composed largely of former President Theodore Roosevelt's friends, had concluded that Senator Robert M. LaFollette, of Wisconsin, was impossible as a candidate for the Republican or Progressive Presidential nomination, and had plainly told him so. This was a few days prior to the Publishers' dinner in Philadelphia, at which Senator LaFollette utterly collapsed physically and nervously.

The one man on the LaFollette Committee who protested against the abandonment of the Senator was Charles R. Crane, of Chicago. President Wilson later offered Crane the post of Ambassador to Russia. Mr. Crane had been confirmed as Minister to China under Mr. Taft. He was recalled in the process of his journey. At the break-up of the LaFollette Committee, Mr. Crane asserted that he would continue in his financial support of Mr. LaFollette.

I went to Chicago to confer on the Wisconsin situation, and also to see Roger C. Sullivan again. The deficit hanging over me and the great expense that was to follow were quite depressing. I had found out that primaries are the most expensive form of political campaigning. The odds are all in favor of the man with the money and the man who has the organization behind him.

As I sat in the Blackstone Hotel, alone, on a foggy morning, I was raking my mind on how to discover some new person to contribute to the Wilson campaign. I thought of Charles R. Crane, and deter-

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mined at once to see him. It was a short journey to his office.

Mr. Crane received me with great politeness. I told him that I admired his courage in continuing to support Mr. LaFollette, but that, of course, Mr. LaFollette's nomination was impossible. I argued to Mr. Crane that Governor Wilson stood for progressive ideals, and that there was no inconsistency in supporting both Wilson and Mr. LaFollette.

After twenty minutes Mr. Crane gave me a check for \$5,000, and said that he would give me \$5,000 more later. This \$5,000 went into the maw of the Wisconsin primaries.

Mr. Crane had influence, and, indeed, a substantial interest in the *Milwaukee Journal*. He promised the support of the *Journal* for Governor Wilson. He also enjoyed intimate acquaintanceship with the Scripps-McRae papers. He volunteered to argue for the support of that chain of great dailies for Governor Wilson, and it was largely accomplished.

If I ever had an inspiration it was certainly the inspiration of seeing Mr. Crane. I left his office still \$36,000 in debt, but feeling vastly more hopeful of the general result. His face and his first-spoken word convince one that he is a man of high ideals and fidelity of purpose.

From Mr. Crane's office I went into conference — the third one — with Roger C. Sullivan, the National Committeeman from Illinois. It was plain that although a chronic bitter fight was being made on Mr. Sullivan he would control the delegation at Baltimore.

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The first time I saw him was on the twelfth of February — Lincoln's Birthday — when Governor Wilson spoke at the Lincoln Day dinner in the Hotel LaSalle. It was a rather soggy occasion. The businessmen of Chicago, as elsewhere, viewed Wilson with suspicion and alarm. Outside of a very cordial talk, we got nowhere. Mr. Sullivan, very properly, was looking after his own political position. The very mixed condition of Illinois would not permit him to make a statement. I knew that if Roger Sullivan ever committed himself to us, his word would be as good as his bond.

The net result of the first conference was that he expressed a very high regard for Mr. Wilson.

On the second occasion, Senator Saulsbury and I were on a Western tour, terminating in Topeka, where Governor Wilson was to speak. Mr. Sullivan again took the position that his own leadership was involved, and that he was compelled to protect that. He would not commit himself to anyone. We both knew his underlying political judgment was that Governor Wilson should be nominated.

On the third occasion, we had a very long conversation. Mr. Sullivan was even more enthusiastic about Governor Wilson, but less hopeful of his nomination. Nevertheless, I thought that the conference would at least develop a cordiality between us and cement mutual confidence. That it did was demonstrated when in the Baltimore Convention Mr. Sullivan finally swung the 58 votes from Illinois to Wilson, and made his nomination certain.

VIII

PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION

ONLY 327 OF THE 1088 NATIONAL DELEGATES FOR WILSON AS THE NET RESULT OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES — McCOMBS TOURS SOUTH AND WEST TO GAIN VETO POWER IN CONVENTION — "ONLY A MIRACLE CAN SAVE WILSON", SAYS DAVIES — WILSON CONFERENCE AT WASHINGTON GLOOMY — NEWTON, PUBLICITY MAN, DISCHARGED.

THE CONTEST in Wisconsin involved the vote of a very large Southern European element, especially in Milwaukee. A very bitter pamphlet prepared by George Fred Williams against Governor Wilson was the chief weapon of the opposition. It appealed very strongly to the foreign vote.

Wisconsin had been so thoroughly organized that the primary came out quite to our satisfaction. We won twenty out of the twenty-four delegates. We had, at least, checked the Clark tide. We tripled our circulation of publicity, but we were still short of money. Contributions were given in a spirit of great trepidation, and the campaign was not underwritten at all, except by Mr. Morgenthau.

The time for the selection of delegates in Illinois was coming apace. The state was absolutely rent with factionalism. Mr. Clark's supporters had organized

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the state most thoroughly and with great skill. Mr. Hearst's papers were pounding the Wilson candidacy with great effect. Governor Dunne's forces were working for the nomination of the Missourian with the support of Mayor Harrison and of Mr. Hearst's newspapers.

Mr. Sullivan was working to maintain control of the state organization. It was impossible for us under such circumstances, to have an adequate organization in the state. It would have required a vast sum of money to obtain it. We did not have the funds.

Accordingly, I organized a faithful group, mainly composed of young men outside of any organization. They included William Brown, Jr., later Naval Officer of the Port; River McNeill, later Collector of Customs; William C. Niblac, a prominent banker; Dixon Williams, a manufacturer; Irving Shuman, later Assistant United States Treasurer at Chicago; Lawrence Stringer, later Congressman-at-large, and the Jones brothers, Thomas D. and Frank. Thomas D. was afterward nominated by the President for the Federal Reserve Board. This group had the very greatest difficulty in raising funds. Just before the selection of delegates, I gave the organization \$250, every cent that I could afford, for the payment of a deficit on printing.

Ten days before the selection of delegates, a primary law was passed in Illinois. When the news came to me, I told our organization that Illinois was hopeless and that it must go to Mr. Clark. I recommended the

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expenditure of no further money, but upon their insistence for funds I gave them \$3,000. It was more of a reward for the loyalty of their services than anything else.

Mr. Clark won by a tremendous plurality,—over 140,000. I received the news at my New York hotel. I was \$57,000 personally committed to the campaign. The morning was foggy, and, of course, to me was blacker than usual. I had breakfast and walked down Fifth Avenue, not knowing where any further funds were coming from. I puffed vigorously at a black cigar. I was of course not willing to give up. Indeed, it was a matter of pride not to surrender until thoroughly beaten at Baltimore, and I still thought we would not be beaten.

The success of the Wisconsin primaries was not long-lived. The Clark movement got a tremendous and thoroughly organized swing. Nebraska, Iowa, California, Washington, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland, went for Mr. Clark almost in succession. Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, a part of Tennessee, a part of North Carolina, went sweepingly in turn for Mr. Underwood.

While these events were occurring, Mr. Joseph E. Davies said that Governor Wilson could only be nominated by a political miracle.

I knew it was necessary for us to buttress ourselves in a few states to check the almost overwhelming tide. I selected Minnesota, South Dakota, North Carolina, and South Carolina in which to concentrate the fight.

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We had made a formal fight in Massachusetts. It consisted mainly of speakers. We had the able services of Robert L. Henry, who had transferred himself from Wisconsin, where we had retrieved ourselves with nine delegates.

The "Old Man of the Sea" (Senator Gore) and I were much in conference. Pence was pounding away with publicity in every direction. The New York Headquarters, so far as its resources would allow it, was consistently sending out Wilson publicity.

In Minnesota we had some very able men. They included Fred B. Lynch, E. L. Wise, editor of the *Duluth Herald*, which was a power with its editorials; Mr. Jacques, Mr. Hudson, and others. We secured a handsome, but belated victory in Minnesota.

Under the able leadership of E. S. Johnson, opposed violently by Senator Pettigrew and George Fred Williams, we took South Dakota.

Under the leadership of William H. Osborne, and other strong men, we took twenty out of the twenty-four North Carolina delegates.

With Senator Tillman and Mr. Gonzales, now Minister to Cuba, we took South Carolina.

On the 28th of May the New Jersey primaries came on. As was to be expected, Senator Smith held his own in Essex. The result was 24 Wilson out of the 28 state delegates.

By the 1st of June all of the state conventions and primaries were over.

Early in April the strain was beginning to become too much for me. During the period I had not taken

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a Sunday or a holiday off. I had worked from twelve to eighteen hours a day. I frequently felt that I must give up.

While Mr. Clark was sweeping the country, the Governor had become very much discouraged. He thought it was too much to call on his friends to do. He more than once intimated that he desired to withdraw. My argument was, that it would be unfair to his friends who had so vigorously supported him, and who, I was sure, would rather go to defeat than to quit in the midst of a conflict.

After June 1st the tactics for the Convention had to be worked out. I sent into all of the states. I took a list of the delegates selected, sent to me from an inquiry made as to their first and second choice. This I carefully noted in a book.

In New York, I had declined to make a fight for two reasons: I knew that the sentiment of the state was decidedly against Governor Wilson. I knew that the organization which controlled the selection of the delegates was against him. My only hope was to further the amicable and cordial terms with the delegates selected, in the hope that at some juncture in the Convention they might see fit to vote with us.

It was apparent that the only effort that could be made there was to turn the edge of animosity. This position I took counter to many suggestions and the violent protestations of Governor Wilson's friends. I knew a fight would result only in creating bitter state animosities which would prejudice success in the state of any Democrat nominated in the Convention, and

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could by no chance be of any value to Governor Wilson. The only thing done in the state was the circulation of a large amount of publicity.

Some of the delegates, notably Abram I. Elkus, Henry Morgenthau, Martin H. Glynn, Samuel Untermyer, and others, were loyal Wilson men. The suggestion was made that a contesting delegation go to Baltimore, following the precedent of the Anti-Snap movement in the Democratic convention of 1892. The Anti-Snap was all right. But the facts were not the same. I was sure that no convention would pay any attention to such a movement.

The net result of the selection of delegates prior to the Baltimore convention showed Mr. Wilson to be in possession of 327 out of the 1088 delegates,— less than a third.

Within a few days after the 1st of June, I went up into the country with my list of delegates and all of the information that I had acquired during the fifteen months of campaigning, to lay out a plan of battle for submission to my associates. I was quite alone. First I studied and learned by heart the personnel of the 1088 delegates. I found that many Clark delegates held Wilson as their second choice, and that some were very sympathetic with Harmon.

I determined that if we could, in the process of the convention, muster a veto power,— that is, more than one-third, and hold it in compact order for four or five days, we had an excellent chance to secure many more delegates and perhaps the nomination. / As to the Underwood delegates, who were entirely from the

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South, it seemed clear that, at the convention, they should be left entirely alone in order to strengthen them. Their great value at the first part of the convention would be in blockading the Clark movement and preventing his nomination.

I was aware that the Underwood people hoped to be the residuary legatees of either the Wilson or Clark strength. I resolved that during the first two days of the convention we should merely do sharp-shooting at the Clark delegates,—that is to say, draw off individual delegates to get the coveted one-third.

I thought I could see where we would get more than one-third of the delegates in this manner and hold them together.

As to the floor organization, I determined upon a committee composed of vigorous, active men, that could do continuous manoeuvring, and who were physically vigorous enough to work day and night.

Governor Burke, of North Dakota, now Treasurer of the United States, wrote that if we needed the North Dakota delegates we could have them at any time.

I returned from my seclusion and laid the plan of organization before Governor Wilson, Senator Gore, Mr. Pence, and one or two others. It was accepted.

About June 10, I went to Washington and took up the matter of our Congressional support. We worked out the personnel of the floor leaders and called a secret meeting at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, Philadelphia. There were present Governor Wilson, Senator Gore, Senator Saulsbury, Mr. Burleson, and,

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I think, Mr. Palmer, Mr. McGillicuddy, Robert S. Hudspeth and Representative Hughes. I proposed a plan for carrying off the delegates of the various states, one from Pennsylvania and one from Texas, who were not on the Floor Committee, to work among the various delegations between sessions.

Mr. Pence evolved the idea of having a complete press bureau in Baltimore so as to get immediate favorable publicity directly into the hands of the delegates. The publicity here was done by clippings. I determined to put Colonel Thomas R. Burch in charge of the convention hall galleries and to be Commissioner and "Chief of Enthusiasm". I arranged to have brought down to Baltimore, Princeton, Yale and Harvard Woodrow Wilson Clubs, which numbered some 1500 young men with strong lungs and stronger enthusiasm.

The plans for Baltimore were complete; but to return to some other incidents.

About January 15, Byron R. Newton, later Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Collector of the Port of New York, then publicity agent, taken from Mr. McAdoo's office, became exceedingly unsatisfactory. His enthusiasm had fallen away. I attributed it at first to nervousness. They told me that he was doing absolutely nothing at headquarters, and became exceedingly quarrelsome. This happened at the time of the Watterson interview, when for the first time I came forward with continuous publicity which necessarily involved my name.

Newton secretly represented Mr. McAdoo. He

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was jealous because I was directing the movement, and because of his greater age. Finally, with great reluctance, I was compelled to discharge him to bring order into the headquarters. He left grudgingly. He wrote a vitriolic letter to Governor Wilson concerning the condition of the campaign. That was the last I heard of Newton, until at Baltimore, I am reliably informed, he publicly appeared on the floor of the convention exploiting alleged injurious letters.

At the instance of Dan Fellow Platt, of New Jersey, I engaged Walker W. Vick as an assistant at headquarters. He seemed to have a large acquaintance in the South. As a try-out, I sent him down there to look over the situation. He came back with valuable information. Mr. Vick proved himself to be a valuable executive. Upon letting Mr. Newton go, I put Mr. Vick in charge of headquarters, associating with him Mr. Parker, a publicity man, and others.

Soon afterwards I asked Senator Gore to recommend a man who was familiar with Middle West conditions. He suggested Judge Thomas H. Owen of Oklahoma. Judge Owen, at Senator Gore's instance, volunteered to come without salary to headquarters and spend a month. He proved himself of very great value in organization and in his familiarity with Middle Western conditions.

To go back a little, I determined on March 14th that it would be of advantage to go into the South and confer with some of our friends in the various states. My particular aim was toward New Orleans. I went to Augusta, to the Bon Air Hotel, for a few days'

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rest, occupying the time, however, in receiving Wilson leaders from the surrounding states, including J. T. G. Crawford, National Committeeman from Florida; Mr. Gonzales, of South Carolina, and Bowdrie Phinzy, of Augusta. Mr. Saulsbury was there. The vacation consisted of planning for the future and sending out of telegrams to various leaders in the primaries.

From Augusta I went to Atlanta and conferred with the Wilson leaders in Georgia, especially Colonel Gray, editor and proprietor of the *Atlanta Journal*, who was rendering us valiant service. The trip convinced me that Mr. Underwood must have Alabama, Georgia and Florida.

Lieutenant Governor Bilbo met me at New Orleans. He was not entirely committed to Underwood.

An analysis of the situation in Mississippi showed that the state was largely dominated by Senator Vardaman and Governor Brewer. I was sure that no success could be had there for us.

According to our plan of not abandoning any state completely, excepting New York and the Presidential candidate states, we made fights in all of the others, with the anticipated result.

My object in going to New Orleans was specific. The southern half of Louisiana was disrupted over the Underwood Bill of 1911, because it had a provision for free sugar. Louisiana people contended that it was confiscatory. Mr. Wilson, in his speech of January 3, 1912, had pronounced himself against any tariff that would prove confiscatory. At that time I did not

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dream that he would be for free sugar. Indeed, he had told me that he had not made up his mind, but that if it were confiscatory, he would be against it.

In New Orleans I met Colonel Ewing, National Committeeman of Louisiana and editor of a prominent daily paper, and editors of several other papers. They were satisfied that as among Clark, Underwood, and Wilson, Wilson was the better choice for Louisiana. The delegation was about evenly divided between Wilson and Clark. The southern, or sugar, half of the state was for Wilson.

I then made a trip into my native state, Arkansas. I had had considerable hopes, or rather profound longing. Upon my arrival at Little Rock I found that the effective work of Jerry C. South had entirely precluded our having it, and I left in chagrin.

I proceeded to St. Louis; then to Chicago, to renew my friendship with Roger Sullivan, and then to New York.

The day following my arrival I took a trip to Atlantic City for sea air, conferences, and contributions. Mr. Pence came up from Washington to report, Judge Owen to confer with us all, and Vick to pave the way for contributions.

Through the editor of an Atlantic City paper, we were able to raise about \$5,000. This was a great help because we were bankrupt again, and there were continued demands for money.

Referring to the trip to Topeka, which I have mentioned in a previous chapter, Mr. Saulsbury and I took it together. The dinner on this occasion was for

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both men and women. The ceiling was low, the Governor was out of voice, Homer S. Martin implored us for funds we did not have. We came into contact with the vicious George Fred Williams' letter, which was being circulated tremendously. It was not a bridge of comforts. But our leaders were enthusiastic. On the return I invited as many of them as were going in that direction to dine with me at Kansas City. I took Mr. Martin across into St. Louis, where I could draw some money and appease him slightly. We then went to Louisville and enjoyed the hospitality of the Pennennis Club and the companionship of Urey Woodson,— and learned that Kentucky was for Clark. We journeyed thence to Frankfort, met Governor McCreary, Desha Breckenridge, and ex-Governor Beckham, and found that Kentucky was for Clark more than ever.

The "hog's eye was sot". The leaders were nearly all against us. We left a thin line, mainly composed of very young men, as a rear guard, and departed for Washington. There I stopped to check up events with the "Old Man of the Sea", and then on to New York to continue the work.

June 20, 1912, the entire staff of New York and Washington Headquarters was moved to Baltimore. We had most of the tenth floor of the Emerson Hotel and the main room downstairs. I was urged to take the big room downstairs for \$10,000, for the convention, at what might be called a prodigious sum from the Wilson standpoint. I was urged on by my good friend Colonel McGraw, of West Virginia, who was

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accustomed to the old days of conventions, and who made great merriment over my objection to paying such an extraordinary price. The days between the 20th and 25th were spent in conference with the Wilson leaders and in laying further plans for the convention.

Mr. McAdoo, during this time, was at the Republican convention in Chicago. However, he had reserved a suite at the Emerson.

IX

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BATTLE FOR CONVENTION CONTROL — BRYAN BITTERLY ATTACKS PARKER AS "PREDATORY INTERESTS CANDIDATE" — PARKER DEFEATS BRYAN FOR TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN OF THE CONVENTION — THE WILSON GROUP SUPPORTS BRYAN TO ELIMINATE CLARK — CLARK'S MANOEUVRES AGAINST BRYAN TO PREVENT HIS FOURTH PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — The following is compiled by the editor.]

THE SKELETON organization with which Mr. McCombs entered the Baltimore convention consisted in the main of young college graduates of Princeton, Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Cornell, University of Pennsylvania and other universities. In addition, Mr. McCombs had succeeded in enlisting these more or less influential leaders in these subjoined states:

Alabama: Frank P. Glass, Judge Peter J. Hamilton, former Governor W. D. Jelks, General Bibb Graves, Judge W. E. Thomas, ex-Governor Senator B. B. Comer.

California: James D. Phelan, United States Senator.

Delaware: Willard Saulsbury, afterward United States Senator.

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Florida: Frank L. Mayes, J. T. G. Crawford, J. W. Appleyard.

Illinois: Edwin Hurley, afterward United States Shipping Commissioner; Irving B. Shuman.

Iowa: Jerry B. Sullivan.

Kansas: Homer S. Martin, Governor George H. Hodges.

Louisiana: Senator Robert E. Broussard.

Maine: Hobadiah Gardner, recently member of the Inter-Boundary Commission; Daniel McGillicuddy, former Governor Plaisted.

Massachusetts: E. E. Filene, Charles H. Grasty.

Missouri: Edward F. Goltra.

New Jersey: Colonel George Harvey, William Hughes, Dan Fellows Platt, Judge R. S. Hudspeth, Colonel T. H. Birch, Congressman Robert Brenner, John Hinchcliffe.

New Hampshire: Eugene E. Reed.

New Mexico: United States Senator A. A. Jones.

New York: Henry Morgenthau, George Foster Peabody, Franklin D. Roosevelt, William Church Osborn, Thomas Mott Osborne, Fred S. Penfield, Cleveland H. Dodge, Walter H. Page.

North Carolina: Hugh MacRae, "The Three Sprunts", A. H. Gouverneur, H. C. McQueen, Thomas H. Wright, former Governor Robert Glenn, A. H. Eller, Colonel W. H. Osborne, E. J. Justice, Captain S. J. Williams, J. R. Preston, Major W. F. Robertson, General J. O. Carr, Josephus Daniels, just retired as Secretary of the Navy.

North Dakota: Governor John Burke.

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Ohio: W. W. Durbin, Harvey Garber.

Oklahoma: United States Senator Thomas P. Gore,
Judge Thomas H. Owen.

Oregon: W. B. King.

Pennsylvania: Joseph M. Guffey, A. Mitchell
Palmer, W. W. Roper, Vance McCormick, Roland
Morris, Ambassador to Japan.

South Carolina: R. S. Whaley, W. E. Gonzales,
W. W. Ball, J. Willard Ragsdale, John Gary Evans.

Rhode Island: Congressman O'Shaughnessey.

South Dakota: Senator Edward S. Johnson.

Texas: R. L. Henry, A. S. Burleson, Colonel T. H.
Ball.

Tennessee: Hobart F. Fischer.

Vermont: J. Walter Lyons, Thomas H. Browne.

Virginia: Stuart G. Gibboney, ex-Governor Elly-
son.

West Virginia: Colonel John T. McGraw.

Wisconsin: Joseph E. Davies.

District of Columbia: Charles A. Douglass.

Hawaii: John H. Wilson.

Porto Rico: Henry G. Molina, Henry W. Dooley.

Kentucky: Henry S. Breckinridge, Governor
Yagar, now in Porto Rico; J. W. C. Beckham.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — Mr. McCombs resumes his narrative.]

After Chairman Norman E. Mack of the National
Committee, on June 25, 1912, had formally called the
convention to order, he submitted the name of Judge
Alton B. Parker, former candidate for President of
the United States, for Temporary Chairman. When

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he asked for other nominations, Mr. Bryan arose. Referring to his credentials as three times the standard bearer of the Democracy, and the fact that six and a half million people had voted for him on each occasion, he opposed Judge Parker on the ground that the Judge had been nominated for the forces in St. Louis, chiefly Messrs. Thomas F. Ryan and August Belmont, who had defeated him (Mr. Bryan) for President. He presented Senator John W. Kern of Indiana, who had run with him on the Democratic ticket in 1908, and he spent much of his time in rehearsing his personal achievements.

Mr. Kern recited his personal friendship for Mr. Parker. He urged him to retire in the interest of harmony in favor of Senator O'Gorman of New York, Senator Culberson of Texas, Representative Clayton of Alabama, former Governor Campbell of Ohio, former Governor Folk of Missouri or Senator Shively of Indiana. He added:

"If there is to be no response; if the responsibility is to rest there; if this is to be a contest between the people and the powers; if it is to be a contest such as has been described — a contest which I pray God may be averted — then the cause to which I belong is so great a cause that I am not fit to be its leader. If my proposition for harmony is to be ignored, and this deplorable battle is to go on, there is only one man, who has been at the forefront for sixteen years, the great American Tribune, William J. Bryan. If you will have nothing else, if that must be the issue, then the leader must be William Jennings Bryan".

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We knew in advance that Mr. Bryan was to make the attack, and that Mr. Kern, by declining the nomination, was, in effect, to support Mr. Bryan. Judge Parker, we also knew, had the support of a great many Clark men, as well as the Harmon and Underwood people.

Senator Ollie James, of Kentucky, was Mr. Clark's close personal friend. We at once decided that the thing to do, inasmuch as we could not win on the issue of the Temporary Chairmanship, was to get in behind Senator James.

I conceived this move on the theory that it was a foregone conclusion that Judge Parker was to be elected Temporary Chairman, and that we might draw away some of the Clark support by developing a situation where delegates favorable to Mr. Clark would not vote for his best and most outspoken friend. This would reveal a combination for Judge Parker. It had the desired effect. Immediately, over the country, the Clark forces were accused of joining with the reactionary forces.

Right here I may clear up a false impression as to Judge Parker's participation. I learned from him, that he did not even know that he was to be placed in nomination for Temporary Chairman, at Baltimore, until his name was submitted to the convention. When his name was submitted, and attack was made upon him, he felt a personal pride in letting the issue be determined by the convention itself. He was not a party to the matter at all. He accepted the position

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in entire good faith, and of course discharged it with high distinction.

By the support of James, I conceived that we had won the first skirmish.

Of course, it was impossible to determine Mr. Bryan's ultimate position, except by a slender chain of circumstances and by his moves. I had known that, in two states at least, he had suggested that the delegates be divided equally between Mr. Clark and Mr. Wilson. This was a danger signal to me, because, if that policy were followed out generally, it would mean the impossibility of nominating either. Personally, I preferred a whole-hearted minority of the delegation to a substantial equality with Mr. Clark of perhaps unenthusiastic delegates. My plan was always to hold thoroughly intact, as a second line of defense, the pledged delegates, in the belief that if we could ever get them up to one-third of the convention, my way would be easy.

The James support gave the Wilson candidacy a very large impetus.

After Mr. Kern's speech, Mr. Bryan agreed to become a candidate for the Temporary Chairmanship. He denounced Parker as the candidate of "Wall Street predatory interests". Two things were to be determined — the cohesiveness of the agreement on Judge Parker, and the personal following of Mr. Bryan in the convention.

Alabama, whose Presidential preference was Mr. Underwood, voted for Mr. Bryan with the exception of 1½ votes. In Arizona, Bryan got 4 and Parker 2.

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One of the delegates, when Arizona was called, asked that the name be called, so that it might be known who had voted for Wall Street and who voted for Bryan. Illinois cast 53 votes for Parker and 5 for Bryan. The Unit Rule applying there, the entire 58 votes went to Judge Parker. In Oklahoma, 15 were for Bryan and 5 for Parker, the Wilson men voting for Bryan. The general result was that Judge Parker received 579 votes, Bryan 508, O'Gorman 4 and Kern 1. The Wilson forces supported the Bryan chairmanship almost solidly.

As a matter of fact, the election of Judge Parker was eminently satisfactory to us. We enjoyed the selection of Judge Parker in every respect. The Temporary Chairmanship of the National Convention is not a position of very tremendous power. We knew that Judge Parker would be eminently fair, and that we would make great inroads into the good graces of the supporters of Bryan and the so-called Progressive supporters of Clark.

The suspicion was rife that Judge Parker was elected by a combination against the interest of Mr. Wilson. Mr. James' name, of course, never came before the convention of his own desire. The events leading up to the selection of Judge Parker as Temporary Chairman were:

June 21st, four days previous, the selection of Judge Parker as Temporary Chairman was made by the subcommittee on arrangements. The vote stood: Parker, New York, 8; James of Kentucky, 3; Henry of Texas, 3; Kern of Indiana, 1; Senator O'Gorman,

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1. Daniels of North Carolina, Osborne of Wyoming, and Ewing of Louisiana, voted for Henry. All were Wilson men. McGraw of West Virginia and Huds-peth of New Jersey voted for O'Gorman and Kern, respectively. Woodson and Wade, Clark men, voted for James, as did Ball of Delaware.

The Parker vote was: Mack of New York, Sullivan of Illinois, Taggart of Indiana, Howell of Georgia, Johnson of South Dakota, Wood of Michigan, Brown of Vermont, and J. Fred Talbott of Maryland.

The next day Bryan addressed the following tele-gram to Champ Clark, Governor Foss of Missouri, Governor Wilson of New Jersey, Governor Burke of North Dakota, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut, Mayor Gaynor of New York:

"I took it for granted that no committeeman inter-ested in Democratic success would desire to offend the members of a convention, overwhelmingly progressive, by naming a reactionary to sound the keynote of the campaign. Eight members of the sub-committee, however, have, over the protest of the remaining eight, agreed not only on a reactionary but upon the one Democrat among those not candidates for the presi-dential nomination who is in the eyes of the public most conspicuously identified with the reactionary ele-ment of the party. I shall be pleased to join you and your friends in opposing his selection by the full com-mittee or by the convention. Kindly answer here."

Champ Clark answered at once:

"Have consulted with Committee having my inter-ests in charge and agree with them that the supreme

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consideration should be to prevent any discord in the convention. Friends of mine, on the sub-committee of arrangements, have already presented the name of Hon. Ollie James to the sub-committee. I believe if all join in the interests of harmony in an appeal to the entire National Committee to avoid controversies in matters of organization, the committee will so arrange as to leave the platform and nomination of candidates as the only real issues on which delegates need divide”.

Mr. Bryan's telegram was a challenge. It required an answer. On the sub-committee Mr. Clark's friends were divided. His answer had, of course, strong points of common sense. But it did not satisfy the public. Governor Marshall's answer approved the selection of Parker. The Harmon men regarded the selection of Mr. Parker as a victory for themselves. The Underwood men were satisfied to be quiet.

On the whole, there was a feeling in the National Committee that Mr. Bryan had put all candidates in a very embarrassing position and had raised a very unnecessary issue. The situation was probably best sized up by the statement of J. Fred Talbott of Maryland, National Committeeman, who was for Mr. Wilson, and he said:

“We need all the Democrats there are in order to win the election. Bryan should not say to the Conservatives that they cannot have a look in at that convention. Our decision to make Judge Parker Temporary Chairman was the decent thing to do. I am surprised that Bryan should not be in favor of doing the decent thing. I thought I was taking the

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best course for the party in voting for Parker, and I still think so”.

The Clark men were in distinct discomfort. If they did not support Judge Parker they felt themselves in a position of antagonizing Charles F. Murphy of New York, Roger C. Sullivan of Illinois, and Thomas T. Taggart of Indiana. They made an attempt, on the theory that these three men would determine the destinies of the convention, to line up the whole Clark influence for Judge Parker. In the sub-committee the Wilson men did not join in a straight out and out fight on Judge Parker, but scattered their votes among others, without concentration.

The fight on Judge Parker was distinctly a Bryan fight. It was not a clean-cut issue between the Clark and Wilson forces, although the Wilson forces handled themselves at that juncture with more boldness.

The atmosphere of Baltimore could be summed up in these words: “What shall we do with Bryan and what is Bryan going to do with us”?

On the night of June 22d, the Wilson Floor Committee met and discussed the question of whether Mr. Wilson should make a reply, and if so, what it should be. It was apparent that the whole campaign of Governor Wilson was progressive. The men who supported him were progressive. He must stand or fall on that issue. While there was no personal objection to Judge Parker, we determined that whatever Mr. Bryan's motives were, and however unfortunate the position was in which he placed the convention, that an answer in the first place was the desirable thing.

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In the second place, silence on the matter seemed the height of folly.

Accepting it as a fact that the so-called reactionary element put Mr. Parker forward, it seemed the proper thing to agree with Mr. Bryan, and take the chance of alienating New York and the other so-called Conservative delegations. It did not seem to me a very great risk. It was obvious, inasmuch as the issue was small, and the convention would be a hard-fought one, that as soon as Judge Parker had surrendered his duties as Temporary Chairman, the convention would forget about the petty animosities created. This proved to be the fact.

In our meeting we drew up a suggestion to Mr. Wilson as to the logical position to take. The substance of it was in the reply given by Mr. Wilson, although the Governor went somewhat further toward Mr. Bryan than the Committee had recommended. The Wilson reply to Bryan was:

“You are quite right. Before hearing of your message I clearly stated my position. The Baltimore convention is to be a convention of Progressive, of men who are Progressives, in principle and by conviction. It must, if it is not put in a wrong light before the convention, express its convictions in its organization and in its choice of men who are to speak for it. You are to be a member of this convention, and are entirely within your rights in doing everything within your power to bring that result about.

“No one will doubt where my sympathies lie; and you will, I am sure, find my friends in the convention

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acting upon clear conviction and always in the interest of the people's cause. I am happy in the confidence that they need no suggestion from me".

It is to be remembered that Mr. Bryan had stated, many times, that Mr. Clark and Mr. Wilson were both Progressives and satisfactory candidates. This left the Clark supporters, so far as the Bryan influence was concerned, rather in the lurch. At this time Doctor Hall, the committeeman from Nebraska, said that he had a letter from Mr. Bryan in which Mr. Bryan stated that he was not a candidate, did not want to be nominated and would not allow his name to be used. Doctor Hall started to bring forth the letter, but felt the restraining hand of some of the Bryan supporters.

It was indeed a situation that might well have pleased Mr. Bryan, because he had wedged himself in as the central figure and had been cast in the rôle again of the "Gladiator Against Wall Street".

A relatively small position, that of Temporary Chairman, the only qualifications of which were that the person be a well-known man and a good speaker, had become the center of a storm. The whole trouble could have been averted if Mr. Murphy of New York had accepted Senator O'Gorman as Temporary Chairman. O'Gorman was not accepted for the reason that at a meeting of the National Committee early in March his name had been suggested by John T. McGraw of West Virginia, a Wilson man. Mr. Murphy would not allow it to go through because he had not been consulted first about Senator O'Gorman.

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At that time there was no feeling between Murphy and O'Gorman.

On June 24th, Bryan arrived in Baltimore. He was received with great acclaim. His personal popularity was at once apparent. He was called on by delegates to the convention. It was obvious that there was a grim determination on the part of the Eastern and Southern states to prevent his nomination in any event. To me, that sounded like security. The conclusion was obvious that at some time during the convention the delegates might feel themselves compelled to accept Wilson instead of Bryan.

As one Pennsylvania delegate said in conversation with a New York delegate:

“You'll take Wilson, or we'll jam Bryan down your throat”!

Later on, when asked about the Temporary Chairmanship, Mr. Bryan said:

“I have declined to accept it and shall not present my name for the place”. Asked if he were a candidate for the Presidential nomination, he replied:

“Be patient! Hush! Wait! There is no hurry”!

The so-called Conservative element was becoming unpopular. Wilson delegates were arriving in large numbers. We were pouring publicity on them. The Wilson delegates in groups of two were going about among the delegations with the Wilson propaganda. Their manner was one of good nature rather than bitter partisanship. Our strength was not great enough to be violently against any candidate, and such a stand was bad on general principles.

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The fury of the Temporary Chairmanship fight on the 24th grew apace.

Tuesday, the 25th, was the deciding day. The National Committee endorsed the action of the subcommittee. Judge Parker received 31 votes. Ollie James, behind whom the Wilson forces united, received 20 votes. The Clark followers went to Judge Parker.

The charge was made that the Clark votes were purchased by promise of support. It went out through the country. This was most unfortunate for Mr. Clark, because many of his delegates were not tied up for many ballots under instruction.

Bryan was furious. Senator James said he would not accept the nomination for Temporary Chairman from the convention as he was for Clark first, last, and all the time. This was construed as an indication of a Clark alliance with the anti-Bryan leaders. A large section of the press construed Judge Parker's success in the committee as a combination of Underwood, Clark and Harmon followers to defeat Governor Wilson at all hazards.

After the result in the committee I said:

"I do not think the result of the vote on the Temporary Chairmanship in the National Committee will have any effect on Wilson's chances. We were for a Progressive for Chairman, and we are still for a Progressive. We accepted a Clark man and voted for him. The result may be reversed in the convention. Even if it is not, it will not show that the reactionaries are in control. Some delegates may have voted for Parker because of personal friendship, and some

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because of a desire to support the National Committee as a matter of regularity”.

On the 26th of June the convention assembled. Mr. Bryan made a personal appeal that he instead of Judge Parker be made Temporary Chairman, and designated Parker as the “candidate of the predatory Wall Street interests”.

Mr. Bryan played his card magnificently, even though he lost by a vote of 579 to 510. He got a vote which attested strongly to his personal popularity. Those 510 votes, at the moment they were delivered, represented to my mind 510 potential Wilson votes. When it came to a fight on the floor, half of the Clark delegates could not be delivered to Judge Parker. That was significant. Underwood and Harmon were temporarily driven into obscurity.

The Clark interests were paying heavily for the imputation of a deal. Bryan put Kern in nomination for Temporary Chairman, and it is said that Kern was willing to retire if Judge Parker would. This was all lost in the din and confusion. Although those who were near Mr. Bryan could not fail to be impressed by his masterly effort, it was lost on the crowd. Then Bryan nominated himself.

Delegates were rushing to the platform to speak. Everything was in confusion.

The roll was called: Parker 579, Bryan 510, O’Gorman 3, Kern 1.

The Wilson delegates stood almost solidly for Bryan.

Mr. Parker, taking the chair, made an able speech.

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It was conciliatory in tone. No exception could be taken to it by Conservative or Radical. It was received almost formally. The Temporary Chairmanship incident was gone.

What stood out was that Judge Parker would not have succeeded but for the Clark support in the convention. That was the opening wedge for driving into the heart of the Clark movement.

Many Clark leaders believed that Bryan was in sight, and that the Conservative element would rush immediately to Clark's support. Predictions were made that he would win on the first or second ballot. My conclusion was that Clark was definitely out of the race, and could under no circumstances get a two-thirds vote in the convention.

X

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McCOMBS SECURES ABROGATION OF THE UNIT RULE — MURPHY, TAGGART, SULLIVAN, ET AL IGNORE THE INJUNCTION — BRYAN DEMANDS WITHDRAWAL OF RYAN AND BELMONT AS DELEGATES — CALLS THEM "MONEY-TRUST DESPOTS" — CLARK RECEIVES A MAJORITY VOTE ON TENTH BALLOT, BUT NOT THE NECESSARY TWO-THIRDS — CHAIRMAN JAMES IS ACCUSED OF TRYING TO STAMPEDE THE CONVENTION FOR CLARK.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — From this point in the narrative, the story of the Wilson campaign will be a compilation from notes which Mr. McCombs left and which have been put together with as much care as possible.]

ON THE afternoon of June 26, 1912, the century-old unit rule was smashed. This feat was accomplished by another combination of the Wilson men, led by Mr. McCombs, and the Bryan men, led by Mr. Bryan.

Under the unit rule the vote of every individual delegate was cast for the candidate declared for by a majority of his state colleagues. Of course, many delegations were absolutely dominated by the state bosses. Charles F. Murphy, for instance, assumed power to cast the solid 90 votes from New York, not only for any candidate he desired, but for any proposition that suited him.

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Roger C. Sullivan threw the 58 votes of Illinois as he pleased. Thomas T. Taggart threw the 30 from Indiana as he chose, while E. H. Moore sought to handle the 48 from Ohio in a similar way, according to his own plans.

Twenty of the New York delegates were at heart for Wilson. Nineteen from Ohio, a few from Illinois, Indiana and other states, whose delegates were used by the anti-Wilson bosses as "rubber stamps", also desired to vote for the New Jersey Governor. Bound by the iron unit rule riveted at state convention or caucus, they were forced to be mere mute automatons. During ballot after ballot, they were held for the one candidate whose nomination they opposed.

McCombs saw in the abrogation of the unit rule a chance to break the anti-Wilson strangle hold on delegates who voted *en bloc*.

He called a conference of all the Wilson leaders. Newton D. Baker, afterward Secretary of War, represented Ohio; A. Mitchell Palmer, afterward Attorney General, and James M. Guffey, Pennsylvania; Senator James A. O'Gorman, William G. McAdoo, John B. Stanchfield, J. Sergeant Cram, Herman Ridder, and others, New York; Robert S. Hudspeth, New Jersey; Josephus Daniels, afterward Secretary of the Navy, North Carolina, and Mr. Bryan and his brother, Charles W., Nebraska.

It was determined at this conference that the report of the majority of the Committee on Rules permitting the leader of a delegation to cast every vote for his personal choice, should be beaten. A minority report,

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submitted by Mr. Baker, of Ohio, declaring that each delegate should be upheld in supporting his undivided preference, was prepared and presented.

The Murphy-Taggart-Ryan-Moore-Sullivan combine fought this bitterly. For hours an acrimonious debate raged upon the floor, but by a vote of 565½ to 491½ the minority report was adopted.

Triumphant shouts greeted this from the Wilson cohorts. Of course, the anti-Wilson men were chagrined. Murphy, Taggart, Moore and Sullivan, however, persisted in announcing the vote of their respective delegations as solid for Clark, Harmon, Marshall or Underwood, as if the unit rule ^{resolution} convention had reaffirmed the unit rule. They justified it on the ground that there were no challenges from the state delegates.

This defiance of the convention majority provoked fury in the delegations where the pro-Wilson votes had been suppressed. Many took the advice of McCombs and demanded a poll. This furnished a check for each delegate publicly to proclaim his choice, no matter how often he was delivered for the favorite of his leader.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — McCombs continues his narrative here.]

Probably one of the most tense moments of the convention came after its organization. At 8 o'clock in the evening of the 26th, Mr. Bryan addressed the convention in these words:

“Mr. Chairman, I understand that the rules under which we are acting require that the resolutions be referred to the Committee on Resolutions. I have a

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resolution which I think ought to be acted upon before we begin the nominations. I, therefore, ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration."

Mr. Bryan, upon unanimous consent, read the resolution:

"Resolved: That in this crisis in our party's career, and in our country's history, this convention sends greetings to the people of the United States, and assures them that the party of Jefferson and of Jackson is still the champion of popular government and equality before the law. As proof of our fidelity to the people, we hereby declare ourselves opposed to the nomination of any candidate for President who is the representative of, or under obligation to J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class. Be it further

"Resolved: That we demand the withdrawal from this convention of any delegate or delegates constituting or representing the above named interests".

Mr. Belmont and Mr. Ryan were delegates. Mr. Morgan, a Republican, was not. The convention was immediately thrown into chaos. All rules of parliamentary procedure were attempted at once to prevent the resolution from coming up, and it required a suspension of the rules and a two-thirds vote for it to be passed.

Mr. Bryan said furthermore:

"This is an extraordinary resolution, but extraordinary conditions need extraordinary remedies. We are now engaged in the conduct of a convention that

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will place before this country the Democratic nominee, and I assume that every delegate in this convention is here because he wants that nominee elected. It is in order that we may advance the cause of our candidate that I present this resolution.

“There are questions of which a court takes judicial notice; and there are subjects upon which we can assume that the American people are informed. There is not a delegate in this convention who does not know that an effort is being made right now to sell the Democratic Party into bondage to the predatory interests of this nation. It is the most brazen, the most insolent, the most impudent attempt that has been made in the history of American politics to dominate a convention; stifle the honest sentiment of a people and make the nominee the bond-slave of the men who exploit the people of this country.

“I need not tell you that J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan and August Belmont are three of the men who are connected with the great money trust of this country; who are as despotic in their rule of the business of the country, and as merciless in their command of their slaves as any men in the country.

“Some one has suggested that we have no right to discuss the delegates who come here from a sovereign state. I reply, that if these men are willing to insult six and a half million Democrats, we ought to speak out against them, and let them know we resent the insult.

“I, for one, am not willing that Thomas F. Ryan and August Belmont shall come here, with their paid

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attorneys, and seek secret counsel with the managers of this party. And no sense of politeness or courtesy to such men will keep me from protecting my party from the disgrace that they inflict upon us.

“My friends, I cannot speak for you. You have your own responsibility; but if this is to be a convention run by these men; if our nominee is to be their representative and tool, I pray you to give us, who represent constituencies that do not want this, a chance to go on record with our protest against it. If any of you are willing to nominate a candidate who represents these men, or who is under obligation to these men, do it and take the responsibility. I refuse to take that responsibility.

“Some have said that we have not a right to demand the withdrawal of delegates from this convention. I will make you a proposition. One of these men sits with New York and the other sits with Virginia. If the State of New York will take a poll of her delegates, and a majority of them — not Mr. Murphy, but a majority of the delegates on a roll call, where her delegates can have their names recorded and printed — do not ask for the withdrawal of the name of Mr. Belmont; and if Virginia will, on a roll call, protest against the withdrawal of Mr. Ryan, I will then withdraw the last part of the resolution, which demands the withdrawal of these men from the convention. I will withdraw the last part, on the request of the state delegations in which these gentlemen sit; but I will not withdraw the first part, which demands that our candidate shall be free from entanglement with them”.

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Here again Mr. Bryan referred to his six and one-half million votes.

Several of Bryan's friends surged to the platform and urged the withdrawal of the duly elected delegates, Mr. Ryan and Mr. Belmont. He evidently saw that the second part of his resolution was a mistake.

The dashing and brilliant member of the Virginia delegation, Henry D. Flood, rushed to the platform and said:

"In the name of the sovereign State of Virginia, which has 24 votes on this floor, I accept the insolent proposition made by the only man in this convention who wants to destroy the prospect of Democratic success".

Mr. Price, of Virginia, came to the platform and said:

"On behalf of the sovereign State of Virginia, we protest as to the latter part of the resolution; but no one will accede more heartily and more thoroughly to the first part of the resolution than the State of Virginia. Virginia has always been able to control her own internal affairs. She has never yet asked aid or help from any outside influence. If there are undesirable citizens on the delegation from Virginia, Virginia will take that responsibility.

— "Last night, on the Ohio resolution, there were only three and one-half Virginia votes against sustaining the minority report, and to-day, on the Utah resolution, it was unanimous. Virginia is able to right her wrongs and demand her rights at the hands of this convention. Mr. Bryan has very kindly yielded me

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this moment, and he will now make his own statement”.

Mr. Bryan was obviously embarrassed by the latter part of the resolution. He asked the states of Virginia and New York if they were willing to poll their delegates. Virginia was, but New York was not.

Finally, Bryan abdicated on the latter part of the resolution, saying:

“I now withdraw the latter part of the resolution; but I do not intend that any member of this convention shall shield his negative vote, against the principal part of the resolution, by hiding behind the latter part of it. I intend that the men who think the first part of this resolution is either wrong or unnecessary shall have a chance to say so on roll call.

“In answer to the argument of the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. McCorkle) that this question ought not to be brought up now for fear of disturbing harmony, I present him the Bible doctrine — and I challenge him to deny if he can — ‘If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off’. I am sure that if it is worth while to cut off the right hand to save the body, it is worth while to cut off Morgan, Ryan and Belmont to save the Democratic Party”.

Of course, the latter part of the resolution was the only thing that was really offensive. The first part was, in effect, a vote by the delegates as to their freedom from malicious influence and an affirmation of virtue. Some of our delegations were chafing under it, but I sent word to them to that effect.

A roll call showed the initial part of the resolution adopted by this vote: 883 yeas, 201½ nays; not vot-

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ing, 31½. New York voted its entire delegation, Yea. Virginia voted its entire delegation, Yea, with the exception of 1½, not voting.

At the time that Bryan was making his speech, I was standing close by him. I looked at him and Mr. Murphy alternately. I said to myself: "One of two things will happen now. Murphy will sit still, or he will do a very brilliant thing: he will eliminate Wilson from the contest by voting for him." But he did not rise to brilliancy and the convention gradually flooded down to normal, while Mr. Bryan cooled himself with a palm leaf fan.

I remember during this Bryan speech, that Frederick J. Talbott, for many years a member of Congress and a member of the Democratic National Committee, a very old and a very lovable man, but withal possessed of strong traits, passed between me and Mr. Bryan. He shook his fist in Bryan's face and, with the tears streaming down his own, said:

"Everybody in this convention wants the Democrats to win, except you"!

"Uncle Fred" was for Wilson. I gently pulled him back to his seat and said:

"Let the man go on; he has got a lot of speeches to make, and this one had just as well be made now".

After the nominating and seconding speeches, consuming from 3 A. M. to 7 A. M., June 28, the first ballot was taken. It showed Mr. Clark to have 440½, Mr. Wilson 324, Mr. Harmon 148, Mr. Underwood 117½, Mr. Marshall 31, Mr. Baldwin 22, Mr. Sulzer 2, and 2 not voting.

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The vote on the first ballot was, of course, exactly as expected. It was calculated to a certainty.

Before the ballot was taken, I went to a leading Harmon member of the Ohio delegation. I said that, inasmuch as the question of the unit rule had been raised, and although it had been defeated, and 19 votes could be cast for Mr. Wilson, I regarded it a courteous thing that the whole vote of the State of Ohio should be cast for Mr. Harmon on the first ballot. They could state to Wilson delegates in the Ohio delegation that I was quite willing and would recommend such a procedure.

My idea, in addition to the courtesy, was, that by making this generous offer (which I hoped would be accepted by the Wilson men), I would need and get the Harmon support at some stage in the proceeding. We could lend 19 votes for a few ballots, because we did not have the necessary one-third of the convention at that time. The Wilson delegates, who were more strictly anti-Harmon than pro-Wilson, in the main, to my disappointment refused to make the concession.

At this juncture the Wilson votes were: Delaware, 6; Louisiana, 9 out of 11; Michigan, 10 out of 30; Minnesota, 24; New Jersey, 24 out of 28; North Carolina, 16½ out of 24; North Dakota, 10; Ohio, 10 out of 48; Oklahoma, 10 out of 20; Oregon, 10; Pennsylvania, 71 out of 76; South Carolina, 18; South Dakota, 10; Tennessee gave each of the leading candidates, Clark, Wilson, Harmon and Underwood, 6; Texas, 40; Utah, 6 out of 8; Virginia, 9½ out of 14½;

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Wisconsin, 19 out of 26; Hawaii, 3 out of 6; Porto Rico, 3 out of 6. Total, 324.

Mr. Clark secured Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, part of Louisiana, part of Maine, Maryland and Massachusetts; part of Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 1 in Ohio, half of Oklahoma, Rhode Island, part of Tennessee, part of Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, most of Alaska, District of Columbia, part of Hawaii, and Porto Rico. This made a total of 440½. It is to be observed that Mr. Clark's votes were well spread over the Union; that Mr. Harmon's votes were pretty well confined to Ohio and New York, with a few scattering votes. Mr. Underwood's votes were limited to the South, with a few scattering votes elsewhere. It is readily seen that the Underwood and Harmon votes, as a class, were very nearly identical in nature. They constituted all that part of the convention that wished a "safe" candidate. The various Clark delegations were honeycombed with men who were really at heart for some of the other candidates.

When we went into the convention, I was confident that the greatest potential strength lay in Mr. Underwood's candidacy; that is, the votes could be delivered without much persuasion, and speedily. I told our floor managers that if we could get by the tenth ballot without Mr. Underwood's nomination, he could be gradually marooned in the South. My theory was, that unless the votes were developed quickly for him,

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his managers would take the position of hoping to be the residuary legatees of Clark, Wilson or Harmon, or all of them.

I, therefore, advised our Floor Committee not to make any attempt to take votes from Mr. Underwood. I preferred that his strength in the South should remain normal, because votes in his hands were safer than elsewhere. I also suggested that we should devote our energies to the Clark delegates, in order to bring out the Wilson strength that lay among them. I was quite sure that the Harmon strength would atrophy of itself.

I knew that Mr. Marshall, Mr. Baldwin, and Mr. Foss would receive the votes of their states because they were their governors, and the delegations preferred to wait until things developed.

But reverting to the Underwood situation: My analysis of the convention was that upon quick development, in addition to the delegates that he had, Underwood might have had California, a large part of Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 4 from New Jersey, New York, most of Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, most of Virginia and West Virginia. A fair analysis showed that Mr. Harmon's candidacy was impossible and Mr. Underwood was the natural legatee of this strength.

Mr. Clark's delegations had a great many Underwood men among them. I reasoned this way on the tactics of the situation: I did not have an idea that Mr. Clark could be nominated, but I determined to

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pull out the Wilson strength from his delegations as quickly as possible, to forestall the same move on the part of the Underwood men. I had not much hope of the Harmon strength.

The first night of the convention was long and tedious. The nominating speeches were of course long. After we took our first ballot, Friday, about 7 A. M., we adjourned until 4 P. M.

Ballot number two showed Clark with a gain of 5. Wilson gained 15½. Harmon and Underwood lost slightly.

Proselyting tactics continued in the third ballot. The result was about the same.

On the fourth ballot we broke into Connecticut for 1 vote and into Nebraska for 3. We got several scattering delegates which put Wilson up to 351. I was aiming at something more than one-third of the delegations early, so that we could have a veto power. My plan was to pledge and repledge these delegates to stand by Wilson,— to cheer them all the time with the argument that he could be nominated. This we did before and after every session of the convention.

The result was that we had very few defections. I was never fearful of a defection, for I had it ascertained positively, before each session, that our votes would stay with us. That left my mind free to work out the problem of accession.

The sixth, seventh and eighth ballots remained about the same all around. So did the ninth.

On the tenth ballot the fireworks began. New York changed its 90 votes from Harmon to Clark. Most of

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Tennessee went to Clark. Mr. Harmon was deserted. The Underwood strength practically remained intact. Mr. Clark had 556 votes, or more than a majority.

The convention was in bedlam. The standards were taken from the various delegations. There was a great march of the delegates about the hall and over the platform.

To the casual observer, it looked as though Mr. Clark was the sure nominee of the convention, for no Democrat had ever failed of nomination in a convention who had received a majority of its votes (with one possible exception).

I got word down to the various Wilson delegations that were standing like a rock, that this was as high as Mr. Clark could possibly go, and that if a majority were a prerequisite of nominating him, he would never have gotten it. The 90 votes of New York, for example, would not have been cast for him if it was necessary to give him two-thirds.

It was clear to me that the move was made to eliminate Mr. Wilson. Furthermore, I was sure that the Underwood managers understood the situation and would not leave him for Mr. Clark. Mr. Harmon was out of the race.

Chairman Ollie James, in announcing the vote, like an exhorter at a camp meeting, shouted:

“No candidate having received two-thirds of the vote cast, no nomination is made. Mr. Clark having received eleven more than a majority, is not the nominee until he receives two-thirds.” The language was considered an exceedingly unfair attempt on the part

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of Senator James to indicate that it was now the duty of the convention to nominate Mr. Clark. This brought forth a violent Wilson protest.

I was standing with Billy Hughes of New Jersey. I called his attention to the perfectly egregious position which Chairman James was taking to implore the convention, under the stimulus of a wave, to give the two-thirds to Clark. Hughes was one of James' closest friends. He said: "I will fix him"!

Hughes went to the desk and said to James: "There is a movement among the delegates to depose you as Chairman because of such unparliamentary tactics".

The effect on Chairman James was instantaneous. After that he was indulgent and polite to a degree.

After the Clark demonstration, we gave the word for a Wilson demonstration. Again bedlam broke forth. Sentiment in the gallery was pronouncedly with Governor Wilson.

XI

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BEGS MCCOMBS TO WITHDRAW HIS NAME AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE — MCCOMBS REPLIES: "YOU BET YOUR LIFE, I WON'T"! — OTHER INSTANCES OF WILSON'S TRYING TO QUIT WHEN HE FEARED DEFEAT — BRYAN EXCORIATES MURPHY AND "SUBTLETY" — SWINGS TO WILSON.

EARLY FRIDAY, June 28, I was apprised that Senator William J. Stone, manager for Champ Clark, had sent a telegram to Governor Wilson, at Sea Girt, insisting that he withdraw. The message urged that never in the history of the Democratic Party had a Democratic candidate, receiving a majority of the votes in a convention, failed of a nomination. The Missourian argued that it was useless for Governor Wilson to continue in the field, and that his nomination was impossible. Therefore, it was his patriotic duty to quit.

The moment I learned of the Stone message, I called up Governor Wilson. He admitted having received the Stone telegram, and added: "Governor Stone's logic is correct. You are authorized to withdraw my name from further consideration".

I begged the Governor, if only to protect his supporters, to abandon such an idea. I pleaded that

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thousands of members of his party had risked their political and financial lives for him. He owed it to them to stick as long as they would stick.

The Governor seemed obdurate and I rang off.

About 2 A. M., Saturday, I was sitting alongside of Chairman James on the convention hall platform. Walter W. Vick handed me a message. It had come by 'phone to our headquarters at the Hotel Emerson, and had been relayed from there.

I was engaged in reforming our lines and did not inspect the message promptly enough to suit Vick. Pale, and apparently alarmed, Vick begged me to read the paper.

It was another message from Governor Wilson. It again insisted that I take him out of the race. He specifically directed me to release the delegates who had been voting for him.

I was thoroughly enraged. I felt that if loyal Wilson men were willing to fight to the last for the Governor, he at least might maintain his nerve and stand with them. I also had an abiding faith that he was to be nominated, though Clark still had a majority, but not the necessary two-thirds.

Turning to Vick, I said: "The Governor wants to withdraw"!

"You won't let him now, will you"? inquired Vick.

"You bet your life I won't"! I answered. "Not a word about this to anyone", I added.

I tucked the Governor's instructions into my pocket. They remained there until the convention nominated him. That act of itself made history, for which I hope

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to be forgiven. Had the contents of that message become noised about that convention hall, Woodrow Wilson would never have been President of the United States. There would have been a stampede to Clark, and he and not Wilson would have been nominated.

My position was that Governor Wilson was not through until he was "knocked out". He owed it to his friends, if not to himself, to remain in the fight until the finish.

As I, suffering from loss of sleep, fought to hold the Wilsonian delegates, I could not help recalling other occasions when Wilson would have destroyed himself but for my interposition.

I had known him to be subject to frequent panics and overweening pride. I learned, from many experiences, that Wilson was the boldest man when victory was near and the first to withdraw when defeat threatened.

When we lost the Illinois primaries by an overwhelming majority to Champ Clark, Governor Wilson in alarm despatched a Princeton professor to me. He said:

"The Governor feels it is useless for him to remain longer in the field. He authorizes me to say to you that he wishes to withdraw from the contest for the Presidential nomination. He desires to do this gracefully now, so as to avoid the humiliation of defeat".

My reply was: "My good Professor, please tell the Governor that you saw me, and that I said that he should consider others than himself. He should remember that a lot of people may fare worse than he

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because they have given up their time and their money and risked their political future in his cause. He will have to debate it with me and give a better argument before I will listen". I never heard from the Professor again.

When the Governor passed Clark and secured a majority of the delegates himself, he called me on the 'phone and said: "I was wrong and you were right. My eternal gratitude to you. You knew the situation. I did not. I shall never forget your loyalty and your courage".

After getting Governor Wilson's instructions to withdraw, and forgetting them, the Governor called me up again and asked if I had made public a message to Mr. Bryan agreeing that no candidate should accept the support of Charles F. Murphy.

"No, but we have secured enough delegates to nominate you since you sent the note, Governor", I replied.

"That's fine! That's fine! I thank you most profoundly", added the Governor.

On the eleventh ballot, an incident occurred which was small, apparently, in significance, but proved to be of great value. Mr. Ives, of Arizona, changed his vote to Wilson. Mr. Clark receded 2 and Mr. Wilson gained 4.

On the following ballot Mr. Clark lost a few votes again. Evidently, the managers of Mr. Clark were quite willing to stand where they were at this time. I very much doubted the wisdom of it, but from their viewpoint they had lost very few votes, and by one of those fortuitous events of a convention might arouse

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further enthusiasm. We were quite willing to adjourn and look for weaknesses in our delegations and develop further strength if possible.

The adjournment was at 3 o'clock Saturday morning, June 29th, until 1 P. M. During this and the previous night not a single one of the Wilson managers had taken off his clothes.

As I walked out of the hall I was sure that the Clark candidacy was gone. Again, it was possible to cast his strength to Mr. Underwood or some other candidate. If the late Mayor Gaynor of New York ever had a chance in the convention it was at this moment, when by moving New York and a few other states to him a real sentiment might have been built up.

At the end of the session the floor leaders were desperately tired. Six or eight of us went over to the Belvidere Hotel and woke up a sleeping waiter. We had arrived at that state of exhaustion where neither food nor drink appealed to us. After sitting for ten or fifteen minutes, in some strange way watermelon occurred to me. I said:

"Gentlemen, in celebration of the forthcoming nomination of Woodrow Wilson in this convention, I wish you to join me in raising to our lips luscious, red, Georgia watermelon".

That was all we had. We analyzed the vote, studied the tactics of the situation and planned the next session until about 7 o'clock in the morning.

Of course, the first move was to reassure and repledge our delegations.

I got out my long book, showing the utmost Clark

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strength. I told my friends that I could reach that Clark was through.

After a long discussion of ways and means and the delegations we desired to secure, I concluded that the first thing to do was to pledge every Wilson delegation for the day. This was agreed to, with the exception of one leader of giant physique, who left the room saying he was an "opportunist" (Frederick B. Lynch, of Minnesota [Ed.]).

Saturday found all our delegations well tightened up and safe. It was clear that the best thing was to carry through the general Clark "potting" process, turn every Bryan move to our advantage, and watch for some tactical change.

The opening ballot, at 1 o'clock P. M., showed a Clark loss of a few votes and a Wilson P. M. gain of a few. Governor Foss of Massachusetts for the first time entered with two votes.

On the fourteenth ballot Nebraska asked to be passed. Nebraska then asked to be polled. When the name of Mr. Bryan was reached he said:

"As long as Mr. Ryan's agent, as long as New York's 90 votes are recorded for Mr. Clark, I withhold my vote from him and cast it" —

At this point there was a demonstration.

Senator Stone requested that Mr. Bryan be heard, and asked unanimous consent, which was agreed to.

Mr. Bryan resumed:

"The vote of the State of New York in this convention, as cast under the unit rule, does not represent the intelligence, the virtue, the Democracy or the patriot-

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ism of the 90 men who are here. It represents the will of one man — Charles F. Murphy — and he represents the influences that dominated the Republican convention at Chicago and are trying to dominate this convention. If we nominate a candidate under conditions that enable these influences to say to our candidate, ‘Remember now thy Creator’, we cannot hope to appeal to the confidence of the progressive Democrats and Republicans of the nation. Nebraska, or that portion of the delegation for which I am authorized to speak, is not willing to participate in the nomination of any man who is willing to violate the resolution adopted by this convention, and to accept the high honor of the Presidential nomination at the hands of Mr. Murphy.

“When we were instructed for Mr. Clark, the Democratic voters who instructed us did so with the distinct understanding that Mr. Clark stood for progressive Democracy. Mr. Clark’s representatives appealed for support on no other ground. They contended that Mr. Clark was more progressive than Mr. Wilson, and indignantly denied that there was any co-operation between Mr. Clark and the reactionary element of the party. Upon no other condition could Mr. Clark have received a plurality of the Democratic vote of Nebraska.

“The thirteen delegates for whom I speak stand ready to carry out the instructions given in the spirit in which they were given, and upon the conditions under which they were given; but some of these delegates — I cannot say for how many I can speak,

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because we have not had a chance to take a poll — will not participate in the nomination of any man whose nomination depends upon the vote of the New York delegation.

“I shall withhold my vote from Mr. Clark as long as New York’s vote is recorded for him. And the position that I take in regard to Mr. Clark I will take in regard to any other candidate whose name is now or may be before the convention. I shall not be a party to the nomination of any man who will not, when elected, be absolutely free to carry out the anti-Morgan-Ryan-Belmont resolution and make his administration reflect the wishes and hopes of those who believe in a government of the people, by the people and for the people.

“If we nominate a candidate who is under no obligation to these interests which speak through Mr. Murphy, I shall offer a resolution authorizing and directing the Presidential candidate to select a campaign committee to manage the campaign, in order that he may not be compelled to suffer the humiliation and act under the embarrassment that I have, in having men participate in the management of his campaign who have no sympathy with the party’s aims, and in whose Democracy the general public has no confidence.

“Having explained the position taken by myself and those in the delegation who view the subject from the same standpoint, I will now announce my vote” —

Governor McCorkle, of West Virginia, asked Mr. Bryan whether he intended to be understood that he

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would not support the nominee of the convention if he were voted for and nominated by the vote of the State of New York in the convention.

Mr. Bryan replied:

“I distinguish between refusing to be a party to the nomination of a candidate and refusing to support him.

“Now I am prepared to announce my vote, unless again interrupted. With the understanding that I shall stand ready to withdraw my vote from the one for whom I am going to cast it, whenever New York casts her vote for him, I cast my vote for Nebraska’s second choice, Governor Wilson”.

The result of the Nebraska poll showed 12 for Wilson and 4 for Clark.

Mr. Bryan’s subtlety was apparent. The only construction that could be placed upon it was that he was seeking the nomination for himself. Mr. Clark had about one-half of the convention. Mr. Wilson lacked nearly 100 votes of a majority. By the accession of certain Bryan strength in the Clark delegations, Mr. Clark and Mr. Wilson could be brought up to about even numbers.

For months reports had come to me that it was Mr. Bryan’s personal desire that this be the case in the Baltimore convention. Indeed, I had direct reports from Wisconsin and other states that he wished the delegations to be divided between Wilson and Clark, the reasoning being that a deadlock between these two delegations would produce enough strength in the

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event of a breakup to nominate him. Mr. Bryan began to feel that the Clark strength was too great.

Governor Brewer, of Mississippi, propounded this question to Mr. Bryan:

“If Mr. Clark, Mr. Underwood, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Harmon, Mr. Kern, or Governor Foss is nominated by this convention by a two-thirds majority, with New York voting for the man who is nominated, will you support the Democratic nominee?”

Mr. Bryan replied:

“I deny the right of any man to put a hypothetical question to me, unless he is prepared to put into that question every essential element that is necessary to be understood before it can be answered intelligently. I have no expectation that any nomination in this convention will be secured in any way, or under any conditions, that will prevent my giving” —

Mr. Bryan was interrupted, but continuing, said:

“I expect to support the nominee of this convention. I do not expect anyone to be nominated here who will not deserve the support of the Democratic Party. I do not expect anyone to be nominated who would permit a partnership between Morgan, Ryan, Belmont and himself. But I do not consider myself under obligations to give bond to answer the question categorically until the conditions arise when I can know what I am answering”!

On the fourteenth ballot Mr. Wilson made a further gain. Mr. Underwood began to sink.

On the sixteenth ballot Idaho asked to be polled, with accessions of two for Wilson. The unit rule was

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applied. We considered the polling of delegations, at frequent intervals, although bound by the unit rule, tended strongly to show Wilson strength in the delegations and a desire to change. This tactic was used to bolster up the enthusiasm that we already had, and to continue the solidity of our delegations. I gave them distinct hope that at some time, the delegations which asked to be polled, and which showed unknown Wilson strength, would ultimately break over. I regarded it as of tremendous psychological value.

On the seventeenth ballot Tennessee asked to be polled. The poll showed Mr. Clark was being deserted, and an attempt was being made to shift the strength from him to Underwood. This was offset by further accessions to the Wilson camp.

The nineteenth ballot showed about the same conditions.

On the twentieth ballot Mr. Clark sank to 512, and Mr. Wilson went from 358 to 388.

On the twenty-first ballot, the State of Washington asked to be polled, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ votes were declared for Mr. Wilson. The Washington delegation was very tightly controlled by Hugh R. Wallace and Judge Turner. As soon as I found that $2\frac{1}{2}$ votes could be relied on in that delegation I had the fact brought out by the poll. Wyoming then asked to be polled. It showed 2 votes for Mr. Wilson. The whole 6 votes had theretofore been cast for Mr. Clark. The unit rule applied, but the sentiment was shown. ³⁹⁵

On the next ballot Mr. Wilson went to ~~352~~³⁹¹ $\frac{1}{2}$, with Mr. Clark down to 508. Mr. Francis, of Missouri,

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moved for an adjournment. The motion was defeated. We were on the up grade.

On the twenty-second ballot, Massachusetts changed its vote to 2 for Clark and 34 for Foss. Vermont cast its 8 votes for Foss. The Clark vote was lessened, while the Wilson vote remained practically stationary.

On the twenty-third ballot Clark slipped a few votes, while Mr. Wilson gained a few. Mr. Foss received 45.

The next ballot showed no important change except that Mr. Foss lost 2, while Mr. Clark gained.

The sharpshooters were at work.

After consultation with one of the Wilson leaders I concluded that it was about time to poll the Iowa delegation. The result showed 9 for Wilson and 17 for Clark. The unit rule prevailed, but the strength was shown. The psychology was apparent. Governor Wilson got an accession of $3\frac{1}{2}$ votes.

At this point Senator Stone made a very adroit suggestion:

“I ask the unanimous consent of this convention to the following agreement,—that after two additional ballots, the candidate receiving the smallest number of votes be dropped, and after the next ballot thereafter the candidate receiving the smallest vote on that ballot be dropped, and so on until the last ballot; and that on that ballot the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes be declared the nominee of the convention”.

The introduction of this motion required unanimous consent. Objection was made. The motion was never put. Its object, however, was apparent.

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Mr. Marshall would have disappeared, Mr. Foss would have disappeared, Mr. Underwood would have disappeared, leaving the contest between Wilson and Clark. Senator Stone no doubt thought that Massachusetts would return to Mr. Clark, that Indiana would go for him, and that the Underwood vote might follow. There was every reason to believe that this would be true.

Mr. Clark was getting into desperate straits. If the Wilson managers had not been alert, the motion might possibly have been put. But whether they objected or not, I am confident that the Underwood managers would have objected, because there is every reason to believe that they still hoped to be residuary legatees of the convention.

On the very next ballot Mr. Clark dropped 27 votes. Governor Wilson's vote remained about the same.

Wilson sentiment had begun to work on the Maryland delegation. A poll showed 12 votes for Clark, 2½ votes for Wilson and 1½ not voting. These tactics had been winning votes for us right along. Wherever we could get a poll we demanded it. I resolved to keep up the practice as a continuous performance.

But let me revert to the Washington delegation.

When I began seeking an entry into that delegation for the purposes of a poll, I thought that the intellectual polish of Governor Wilson might appeal to women. Washington had a woman on its delegation. I accordingly selected the two most suave and handsome men that we had to lay siege to the lady. They

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were present Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson and Joseph E. Davies, now Commissioner of Corporations. In the various lulls I could observe these two on their way back to the Washington delegation straightening their ties, smoothing their hair and preparing to give first-class imitations of gallants and cavaliers.

The lady was fat and of stern appearance. They would spend ten or fifteen minutes with her and come away with every appearance of being complete misogynists. Nevertheless, I cheered them on. The lady was not susceptible. She voted for Clark until the very last ballot. Whether this gives any light on the question of women in politics I do not know. It is merely mentioned here for what it is worth, and as an incident.

Shortly before the twenty-sixth ballot I had a conference with Mr. Burleson and Mr. Palmer. We concluded that we had about reached our strength for the time being. It was about 10 o'clock at night. We concluded an attempt at adjournment. Sunday was approaching. We went to the Clark and Underwood managers. They agreed that one more ballot should be taken and that then we should adjourn.

At that time the weary delegates were standing in the aisles, waiting for an adjournment, glad to get out of the heat. The adjournment was taken. The convention was next to be in session at 11 o'clock Monday morning.

Mr. McCombs' narrative again suddenly stops.

From notes of his own and data supplied for the

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book by Walker W. Vick and others, it seems that there was a breach of agreement or serious and almost fatal misunderstanding between Mr. McCombs and Senator Stone as to just when adjournment should become effective.

This provoked a quarrel between Mr. McCombs and Mr. Palmer, head of the Pennsylvania delegation, which did not heal for a long time.

According to the scattered manuscript, the twenty-sixth ballot had hardly been completed when Mr. McCombs hurried to Roger C. Sullivan, chairman of the Illinois delegation.

"Now, Roger, this is your chance"! said McCombs. "You can name the next President on the next ballot. Hurry up"!

"All right, Billie, I'll call my delegation together", replied Sullivan, as he gathered his Illinoisans in a side room.

When the Prairie State delegates got together, McCombs uttered a fervent appeal. He said:

"Clark has shot his bolt. He never again can get a majority, much less two-thirds. Harmon has withdrawn. Underwood will soon be out of it. Compromise on a dark horse is impossible. If Illinois will come in, she will get the credit for naming the winner".

A controversy followed. Ultra-Clark men insisted that all was not over with their favorite. Sullivan, himself, was skeptical if it were the psychological moment to desert the Missourian.

"Act quick, Roger! They are calling the roll", pleaded McCombs, in a frenzy.

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Sullivan directed a poll of his delegation. To the delight of McCombs, and the astonishment of Sullivan, it showed 40 for Wilson and only 18 for Clark.

Under the unit rule, Sullivan would be authorized to cast the entire 58 votes for Wilson.

"I'll throw the whole delegation to Wilson on next ballot, Billie", said Sullivan to McCombs, as the two, followed by the Illinois contingent, flocked back to the convention hall.

McCombs was amazed, on reaching the auditorium, to discover hundreds of delegates streaming out. The band was playing "Good Night, Ladies".

"What does this mean"? demanded McCombs, in tones of mingled surprise and disgust.

"Adjourned until Monday"! yelled someone.

"Who ordered this"? shouted McCombs, in wrath.

"Don't know, but the Clark men put it over", was the response.

Mr. McCombs, amid the uproar, ascertained that while he was corralling the Illinois delegation, Senator Stone and A. Mitchell Palmer had put their heads together.

"Everybody is hungry and tired. We want food and sleep. Let's quit now until Monday", said the cunning Stone to Palmer in McCombs' absence from the floor.

Palmer, exhausted and discouraged, suspected no trap.

"All right, Governor, make your motion to adjourn and I will not oppose it", he answered the Clark manager.

WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG

McCombs sought Palmer. In a fury he exclaimed:

“Why did you agree to this adjournment? The compact was for one more ballot before we quit”.

“I regarded it useless for us to continue to-night and believed we could get more votes for Wilson on Monday”, was the reply of the Quaker from the Keystone State.

“I had it all fixed with Roger Sullivan to bring his whole brood to Wilson on the next ballot. You have ‘gunmed the cards’,—maybe ruined our chance to win”, McCombs shouted in rage.

“I knew nothing about Illinois. I was busy on the floor holding our people in line”! was Palmer’s meek reply.

“Why not consult me once in a while? I am running the Wilson campaign, and took the job before I ever heard of you”, retorted McCombs.

“Await orders from me hereafter”! was his parting shot at Palmer.

McCombs, who had had little or no sleep for seventy-two hours, dashed back to the Belvidere. He issued a hurry call for all his counsellors.

“It’s a shameful mess and Mitchell Palmer got us into it. But we have twenty-four hours to clear it up”, said McCombs to his adjutants.

XII

BRYAN UNMASKS

IN DESHABILLE, HE BESEECHES MCCOMBS TO DESERT WILSON AND NOMINATE HIM — THE PETITION SPURNED INDIGNANTLY — MITCHELL PALMER'S PLAN THWARTED — MAYOR GAYNOR BOWLED OUT — MURPHY SAYS "LET CAUCUS DECIDE" — WILSON LEADS CLARK FOR THE FIRST TIME — JAMES ORDERS ANTI-UNIT RULE ENFORCED — ALMOST A DEATH-BLOW TO CLARK.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — McCombs' narrative is here resumed.]

IT BECAME apparent that we must get into Sunday in order to maintain our strength, which was about 60 votes behind Clark. I suggested to Daniel F. Cohalan, of New York, that he should get as early an adjournment as possible so as to go into Sunday for recruiting. He and I went to Senator Stone. Stone agreed to a meeting at 11 o'clock P. M. We then went along with the voting sagging back and forth, and finally got up to within 40 votes of Clark, Harmon and Underwood hanging back in the rear with 110 and 117 votes, respectively.

While they were counting the last ballot before the adjournment, I was informed by one of my special messengers that Mr. Clark was on the way to the convention to appear personally in answer to Bryan's speech. While many disagree with me, and I am told

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most of Clark's friends did, he was on the way to the Convention Hall, and close by, when we were near the end of counting the last ballot before the agreed adjournment.

It was my view that Mr. Clark should be allowed to come on the stage at all hazards. I reasoned that, while the attack may have been justified, he would commit suicide so far as the convention was concerned. I rushed several members down, including Senator Hughes, of New Jersey, to tell Senator Stone that we were willing to take another ballot. The purpose of that was to allow Mr. Clark time to get on the floor. However, the delegates were drifting into the aisles, and going away, and my messengers were wholly unable to reach Senator Stone. Therefore, the count on that ballot was completed, the convention was adjourned, and Mr. Clark, too, departed.

I have always regretted that this dramatic incident did not take place. Purely as a dramatic incident, it would have filled the night! In my opinion, it would have fixed the convention for Mr. Wilson permanently. However, I returned to my hotel, went to my room, bathed, and put on a fresh suit to work through the night.

At this stage, Mr. Bryan was permitted among us by his speech for Wilson, although he had delivered only 18 votes. We had about as much of Bryanism as the convention could endure.

Nevertheless, about midnight, Mr. Bryan's brother Charles came to my room, which was at the other end of the hall from Mr. Bryan's room, and asked if I

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would have a talk with Mr. Bryan. I said, "Of course"!

I appeared in a few moments, as fresh as a man might be who had been at work since 8 in the morning.

Friends who were in Mr. Bryan's room disappeared instantly. We were alone. He was standing in a corner, with his side face to me. His appearance was very grim. His mouth looked like a mouth that has been created by a slit of a razor. He was clad in a brown undershirt, baggy black trousers and a pair of carpet slippers. His hair was ruffled.

Mr. Bryan turned to me and, greeting me briskly, said:

"McCombs, *you* know that Wilson cannot be nominated. *I* know that Clark cannot be nominated. You must turn your forces to a progressive Democrat like me", placing a forefinger vigorously on his chest.

I replied with great moderation, because I did not want him to have a chance to break out again:

"Mr. Bryan, you have been in national politics longer than I have; but Mr. Wilson has entrusted me with the management of his campaign in Baltimore. I told him before I left Sea Girt that I would rise or fall with his fortunes. We have not fallen"! and I rapidly left the room.

Mr. Bryan was in a rage. I had secured the true Bryan position, which I had suspected since in March of 1912, namely,—to create an equal Wilson and Clark strength, break through the middle and get the nomination. This suspicion came to me early in March, when several mid-Western leaders, or their

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representatives, told me that Mr. Bryan had suggested that they divide their state delegations equally between Wilson and Clark. I at once concluded that Mr. Bryan was a candidate on the "break through the middle" theory. I told them to go back home and get as many delegates as they could for Wilson; that they would be our delegates when they got to Baltimore and would not shift to anyone else.

Sunday I got busy among the Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Maryland and other delegations. That day a very astonishing event happened. At the house of the brother-in-law of A. Mitchell Palmer (later Attorney General), there met Messrs. Palmer, of Pennsylvania, and Burleson, of Texas, both of our forces; Judge Cohalan, Mr. Murphy, of New York, and Mr. Sullivan, of Illinois. I knew of the event within twenty minutes after the meeting began.

The purpose on the face of it was to come to a conclusion as to a candidate, pretending to be for Underwood, but really being for Palmer. I had made Palmer floor parliamentarian for the purpose of holding him tight. I wanted him put in a position to have to say Woodrow Wilson every fifteen minutes during the convention. Palmer's first choice was himself,—strangely enough, because he had no backing. The Philadelphia end of his delegation bitterly opposed him and only came in through my work. I kept my eye on Palmer continuously. I gave him things to do that were immaterial, but made him appear for Woodrow Wilson. The Sunday conference proved I was correct in my suspicions.

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I went to Palmer Sunday night and told him the details of that conference, and that if he did another thing I had fifty good husky Irishmen to throw him out of Baltimore. There was no more display.

Burleson, because he had no standing at the convention to speak of, I utterly ignored in the matter. We never brought him into any conference that was of any value. Even after the campaign was organized, I put Burleson in a position in which there was absolutely nothing to do. He was one who could go to Coney Island or spend his evenings on the roof gardens as pleasantly as he might.

About 5 o'clock P. M. Sunday, after we had been pushing back and forth wearily most of the day, and without much headway, Norman E. Mack, Chairman of the National Democratic Committee, asked me to go into a conference in his room at the Belvidere.

I agreed readily because there was not much happening, nor much ready to happen. I found there, beside Mr. Mack, A. Mitchell Palmer, who spoke sometimes for Woodrow Wilson; William J. Stone and David R. Francis, representing Champ Clark; William Bankhead, manager for Oscar W. Underwood; Thomas T. Taggart, manager for Thomas R. Marshall; Roger Sullivan, of Illinois; Luke Shea, of Tennessee, and Charles F. Murphy, of New York.

Mr. Mack started by saying that we must select a candidate, and that this convention appeared to be deadlocked. Therefore, we were gathered for a conference.

I regarded it as a set-up game. Mr. Mack called

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on me first to speak about conditions in the convention, and the probability of our agreeing upon a candidate. I sparred and said that I saw present two of the elder statesmen of the Democratic Party, Senator Stone and Senator Bankhead, and that it would be impudence on my part to speak before they did. My purpose was to get at the real meaning of the conferees.

Senator Bankhead made a very bitter speech against the Wilson forces. Advancing within two feet of me, he said that I knew Woodrow Wilson could not be nominated, and that I should not be put in a position of the dog-in-the-manger. Senator Stone made a mellifluous oration about the traditions of the Democratic Party, the seriousness of its purposes, its great principles and the necessity of allowing the delegates to make a choice at the earliest possible moment so that they might go home. Then he turned to me and, pointing his finger at me, said:

“Mr. McCombs, Mr. Bryan has asked each candidate in this convention if he would take the nomination if the votes of New York were necessary thereto. What is your position”?

Of course, I knew that either answer to that question was wrong. If I said Governor Wilson would take those votes under the conditions, it would immediately get to the Convention Hall, and all the Bryan influence and radicals of the West, of which we had many, would discard Wilson forever. Either answer to that question meant destruction.

It came my time to speak. I talked about four

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minutes upon the reason why Wilson should be nominated and sat down. I did not know how many disappointments there were. But I recall that Mr. Murphy took me by the shoulder and said:

“You’re all right, young fellow”!

Then we proceeded into the anteroom, where Mr. Mack had provided a buffet. I, as graciously as I could, opened a bottle of beer, gave a glass to Senator Stone, lifted mine to the flag above the mantel, he doing the same.

I said: “Senator, no matter who is the nominee of this convention, the Republic will survive”!

We resumed the occupation of selecting a candidate as best we might.

Results of the Sunday and Monday conferences were:

First, a definite conclusion on the part of everyone that Woodrow Wilson would be a candidate before that convention until the last; second, that Mitchell Palmer, as a candidate for the Presidency, might as well have been in Shantung.

[EDITOR'S NOTE—Narrative here taken up by editor from Mr. McCombs' notes.]

During Sunday Mr. McCombs devoted himself especially to delegates from his own State of New York, led by Charles F. Murphy, and Indiana, led by Thomas T. Taggart.

Murphy was sticking by Clark, and Taggart by Marshall.

McCombs summoned all the Wilson men from New York that he could muster. These delegates

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responded: Senator James A. O'Gorman, John B. Stanchfield, J. Sergeant Cram, Charles B. Alexander, James W. Gerard, Lawrence Godkin, William G. McAdoo, Samuel Untermeyer, Alonzo McLoughlin, Edward Lazansky, Abram I. Elkus, Herman Ridder, Henry L. Schurman, Thomas D. McCarthy, and others.

McCombs directed them to keep banging away at Murphy and his adherents to quit throwing away their votes on a "dead one" and cast them for a "live one".

Then McCombs assailed Murphy himself. He told him that he would be mighty lonesome if he persisted in supporting Clark; that he had been deserted by Roger C. Sullivan and other comrades, and that Taggart, with his Hoosiers, would soon follow Sullivan into the Wilson camp.

Murphy was obdurate. He was loyal to Clark for the nonce. He began to weaken, however, when Thomas F. Smith, his most trusted adviser, warned him that he would again risk political jeopardy if he persisted in delaying a junction in the naming of Wilson.

To add to Mr. McCombs' perplexity in getting hold of the entire New York delegation, the William J. Gaynor boosters got to work. Mr. Gaynor was then Mayor of New York. He was ambitious to be President. Corporation Counsel Archibald R. Watson, Fire Commissioner Joseph F. Johnson, and other members of the Gaynor cabinet, were doing their utmost to break into the Empire State and other delegations. They had greatly impressed William J.

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Bryan that Gaynor could at least be used to defeat Clark. They were almost incessantly prodding Mr. Murphy with the argument that neither Clark nor Wilson could be nominated, and that here was his chance to name a New Yorker.

McCombs sought to block the Gaynor movement with pleas that the Mayor's Democracy was of a dubious brand. As an aspirant for judicial and mayoralty honors, he had demanded support from the most implacable enemies of the party, and he had, after his election, refused to fulfil his contracts with the organization that nominated him. In proof of this, Mr. McCombs produced a list of appointments of the "Mugwump" stamp and another list of loyal Democrats who, as applicants for office, had been denied preferment of any sort.

Early Sunday morning, Mr. McCombs discovered that Senator Stone, the Clark field marshal, was still conniving to force the withdrawal of all "trailers". That is, he was planning to put out of the race Underwood, Harmon, Baldwin, and other aspirants, and bring their supporters in a block to Clark.

Thomas F. Ryan was found trying to deliver his Underwood men to Clark. Ohio delegates pledged to Harmon were being importuned to desert him, while Homer S. Cummings had been approached to withdraw the Governor of Connecticut and line up with the Missourian.

McCombs put Roger Sullivan to work on the Virginians who stuck to Underwood, and the Ohioans who held on for Harmon. He also induced Edmund

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H. Moore, manager for Harmon, to withhold as many Harmon men as he could control from Clark. Newton D. Baker, too, aided in preserving the integrity of the Harmon forces so far as Clark invasions were concerned, and helped to pick off a few delegates from the Buckeye State for Wilson.

Meantime, all the managers were being besought to "stake" impoverished delegates who were threatened with being dispossessed of their lodgings and denied food. McCombs, Stone, Francis, Bankhead, and others, were constantly implored to furnish means for room rent and food. Threats were made by many delegates that if they were not given funds they would board the first train for their homes.

Managers for all the candidates had to put up large sums of money to hold proprietors of votes in Baltimore for at least another twenty-four or forty-eight hours. They turned their pockets inside out and borrowed right and left to satisfy the demands of sleepy, hungry delegates.

Despite all the Sunday exertions of Mr. McCombs and his associates, the initial ballot (twenty-seventh) on Monday was intensely disappointing. Wilson got but $406\frac{1}{2}$,—a loss of one since Saturday night. Clark held 469, which had been cast for him on the twenty-fifth. On the twenty-eighth ballot, however, Wilson suddenly gained a block of 30. One only came from Clark; the others were deserters from Harmon, Underwood and Baldwin.

On the thirtieth, Wilson jumped into the lead for the first time. His supporters shouted in glee.

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As the Clerk called, "Wilson, 460; Clark, 455," the band struck up "Glory, Glory, Hallelujah"! The Pennsylvania delegates, led by Palmer and Guffey, chanted:

"Pennsyl, Pennsylv, Pennsylvania!
Pennsylv, Pennsylv, Pennsylvania!
Pennsylv, Pennsylv, Pennsylvania!
We'll vote for Wilson too!"

Counting on Wilson leaping to the van on the thirtieth, McCombs rushed over to Roger Sullivan and begged: "Now, Roger, make good. You promised that Illinois would come in on the twenty-sixth. Get a move on"!

But Mr. Murphy and Mr. Taggart had seen Sullivan since McCombs had. They had persuaded him to "hold off" for awhile.

On the thirty-first Wilson scored $475\frac{1}{2}$ and Clark $446\frac{1}{2}$.

The thirty-second chalked up $477\frac{1}{2}$ for Wilson and $447\frac{1}{2}$ for Clark.

On the thirty-fifth Wilson increased his total to $494\frac{1}{2}$.

Clark got $433\frac{1}{2}$, the lowest number received by him during the convention.

During this ballot Florida, which had been voting solidly for Underwood, threw 2 votes for Wilson. This break, which McCombs had engineered over Sunday, caused Governor Gilchrist to leap upon a chair and shout:

"Florida was instructed for Underwood. Any

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delegate who violates those instructions commits a dishonorable act”!

McCombs had seen to it that Senator James A. O’Gorman, an ardent Wilsonite, had become substitute for Chairman Ollie James, when the latter had all but collapsed through fatigue.

“The unit rule has been abolished. Each delegate is at liberty to vote for whom he pleases”, was the rebuking edict of the acting Chairman.

Wilson voters greeted this with thunderous cheers.

McCombs walked over to the Wilson contingent of the New York delegation, whose block of 90 was still being cast for Clark, and implored them to follow the example of their Florida brethren. He also appealed to Chairman Murphy to release such of his delegates as wished to vote for Wilson.

“If the caucus agrees, all right. The caucus will decide”! was Murphy’s response.

But no caucus other than those yet held was called, and New York continued to cast her entire vote for Clark.

Senator James having returned to the chair, Senator Stone insisted that he reverse the ruling of Senator O’Gorman that no unit rule prevailed. James answered this by declaring a break of one to Wilson in the Colorado delegation to be in accordance with the convention mandate.

Iowa, on the thirty-ninth ballot joined the Wilson procession. This put the New Jersey Governor’s total at 501 for the first time.

When, on the forty-second ballot Ohio registered

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19 for Wilson, and it looked as if Wilson might appropriate the whole 48 on the forty-third, the Clark managers sprang another adjournment resolution.

It was nearly 1 A. M. Tuesday. Delegates were exhausted and hungry. No power could hold them in their seats. So they voted 761 to 260 to adjourn until Tuesday noon.

Though Clark managers boasted that the adjournment was still another victory for them, it proved the undoing of the former Speaker of the House.

XIII

WILSON WINS NOMINATION

VICTORIOUS ON FORTY-SIXTH BALLOT — SULLIVAN CLINCHES IT — MURPHY CAPITULATES — McCOMBS WARNED: "REMEMBER JIM SMITH"! — McADOO PICKS PALMER FOR VICE PRESIDENT — McCOMBS SELECTS MARSHALL — SUMMARY OF THE UNPRECEDENTED BALLOTS FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — Editor's narrative continued.]

BEFORE daylight Tuesday, Mr. McCombs had exacted a renewed and copper-riveted pledge from Roger C. Sullivan to head the final stampede for Wilson. This time, Sullivan fulfilled his contract.

On the forty-third ballot, Sullivan, measuring every word, roared:

"Illinois casts 18 votes for Clark and 40 for Wilson. Under the rule adopted by the delegation, therefore, all 58 Illinois votes are cast for Wilson"!

A wild whoop came from the forty Texans; another from the seventy-six Pennsylvanians.

Sullivan was hugged and kissed and cheered by Wilson devotees.

Surlily, Clark men shouted: "What did you get for it, Roger"?

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“The choice of this convention, that’s all”! was the retort.

With the total defection of Illinois from Clark to Wilson, Wilson’s aggregate mounted to 612. Clark’s dwindled to 329.

Wilson gained 17 on the forty-fourth. Clark could get but 306,—the memorable number that stood to the finish for Ulysses S. Grant at the Republican National Convention of 1880.

Clark stuck at 306 on the forty-fifth, while Wilson’s total went to 633.

Underwood and Foss, the latter of whom on late ballots had been supported by Massachusetts, were both withdrawn. Their followers joined the Wilson parade.

Then Charles F. Murphy nodded to John J. Fitzgerald, of Kings.

Amid a frightful hub-bub, created by yelling, marching battalions of Wilsonites, Fitzgerald wearily and reluctantly mounted the stage.

In husky tones, tinged with a look of disgust, he was barely heard to say:

“I move that the nomination of Woodrow Wilson for President of the United States be made unanimous”!

Frenzied cheers from the jubilant Wilson shouters smothered what Fitzgerald might have added.

Amid a crash of band music, tooting of horns, shrieks through megaphones, and yells from thousands, the tally clerk informed Chairman James that the forty-sixth and final ballot registered:



McCOMBS FELICITATES WILSON ON HIS PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATION AT SEA GIRT, N. J., 1912

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WILSON WINS NOMINATION

Wilson, 890; Clark, 84; Harmon, 25; Underwood, 12; Foss, 27.

Chairman James, his voice subdued to a whisper, proclaimed:

“I declare Woodrow Wilson the unanimous choice of this Convention for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States”!

The full table of ballots follows:

THE BALLOTS

	WILSON	CLARK
First.	324	441½
Second.	339½	446½
Third.	345	441
Fourth.	349½	443
Fifth.	351	443
Sixth.	354	445
Seventh.	352½	449½
Eighth.	351½	448½
Ninth.	351½	452
Tenth.	355 351½	556 500
Eleventh.	355½	554
Twelfth.	354	547½
Thirteenth.	356	554½
Fourteenth.	362	550
Fifteenth.	362½	551
Sixteenth.	362½	551
Seventeenth.	362½	545
Eighteenth.	361	535
Nineteenth.	358 ⁹	532
Twentieth.	388½	512
Twenty-first.	395½	508
Twenty-second.	396½	510½
Twenty-third.	399	497½
Twenty-fourth.	402½	496

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	WILSON	CLARK
Twenty-fifth.	405	469
Twenty-sixth.	407½	463
Twenty-seventh.	406½	469
Twenty-eighth.	437½	468½
Twenty-ninth.	436	468½
Thirtieth.	460	455
Thirty-first.	475½	446½
Thirty-second.	477½	446½
Thirty-third.	477½	447½
Thirty-fourth.	479½	447½
Thirty-fifth.	494½	433½
Thirty-sixth.	496½	434½
Thirty-seventh.	496½	432½
Thirty-eighth.	498½	425
Thirty-ninth.	501½	424
Fortieth.	501½	424
Forty-first.	499½	424
Forty-second.	494	430
Forty-third.	612	329
Forty-fourth.	629	306
Forty-fifth.	633	306
Forty-sixth.	890	84

TOTAL:

WILSON.	890
CLARK.	84
HARMON.	25
UNDERWOOD.	12
Foss.	27

As Mr. McCombs stood upon the Convention hall platform, both his hands squeezed almost to a pulp by hysterical Wilsonites, a Princeton chum accosted him with "Well, Bill, you certainly put 'Woody' over! I

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did not think it possible. But look out! Recall the fate of Uncle Jim Smith”!

“What do you mean”? asked McCombs.

“The first throat cut politically in New Jersey after Jim Smith had nominated and elected Wilson Governor was Jim Smith’s. Be careful that the first throat cut after you elect Wilson President is not your own”!

“I ridiculed this warning at the time,” said Mr. McCombs frequently to me after his turn came. “Had I but taken my Princeton friend’s advice, I might have been spared much mental and physical anguish”.

Mr. McCombs fulfilled his pledge to Thomas T. Taggart, to throw the Wilson vote to Thomas R. Marshall, of Indiana, for Vice President. Influential friends of Champ Clark begged him to become Wilson’s running mate. The Missourian declined. Marshall was nominated after a battle of five hours.

Mr. McCombs, in describing the selection of the Hoosier, wrote:

[EDITOR’S NOTE— Mr. McCombs’ narrative resumed.]

Unfortunately, the psychology of every convention, whether Democratic or Republican, has been that very little regard is paid to the selection of a Vice President. This is particularly true where the convention is long and intense, as was the case at Baltimore.

Nobody seriously discussed the Vice Presidency until Mr. Wilson had been nominated. During a convention, the Vice Presidency may be made the subject

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of a trade for delegates from this territory for some candidate for the Presidency. This should not be.

Under our Constitution the Vice President's functions while in office are exceedingly small. He merely performs the duties of a presiding officer. Naturally, that does not involve the selection of a very great man.

He does not even participate in the debates. He is more or less out of touch with both Houses. He is entirely out of touch with the President and the executive side of Washington.

He should be made of the same mental stature as the President, for if the President dies, the Vice President immediately becomes President and charged with all the great duties of that office.

If I were proposing a constitutional amendment, I would at least make the Vice President a member of the President's cabinet so that he may keep in touch with things as they go from the executive side. I would give him full voting powers in the Senate. The present Vice President, Mr. Marshall, has told me the actual truth about the office.

When Mr. Wilson was nominated in Baltimore early that Tuesday afternoon I went to my hotel and slept for a while. Refreshed, I called up the Governor and asked him what he thought about the Vice Presidency. I told him the candidates would probably be Governor Burke, of North Dakota; Mayor Preston, of Baltimore, and Governor Marshall, of Indiana. I told him that he could have his choice for the Vice Presidency, and asked him to make a sug-

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gestion. His suggestion was that I do what I was willing as representing him.

I went to the Convention that evening. On the way I mulled over various possibilities of the Democratic Party.

Governor Burke, of North Dakota, was a good man, but he came from a sparsely settled territory. He had no National prominence. He could not help on the ticket. Mayor Preston, of Baltimore, labored under the same difficulties. I thought of other men and concluded that Marshall was the man.

As I went into the door of the Convention hall I was met by Luke Lee, of Mississippi. He took me into a private room. There were gathered McAdoo, Burleson, Palmer, and a few others who had worked for Wilson. I don't remember the names of all, but curiously enough, I do the number. There were eleven.

They started in by saying that we must decide who should be the Vice President. A vote was proposed. Somebody mentioned Palmer. Then I knew what the vote would be. I also knew that Palmer could not help the ticket at all, because he came from the State of Pennsylvania.

I said that eleven men could not decide who was to be the Vice President of the United States.

I proceeded to the floor. I spoke to the leaders of the large delegations. Marshall was nominated by a tremendous majority. I humbly record that on the first ballot I received 28 votes from my native state, Arkansas, for this exalted position.

XIV

“PROVIDENCE DID IT”!

WILSON SO EXCLAIMS TO MCCOMBS, WHO IS CHILLED BY ABSENCE OF GRATITUDE FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE — MCCOMBS, IN COLLAPSE, BEATS MCADOO TO “HIS PRESENCE” — MESSRS. KERN, PALMER, DANIELS, TAGGART AND HUDSPETH URGE MCCOMBS FOR NATIONAL CHAIRMAN — WILSON PREFERS MCADOO, BUT MAKES HIM VICE CHAIRMAN AND CHOOSES ALL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — The McCombs narrative is resumed.]

I WENT up to Sea Girt with the National Committee to congratulate Governor Wilson the day after his nomination for President. He shook hands with us generally. When I spoke to him, he said: “McCombs, you know I am a Presbyterian and believe in predestination and election. It was Providence that did the work at Baltimore”.

Now, I shall not pass into any discussion of the various theologies; but I stood there a complete wreck from a campaign at Baltimore, during which I slept no more than two hours a night. I saw other drawn faces about me. I saw faces, too, of men who had come to the Wilson standard as events turned. None cast their eyes to a selfish future, but all were hopeful, highly hopeful, that the man who stood before them

“PROVIDENCE DID IT”

might be elected, and that in their own locality they might restore Democracy completely.

I could not accept Wilson's view of fore-ordination in the presence of that group who had all but given their life's blood to make him the nominee of the Democratic Party for the Presidency of the United States.

I must confess that I felt a chill, because I felt that the man had in mind the using of entirely new methods. I was chilled, also, because I thought that if he attempted to apply that Predestination doctrine to the extreme, the Democratic campaign might find itself very much in the ruck.

I was tired beyond expression. I did not desire to become Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, though this had been suggested to me by members on all hands and it had been suggested to the Governor himself.

In the National Committee itself there was a fair amount of discord growing out of many campaigns. It was thought that I would smooth everything over and could handle things without any friction. I was personally friendly with every member of the Committee. I had dealt with them all and none came out of Baltimore with anything but the friendliest feelings toward me.

Mr. Wilson, after two weeks of silence, acquiesced to my election as Chairman of the National Committee, July 12th.

There had been wonderment about Wilson's delay in giving his opinion. Many of the members told me they suspected conspiracy. I said I really did not

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want the place as I was already worked to death, and that I would not take it unless the sentiment of the entire Committee was taken and unless, without the exercise of force from any quarter, I should be the unanimous choice. But in accepting, I sailed into a sea upon which I hope no other man will ever have the misfortune to launch his bark.

Mr. Wilson, at the outset, handed me a campaign committee list composed of gentlemen all of whom I liked, but many of whom I would not have chosen for this particular work.

I was given absolute power by the National Committee to select the campaign committee and to do nearly anything I thought fitting. At the meeting of the Committee in Chicago where I was elected, there was great enthusiasm over the fact that we were "on our way" and intended to push the campaign through to victory. I felt very much heartened.

Returning to New York I found Wilson intent upon having William G. McAdoo for Vice Chairman, for what reason I can never divine. However, since Wilson's inauguration many reasons, Wilsonian, have appeared why he wanted him, but from a public and political point of view there was none.

I strongly advised Mr. Wilson to have as Vice Chairman a man from the West who understood Western conditions. I also spoke insistently for Judge Martin J. Wade, who was a member from Iowa and an exceedingly able man. He was held in very high esteem by the Westerners, and by the Committee itself. I thought he could handle Western

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headquarters better than anybody else. But Governor Wilson was obdurate and we accepted McAdoo as Vice Chairman grudgingly.

[EDITOR'S NOTE—Mr. McCombs modestly bequeathed the task of elaborating the story of his selection as the National Chairman to fellow Committeemen. They prepared the following details.]

Immediately upon the adjournment of the Baltimore convention, Mr. McCombs nearly collapsed physically. A physician was called and McCombs was ordered to bed. Instructions were given that he must not be disturbed for at least a day. To make his rest doubly sure, Mr. McCombs was then taken to a private apartment which he had used for secret conferences during the Convention. The patient, suffering from brain, as well as body fag, was induced to sleep.

While Mr. McCombs was undergoing this enforced vacation, Mr. McAdoo dashed off to Sea Girt, N. J., to be the first to recite to Governor Wilson the details of the Convention. After Mr. McAdoo had hurried from Baltimore, rumors reached the McCombs headquarters that McAdoo had gone to insist that he should be rewarded with the Chairmanship and the executive conduct of the campaign. Mr. McCombs' friends were also told that William J. Bryan would demand the retention of Chairman Norman E. Mack, who had handled his 1908 campaign, while Wisconsin leaders were reported to have gotten back of Joseph E. Davies of the Badger State.

While McCombs, maybe unconscious of much of this, slept at Baltimore, National Committeeman

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Robert S. Hudspeth, of New Jersey, was also speeding to Sea Girt. Hudspeth had been very influential in securing all the delegates but four from New Jersey, Wilson's home state, and holding them intact for forty-six ballots.

But in the race Hudspeth won and reached Sea Girt before McAdoo. Governor Wilson learned from him first, the accurate story of how and to whom he owed his nomination. Hudspeth frankly informed Wilson:

"But for that crippled but militant Princeton lad, McCombs, Clark, Bryan, or an unknown would have defeated you. If any one individual is to be rewarded for your triumph it is Billy McCombs. He lies ill in Baltimore. Never, never forget what he did for you"!

Governor Wilson listened rather frigidly to Judge Hudspeth's encomiums on McCombs. He gave no intimation as to what, if anything, he proposed to do to prove his gratitude.

After his conference with the nominee, Judge Hudspeth was asked by newspaper correspondents if he would be a candidate for National Chairman.

"Under no consideration. I don't want the place", he replied decisively. "McCombs has won it through distinguished service. He has been the pacemaker. He knows the delegates who fought with him the fight for Wilson. It would be bad business, indeed, to trade horses in the middle of the stream".

A. Mitchell Palmer went straight to Governor Wilson, too, and said, "We need a campaign con-

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ducted in the same spirit in which McCombs conducted the nominating battle for you. We need a Chairman young enough to inject that spirit into the party and voters”.

Senator Ollie James, who had been permanent Chairman of the Convention, reinforced Hudspeth's advice with: “McCombs has shown himself to be a young man of great ability as an executive and a wonderful organizer”.

“Hum”! observed Wilson. “That is right. McCombs undoubtedly is a fine executive”! And that was all.

Senator John W. Kern, of Indiana, who had been Alton B. Parker's running mate in 1904, told Governor Wilson: “We all like McCombs first rate. We like the type to which he belongs”.

Senator Thomas T. Taggart, also of Indiana, former Chairman of the National Committee, who had finally swung the Hoosier delegation to Wilson, added his insistence that McCombs lead the party organization in the coming fray.

Governor Wilson had been so inoculated with demands for McCombs' retention as Campaign Manager that when McAdoo finally turned up he was told that the Vice Chairmanship was all he could hope for.

Possibly McAdoo would have made some headway had not McCombs himself suddenly appeared at Sea Girt.

When, after fourteen hours' sleep, McCombs was informed of McAdoo's activities, he set out for Sea

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Girt as fast as a seventy-mile an hour car could carry him.

Governor Wilson was entertaining guests at luncheon, on the lawn at his Sea Girt cottage, when McCombs hove in sight. As he, like an apparition, alighted, and, with the aid of a cane, started straight for the "Boss", as Tom Taggart addressed Wilson, National Chairman Norman E. Mack, who sat next to the Governor, exclaimed, "Why, there is McCombs now! I thought he was ill in Baltimore"!

Governor Wilson, himself astounded, greeted McCombs: "Why, how did you get here? I thought you were sick in bed at Baltimore"!

McCombs, as if looking for McAdoo, smiled grimly and replied: "I was never sick a minute. I slept fourteen hours yesterday and am fit as can be. I am like a leather shoestring. You can stretch me quite a ways without breaking me".

Governor Wilson, Mr. Mack and others laughed at this simile and treated McCombs as if he had just survived a serious surgical operation.

Josephus Daniels, afterward Secretary of the Navy eight years, tapped McCombs affectionately on the back and said: "Governor Wilson, I want you to know that we learned at Baltimore to respect Mr. McCombs and have faith in him. We found that he talked our language and that we talked his. If he makes the same brilliant campaign for your election as he did for your nomination, no Taft nor Roosevelt can possibly defeat you"!

It was not until July 12th, over a fortnight after

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he had been nominated, that Governor Wilson finally determined to risk his Presidential election management to McCombs.

Those who had been associated with, or had observed Mr. McCombs' masterful management of the Pre- and in-Convention campaigns had been persistent in their support of McCombs, and finally induced Governor Wilson to name him as chairman.

On July 12, National Committeeman Hudspeth, of New Jersey, Josephus Daniels, of North Carolina, and Mr. McCombs held a prolonged conference with Governor Wilson at Sea Girt. When it ended, Judge Hudspeth came upon the lawn and announced: "It's McCombs! Governor Wilson has selected him for Chairman of the National Committee".

McCombs, smiling but mute, limped to his auto as rapidly as he could.

National Committeeman Daniels, addressing a group of newspaper correspondents, said: "You saw that young man going past with a slight limp. I have no doubt many of you, as hundreds of others, will wonder, whether he is robust enough for the big job that may be asked of him. He is a great deal more robust than he looks and will outlast a great many men that may appear to be stronger".

"Did you urge Governor Wilson to make Mr. McCombs National Chairman"? Mr. Daniels was asked.

"I certainly did, and he is the choice of all genuine friends of the Governor", responded Daniels.

"The National Committee will meet at New York

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July 15th to organize for the campaign”, announced Chairman Mack.

“The ‘Boss’ says Chicago”, quoth Tom Taggart mischievously. “If you doubt it, ask him”, added the Hoosier leader.

Mack went inside the Wilson cottage. He looked sheepish when he returned.

“Right, Tom. The Committee meets at noon at the Hotel Congress, Chicago, July 15th”.

“That’s what the ‘Boss’ told me, and what the ‘Boss’ says, goes”, retorted Taggart with a snicker.

Judge Hudspeth personally carried Governor Wilson’s orders to the Committee which met at Chicago the following Monday. The Judge presented Mr. McCombs’ name for the Chairmanship in this way: “Mr. McCombs’ intelligence and sagacious handling of Governor Wilson’s nominating campaign during the past year and a half has demonstrated his entire fitness for leadership and showed him to be amply equipped to carry the Democratic Party to victory”.

Neither McAdoo, nor any follower, offered a word openly against McCombs. He was chosen Chairman unanimously.

When Mr. Mack surrendered his gavel, Mr. McCombs briefly acknowledged his election: “I cannot hope to achieve success unless I have the active support of this Committee.

“This is to be a business campaign. We shall pay strict attention to the business of electing Governor Wilson President”.

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“And we must raise a million dollars at once to do it”, said Roger Sullivan, of Chicago.

McCombs did his best to get a nation-wide representative of all factions in the Executive Committee. He planned to put upon it Charles F. Murphy, Tom Taggart, William J. Stone, John H. Bankhead, and others who had fought Wilson’s nomination. The “Boss” overruled him.

July 17th Governor Wilson, premising it by saying “I am entirely satisfied with the way the National Committee has met my suggestions”, announced his famous “Veranda” or “Rocking Chair” Committee.

It comprised William F. McCombs, William G. McAdoo and James A. O’Gorman, of New York; Robert S. Hudspeth, of New Jersey; A. Mitchell Palmer, of Pennsylvania; Josephus Daniels, of North Carolina; William Saulsbury, of Delaware; Joseph E. Davies, of Wisconsin; Thomas P. Gore, of Oklahoma; Col. Robert Ewing, of Louisiana; Will R. King, of Oregon; James A. Reed, of Missouri, and Daniel McGillicuddy, of Maine.

All had loyally supported Wilson for the Presidential nomination except Mr. Reed, of Missouri. He had made the nominating speech for Champ Clark in the Convention.

The Governor directed that Mr. McAdoo assume the duties of “Vice Chairman”, and Joseph E. Davies the Secretaryship. He also named Henry Morgenthau as Chairman of the Finance Committee.

With a Campaign Committee, every member of which was picked by Governor Wilson, Chairman McCombs began the arduous duties of the canvass.

XV

MCCOMBS AND MCADOO QUARREL

AT BITTER ODDS AS CAMPAIGN BEGINS — MCADOO IGNORES HIS CHIEF IN SELECTING HEADQUARTERS FORCE — "BEAT ROOSEVELT", DIRECTS MCCOMBS AS HE FALLS ILL — MCADOO LEVIES ON MCCOMBS' POLITICAL ASSETS AND IS PUT OUT OF HIS PRE-EMPTED POST — NOMINEE FAILS AS A PEACE-MAKER.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — This chapter is written by the Editor.]

THE popular vote-getting campaign for Wilson began auspiciously on the surface. But bickerings inside the camp were constant.

The Republican camp was splitting up. William H. Taft had been renominated for President by the reactionary Republicans. Progressives had bolted the convention and nominated Theodore Roosevelt, who had twice been President.

McCombs' plan was, of course, to keep the Republicans split. He was convinced from the outset that Taft was hopelessly out of the running. It was Roosevelt who must be beaten in order to elect Wilson. Mr. McCombs, therefore, concentrated his efforts toward weaning Progressives away from Roosevelt as well as Taft. Roosevelt was posing as the only Progressive. McCombs saw to it that Wilson was pre-

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sented to the voters as rather more of a Progressive than Roosevelt.

With all this serious business in hand, there was, of course, the question of national headquarters.

Chairman McCombs authorized Vice Chairman McAdoo to lease headquarters in the Fifth Avenue Building at Broadway and Twenty-third street, New York City. This McAdoo did. But without consulting McCombs, he engaged a large staff. Among them was K. B. Conger, who had been associated with McAdoo in his Hudson Terminal enterprise.

Inspecting the pay-roll one day, McCombs discovered that Conger was down for a weekly salary of \$150, and Byron R. Newton, afterward Collector of the Port of New York, for \$120 a week.

As McCombs had been struggling to get enough money to pay headquarters rent, he was surprised.

"What are these men doing for their fancy salaries"? demanded McCombs of McAdoo.

"Conger leased headquarters for us and is acting as Superintendent. Newton is working at Sea Girt, New Jersey, with Walter Measday, at the Wilson publicity bureau. He volunteered", was McAdoo's reply.

"Get rid of both", directed McCombs. "Conger is useless. I fired Newton months ago".

But McAdoo carried Newton's case to the Presidential nominee and he was retained. Conger is said to have continued to draw \$150 a week for the remainder of the campaign, though McAdoo and Treasurer Rollo Wells had many a dispute about it.

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August 12, 1912, Mr. McCombs was prostrated with neurasthenia. He was stricken while on duty at headquarters, and he was carried to the Hotel Knickerbocker. Dr. John D. McBarren advised that unless McCombs were immediately relieved from duty he might die. The stricken Chairman was taken to the home of Mrs. Ethel Thomas, a sister, at Flushing, L. I. He grew worse and was removed to Paul Smith's in the Adirondacks where his sister, Corinne, accompanied him.

For six weeks McCombs fought illness and physicians to get back at his job. Despite protests from his medical advisers and his family, McCombs slipped away from his sanatorium September 4, 1912, and suddenly appeared at the Hotel Plaza in New York. There he again collapsed. Dr. Simon Baruch, father of Bernard M. Baruch (one of Wilson's financial angels) was summoned. He ordered McCombs to bed and to retire from active campaign duties.

"I'll do my job by 'phone"! was McCombs' dogged response.

"And commit suicide"! admonished Dr. Baruch.

While McCombs was doing wire work from the Plaza, McAdoo sat in a swivel chair at the Fifth Avenue headquarters. He assumed the full duties of National Chairman and started in to reorganize the force employed by McCombs. He packed off to Chicago, Albert S. Burleson, of Texas, whom Colonel House afterward induced President Wilson to make Postmaster General; Thomas P. Gore, afterward United States Senator from Oklahoma; Frank B.

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Lord, and other staff officers installed by McCombs. Any officer or employee of the McCombs brand seemed *persona non grata* to him.)

One day, a loyal friend of McCombs dropped in upon him at the Plaza. McCombs, propped up with pillows, was 'phoning commands to lieutenants in other states.

During a lull, McCombs asked: "How are things going at headquarters"?

"McAdoo is trying to administer on your estate before you die"! was the shot returned. "He has fired about all your friends, except Joe Daniels".

McCombs went immediately to the Fifth Avenue building.

Reaching headquarters, he recognized few attachés whom he had appointed. He was mystified and angered by an army of strange people. The office boy accosted him with:

"Who do you want to see"?

McCombs entered the room which he had reserved for himself prior to his physical collapse. McAdoo was swinging about in his revolving chair giving orders to subordinates of his own selection.

Regarding McCombs as if he were a spectre, McAdoo asked: "How are you feeling, Bill? Why did you come back until you were completely recovered? Things are going fine".

"I am here to resume command, and you will please vacate my desk", said McCombs. McAdoo obeyed. McCombs fell into his old chair and summoned Treasurer Rollo Wells, Chairman Henry Morgenthau, of

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the Finance Committee, Chairman Josephus Daniels, of the Publicity Bureau, Secretary Joseph E. Davies, and Assistant Secretary Walker W. Vick.

"I desire to see these gentlemen alone", said McCombs as he glanced at McAdoo. McAdoo departed. McCombs then learned additional details about McAdoo changing his campaign plans and rearranging the office force. Rollo Wells reported the treasury all but empty.

Just then, however, Chairman McCombs opened a letter from a North Carolina friend. It enclosed a check for \$54.66, the proceeds of the final bale of cotton sold by him that Fall.

"We are not broke yet, Rollo", observed McCombs in glee. "But we shall have to dig somewhere, or we shall be broke".

Just as Chairman McCombs was about to start for Sea Girt to get a show-down from Governor Wilson as between him and McAdoo, the Governor suddenly appeared in New York. He called upon McCombs. At the conclusion of the interview, Governor Wilson said:

"There is no friction between Mr. McCombs and Mr. McAdoo. It was necessary for Mr. McCombs to have a short rest. Mr. McCombs is one of the most indomitable men I ever knew. There is a sacrifice that no one can accept from any man. That is his health. Mr. McCombs is much stronger and will continue to perform his duties as Chairman of the National Committee".

McCombs' friends were elated over Governor Wil-

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son's at least public support of Chairman McCombs as absolute campaign manager. Mr. McCombs was mightily pleased and accepted as an expression of popular approval this editorial in the *New York American*, September 12, 1921:

"JUSTICE TO MANAGER McCOMBS.

"Governor Wilson has done well to lay at rest the rumor that political bosses and jealous rivals were to compass the retirement of William F. McCombs as manager of his campaign.

"To Mr. McCombs, more than to any single individual friend in the United States, Governor Wilson owes his nomination at Baltimore.

"The labors of the young Princetonian to this end were assiduous and extraordinary. His devotion amounted almost to consecration. His energy was prodigious, and he displayed conspicuous ability in every phase of the campaign of which he was the recognized manager and director from the beginning.

"Working at times almost single-handed, and spending his time and his money with lavish loyalty, Mr. McCombs impaired his health in the cause of his candidate.

"We felt sure that Governor Wilson could not afford and would not consent to his retirement. The Democratic nominee knows better than most men the character and capacity of the young leader who piloted his fortunes at Baltimore. Nothing short of a physical incapacity to go on with the work could possibly justify McCombs' enforced retirement.

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"Least of all, could Governor Wilson, at this stage of his campaign, afford to bring upon himself the charge of ingratitude to a friend and benefactor such as this able and brilliant young lawyer has so splendidly demonstrated himself to be.

"The American took it for granted that the wise and discreet Democratic nominee would allow no machine bosses or new-found friends to compass the humiliation of the best and most effective friend that his political career has developed.

"Mr. McCombs deserves to finish the work that he began".

Six hundred admirers of Chairman McCombs joined in a Hotel Astor dinner September 29, 1912, to celebrate his convalescence and restoration to command of the Wilson campaign. Governor Wilson joined in the greeting. He eulogized McCombs in this way:

"I am not here for any other purpose than to render my tribute of sincere admiration and affection for William F. McCombs. *It must mean a great deal to a man who has spent his life in teaching, that one of the men he taught, one of the men with whom he has been associated as master with pupil, should so believe in him as Mr. McCombs has believed in me, for this is the highest reward of a teacher.*"

As Mr. McCombs arose to reply, he was more lustily cheered than his "master". He said:

"I am working in the interest of an ideal. I am working to accomplish what is best for the Govern-

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ment. I consider Woodrow Wilson the best man to carry out my ideals. There is no reason why the one million college graduates in this country should not participate in government. I hate distinction of class. We should all collaborate for the best kind of government”.

William B. Hornblower, President John H. Finley, of the College of the City of New York, Col. John Temple Graves, Rennold Wolf and Augustus Thomas threw oratorical bouquets at Mr. McCombs.

Assuming that the Democracy of the country was solidly behind Wilson, Chairman McCombs resumed his battle to rally every Republican he could to his candidate's support. His arguments were admirably epitomized in an address to all voters October 28, 1912. Here it is:

“It becomes my duty, as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, at the beginning of the last week of the campaign, to convey two messages to the millions of citizens who are striving to uphold the principles of constitutional and popular government by electing Woodrow Wilson President of the United States.

“The first is of good cheer. A painstaking and unprejudiced examination of reports from all sources fully justifies the common expectation of a sweeping victory on November 5. The party which polled more than 6,000,000 votes four years ago is united absolutely, the opposition is broken about evenly in twain, and hundreds of thousands of patriotic citizens who have never cast a Democratic ballot will surely vote

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for Woodrow Wilson. Defeat, under such circumstances, is virtually inconceivable.

“My second message is one not of apprehension, but of warning. We must expect that the desperate situation in which our antagonists now find themselves will incite them to extreme measures as they approach the end of their resources. There should be no relaxation of effort in these last few days at any point in the line. There will be none on the part of those charged with the responsibility of conducting the campaign.

“To those who are being told that Democratic success spells panic and depression we say: Remember 1907—with President Roosevelt at the helm and Secretary Taft at his elbow. Whose, then, was the responsibility?

“To those confronted by the dilapidated boggy of free trade, we say: Read not what our opponents write, but what our candidate says. He needs no interpretation. None can deny either his ability or his freedom to speak for himself. And when he pronounces the Democratic proposal and his purpose to be ‘neither free trade nor anything approaching free trade’, but only ‘readjustment of the schedules to meet the actual business conditions and interests of the country’, to the end that the tariff shall cease to be the well-spring of oppressive monopoly and covert taxation of the many for the benefit of the few, no fair-minded man can question either the truth of his words or the reality of his intent.

“All agree that business stability and popular satis-

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faction cannot be achieved until the tariff shall be revised. Both Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt promise, if elected, to take steps to that end. But the history of their administrations shows conclusively that it cannot be done under their guidance. The policy of each, as clearly indicated by the methods he proposes, is one of procrastination. The Democratic purpose no less surely is that of prompt and effective, though careful and considerate, action.

“President Taft generously admits that the Republican Party is not entitled to exclusive credit for the bountiful crops, but his advocates do not shrink from advancing the fact as an argument for standing pat. Prosperity, they assert, is at hand if the existing condition be maintained. Why interfere? Why not let well enough alone? Why elect a President and install a party whose purpose is to close our mills, destroy our industries and drive a starving people to soup-houses?

“It seems strange that questions such as these should be propounded to presumably intelligent persons; and yet they are put forth constantly upon the only supposable theory that the supreme object of one-half of the American people is to bring ruin and disaster upon the other half and incidentally, of course, upon themselves.

“Not many, I suspect, are likely to impute to Governor Wilson this malign intent; and even those who try to conjure up with him a spirit of destructiveness do not deny his possession of intelligence. May it not

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be pertinent, then, to ask what could be his object in inflicting miseries upon his fellow men?

“Assuming, as one must, if these premonitions are to be heeded at all, that his heart would be rejoiced by universal calamity, is it within reason to anticipate that he would be eager to go down in history as a President who has wrought only havoc? Is it not more probable that he would be ambitious to give the country a praiseworthy and successful administration?”

“But we are told that the business world is seriously apprehensive, that Governor Wilson’s election would retard the return of prosperity. This fear, it is solemnly declared in the face of full confidence manifested while the betting is 4 to 1, is the only obstacle in the path of great industrial progress.

“Suppose the existing conditions were reversed. Suppose business was at a standstill and prospects seemed hopeless. What, then, would be the outcry of our critics, now pressed so hardly as plausible arguments? Surely nothing else than positive insistence that the Democratic Party and the Democratic candidates are at the bottom of it all. And the moral, of course, would be plain: Vote against the man who inspires misgivings.

“But the facts do not coincide with the theory. It becomes necessary to advance a paradox as an argument to fit the case. The absurdity of the whole thing is too apparent. Moreover, if stability is the chief desideratum, what is to be said of the record begun with the agitation of Mr. Roosevelt in 1906 and con-

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tinued with the shilly-shallying of Mr. Taft to this very day?

“We will let well enough alone when we have made it better.

“To those sincere citizens who want real progress accomplished we say: What could in reason be anticipated from Mr. Roosevelt’s best endeavors, with Congress and the courts against him, except turmoil and strife? Does not Mr. Wilson embody all that is best, most rational and attainable in Mr. Roosevelt’s declared aspiration? Surely Governor Wilson is as clear-minded, as wide-visioned, as free-handed, as honest, as earnest and as resolute.

“Moreover, if elected, unlike Mr. Roosevelt, he will have a Congress of his own party faith, open to his suggestion and responsive to his leadership. Does not such a situation presage greater actual accomplishment in the interest of the whole people?

“To the thousands of patriotic Republicans who regard apprehensively the violation of our most vital tradition and resent the attitude of Mr. Roosevelt toward the great party to which he owes every step in his marvelous political advancement we say this: You are being urged to vote for Mr. Taft, not for the purpose of electing him, because that is known to be impossible, but merely to give him a larger number of ballots than will be cast for Mr. Roosevelt. What is to be gained thereby?

“It is a recognized fact that hundreds of thousands of Republicans are going to vote for Wilson anyway. The Taft vote, then, will be no measure of the real

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Taft strength and sentiment. Its size, whether larger or smaller than Mr. Roosevelt's vote, will signify nothing. Since the President is to be in the minority in any case, as compared with Mr. Wilson, it cannot matter how small that minority shall be.

"Nobody on November 6 will be able to estimate the number of Republicans who voted for Wilson, who would have voted for Taft but for their sense of a patriotic duty to defeat Mr. Roosevelt at all hazards. Under such circumstances, whatever the result as to second and third places, Roosevelt boasting can avail nothing.

"Why, then, take chances? Why not make assurance of the perpetuation of constitutional government doubly sure by voting for Wilson, as President Taft most certainly would advise and do himself if he should become convinced of the possibility of Mr. Roosevelt's accession to a third term?

"This is said in no partisan spirit. The action proposed is urged upon sober, thoughtful and honorable men as that of patriotism. Everybody knows that Mr. Taft cannot be elected. How great will be the political effect of the sympathy accorded Mr. Roosevelt as a consequence of a lunatic's misdeed is wholly conjectural. It seems apparent, however, that the avidity of his supporters in trying to capitalize the shocking performance of an irresponsible person has defeated its own purpose, and that Mr. Roosevelt has practically no chance of success.

"There remains the one and only remote possibility of the election going to the House of Representatives,

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and the utter chaos, confusion, bartering and strain upon our governmental system, which would surely upset the country beyond possible calculation, and might easily endanger American institutions.

“Upon these grounds we solicit the suffrages of our fellow citizens of all political faiths for Woodrow Wilson, and urge continuance of unremitting endeavor upon those already committed to the great cause of wholly free and truly popular government for which he stands as a candidate for President of the United States”.

A note in the McCombs manuscript indicated anew his belief that Roosevelt, not Taft, was the candidate who stood most in Wilson's way. Mr. McCombs wrote:

“Never at any time did anyone assume that Mr. Roosevelt was not dangerous in that campaign. I believe that if his campaign had been properly organized he might have been more successful and very close to Mr. Wilson indeed.

“The idea often expressed that when Wilson was nominated nothing need have been done to elect him is fallacious indeed. We had to fight every minute of the day. I knew that Taft was out of it. But there were so many possible turns in the fortunes of the Roosevelt wheel, and so many tremendous possibilities in the resourceful Roosevelt himself, that no foe was safe in counting him out until the ballots were counted”.

XVI

“I OWE YOU NOTHING—”

WILSON ELECTED BY AN UNPRECEDENTED PLURALITY — O'GORMAN PROCLAIMS “THIS BOY, MCCOMBS, DID IT” — PRESIDENT-ELECT WIRES HIS “THANKS” — “IT WAS ORDAINED OF GOD THAT I SHOULD BE PRESIDENT”! SAID WILSON TO MCCOMBS WHEN ACTUALLY ELECTED — WILSON IGNORES ALL NATIONAL COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPOINTMENTS — NAMES BRYAN, McADOO, TUMULTY, ET AL, DESPITE PROTESTS OF THOSE WHO WON FOR HIM — MCCOMBS' SLATE THROWN INTO THE WASTE BASKET — HOUSE PICKS CABINET MINISTERS.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — This chapter is compiled from posthumous notes.]

CHAIRMAN MCCOMBS received election returns November 5, 1912, in the East Room of the Waldorf-Astoria. Grouped about him were Colonel E. M. House, Josephus Daniels, Senator James A. O'Gorman, Frederic C. Penfield, Rollo Wells, Henry Morgenthau, John L. DeSaulles, Colonel George Harvey, John W. Clifton, and others.

At 9 P. M., Mr. McCombs, pale and worn, leaning upon the arm of Robert Adamson, stepped to the doorway, and with a jubilant smile, announced: “We have carried forty states. The victory is complete. We have carried New York, Illinois, Massachusetts,

"I OWE YOU NOTHING"

Indiana, New Jersey and even Senator Penrose concedes we have carried Pennsylvania".

Senator O'Gorman placed his arms affectionately about McCombs and exclaimed: "This is not a victory for the Democratic Party. It is a victory for the American people. It is the biggest sweep in the history of the country".

All but hugging McCombs, Senator O'Gorman added: "And here is the boy who did it"!

Many present, including the women, crowded about McCombs and wrung his hand. An hour later this wire came from President-elect Wilson, dated Princeton, reading:

"WILLIAM F. McCOMBS, Democratic National Committee, New York:

"I deeply appreciate your telegram and wish to extend to you and the members of the campaign committee my warm congratulations on the part you played in the organization and conduct of a campaign fought out upon essential issues. A great cause has triumphed. Every Democrat, every Progressive of whatever alliance, must now lend his full force and enthusiasm to the fulfillment of the people's hopes, the establishment of the people's rights so that justice and progress may go hand in hand.

WOODROW WILSON"

This message came in response to one sent the President-elect by Chairman McCombs reading:

"PRESIDENT-ELECT WOODROW WILSON, Princeton, N. J.:

"My warmest congratulations to you, our next President. You have won a splendid and significant victory. At this hour you appear to have received the largest

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electoral vote ever given to a Presidential candidate. The indications are that your administration will be supported by a Congress Democratic in both branches.

WILLIAM F. McCOMBS"

By midnight Chairman McCombs received advices warranting him in saying: "Taft has carried but two states — Utah and Vermont. We have won thirty-nine, if not forty, states, with at least 442 of the 531 electoral votes. We have the House of Representatives by two to one and the Senate is safely Democratic."

The final returns proved the accuracy of Mr. McCombs' statement. Wilson got 442, Roosevelt 77, and Taft only 12 votes in the electoral college. Wilson carried every state except Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Washington. Taft carried Utah and Vermont only.

Wilson's popular and electoral plurality was the greatest in America's history. The total vote was 14,720,037. Wilson received a total of 6,292,718 votes, Roosevelt 4,057,429, Taft 3,369,221. Wilson got over Roosevelt a plurality of 2,235,289, and over Taft 2,923,497. He got more electoral votes than Roosevelt and Taft combined.

Justifiably elated that under his direction a Democratic President had been elected for the first time since 1892, Mr. McCombs decided to pay a personal visit of felicitation to the President-elect. Sleeping hardly two hours after a night of receiving returns and jubilation, Mr. McCombs went to Princeton, New Jersey, November 6, 1912.

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He received a rousing greeting from the university students for his masterful and victorious conduct of the campaign. He was all but stunned, however, by the reception from the man for whose nomination and election he was the indisputable chief instrument.

Mr. McCombs frequently recited to me the incidents of that visit. He said:

“I called upon the President-elect at the residence he had leased after resigning as President of Princeton University. I was somewhat amazed to be kept waiting for an audience. I forgave that, at the moment, because the house was thronged with jubilant men and women, pressing about the winner with their congratulations.

“At last the President-elect deigned to recognize me. He imperiously beckoned me into his library. When we reached there, I said: ‘Governor, I came over to offer you my sincerest congratulations upon your election and to express my hope that you will have a happy and successful administration’.

“The President-elect took my hand in a frigid, mechanical way. His stenographer started to leave the room.

“He said to the stenographer: ‘You need not leave. I shall continue my dictation’.

“Surprised, I inquired: ‘What does this mean, Governor’?

“The Governor fidgeted a bit and jerked out: ‘It means that every word that passes here is to be recorded in black and white’.

“Then I became provoked and insisted upon an

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explanation of the affront which I believed had been deliberately offered me. When I protested, the President-elect, with a heartlessness of which up to this time I was ignorant, turned upon me and in measured tone said:

“‘Before we proceed, I wish it clearly understood that I owe you nothing’.

“I modestly suggested that I might be given credit for doing a little toward his nomination and election.

“Haughtily, Governor Wilson retorted: ‘Whether you did little or much, remember that God *ordained that I should be the next President of the United States*. Neither you nor any other mortal or mortals could have prevented that’!

“I gasped. I could hardly believe what I heard. As I distinctly recall it, I observed that of course God helped, but there were men who had sacrificed health, wealth and time to give Wilson the high office he sought.

“I had been commissioned by members of the National Committee to ask that some of them be rewarded.

“With an iciness which was, I believe, natural, or cultivated at times, the President-elect replied:

“‘I am tired out. I am going to Bermuda for a rest. I must insist that I shall not be annoyed with applications for office until my return’.

“I replied, as calmly as my resentment would permit: ‘I am tired, too. So are hundreds and thousands of others who, when you attempted to hoist the white flag, rallied about you and nominated and elected you.

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They are entitled to immediate and generous consideration. They have commissioned me to speak for them. I recognize your right to name your private secretary and other members of your confidential staff. But members of the National Committee have some suggestions to submit as to members of the Cabinet and heads of other departments and bureaus’.

“Very curtly, Governor Wilson responded: ‘I reserve the privilege of naming whom I please for my official family. But, in any event, I shall consider no one seriously until after I return from my vacation’.

“‘May I ask if you have selected your private secretary? During your absence I may have to communicate with him if I cannot get in touch with you’, I persisted.

“‘I have none and will make no choice until I get back from Bermuda’, was Wilson’s answer.

“All the satisfaction I got was that the President-elect had not selected a single man to serve under him. I presented him a list of names of men who had been indorsed by the National Committee for some of the most desirable offices. He, scarcely glancing at it, tossed the document to his stenographer and said, as he bowed me out: ‘I may have another talk with you when I get back from Bermuda’.

“This was the briefest interview I ever had with Mr. Wilson. If ever I had to know Mr. Wilson, this was the way to find him out.

“I determined not to be on bad terms with him no matter what happened. I had a perfectly certain idea about the way he was going to handle things. I knew

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that it meant the ruin of the Democratic Party if it continued; but I felt that I owed an obligation to the party which had not been in power for twenty years. I felt that what had not been done before must be done, namely: that the party as a party must be strengthened in the matter of its organization; that its policies must be formulated definitely and distinctly.

“There should be no turpitude, no excuses, no vacillation. I believed, as I do yet, that the processes of government must be derived from the people, and that the people, high and low, must be furnished with all the facts about all the great events or the great proposals affecting them.

“I concluded to remain over at Princeton a few days and do what I could to impress the President-elect that I had made pledges to his most influential supporters which he must satisfy. I soon learned that Mr. McAdoo and Mr. Tumulty had spent election day with Governor Wilson and had submitted a list of recommendations for nearly every desirable office within his gift.

“When the newspaper correspondents asked Mr. McAdoo why he was not at his desk at New York Headquarters, he stammered: ‘Well, I thought I would come over and be the first to congratulate the President-elect’.

“Mrs. Wilson, I was afterward informed, reached the President-elect with the definite news of his victory only a minute or two ahead of Mr. McAdoo.

“I called on the President-elect again the Thursday after election.

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"An army of photographers besieged us for snapshots. The President-elect finally condescended to have his picture taken with me. I can hardly say I wore a triumphant smile as the 'snapshooters' shot us in various poses.

"Apparently to show the public that he was not ungrateful or discourteous, the President-elect invited me to go with him to the Princeton-New York University football game the following Saturday. We were accompanied by 'Big Bill' Edwards. While we were watching the 'Tigers' overwhelm the Gotham boys, I once or twice sought to get a definite answer about appointments to carry back to my associates on the National Committee. At each hint Governor Wilson scowled. Finally, in indignation, mock or genuine, he said:

"'Once and for all, Mr. McCombs, not a word on this subject until I get back from my vacation. I must insist upon rest and a chance to think'.

"I did not renew the subject, and returned to New York absolutely in the dark as to the fate of men who had fought and made sacrifices to make Wilson President".

Governor Wilson departed for his vacation a few days later. He was absent until December 16th. Whether or not, while away, he inspected the recommendations of Chairman McCombs and his associates, the fact remains that in the list submitted by them these names appeared:

For Secretary of State: Richard Olney, of Massachusetts.

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For Secretary of the Treasury: Henry Morgenthau, of New York.

For Secretary of War: Colonel John T. McGraw, of West Virginia, or General "Bibb" Graves, of Alabama.

For Attorney General: Robert L. Henry, of Texas.

Not one of the men proposed by McCombs was appointed.

While the President-elect was hibernating in Southern climes, McCombs learned that William G. McAdoo was stating that he would be Secretary of the Treasury, and Joseph P. Tumulty that he would be Secretary to the President.

He was not surprised that McAdoo aimed to handle the nation's billions. But he was rather astonished that Tumulty still sought the Secretaryship to the President. McCombs had been informed that just before leaving the country Governor Wilson had offered, and Tumulty had accepted, the Secretaryship of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. This position carried a salary in excess of that drawn by the President's Secretary. Nevertheless, McCombs kept hearing that Tumulty was to be at the elbow of the President at Washington. Unwelcome as this was to him, he decided to withhold continued opposition on the ground that the President of course was warranted in choosing whom he pleased for this confidential place.

McAdoo, for Secretary of the Treasury, was a proposition which McCombs found difficult to tolerate. He called a conference of those who had been intimately associated with him in the campaign and sought

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their advice. It was agreed that McCombs himself ought to avow himself a candidate for head of the financial branch of the government. Reluctantly, McCombs accepted the advice on condition, however, that he personally should not submit the suggestion to the President-elect.

“I wish”, urged McCombs, “to be in the position of one seeking no office at all under the Wilson administration. As Chairman of the National Committee, however, I reserve the right of recommending candidates whose fitness is guaranteed by those who were most responsible for the nomination and election of Governor Wilson. Of course, should the President-elect offer me the Secretaryship of the Treasury, or the Attorney Generalship, I would feel very grateful and complimented. But I shall never personally ask either or any place from him”.

Colonel E. M. House, Cleveland H. Dodge, and others, called upon the President-elect upon his return from Bermuda, December 16, 1912. They eulogized McCombs and urged that he be made either Secretary of the Treasury or Attorney General. They argued that he was entitled to any office the President-elect could give him.

“What about McAdoo”? asked the President-elect.

“Consider first the man who did more to put you in the White House than any other. We do not care what you do for McAdoo after that”, was the reply of Mr. Dodge.

“Well, I’ll see McCombs and talk it over with him”, responded Governor Wilson.

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Within a few hours after the President-elect got back from his outing, the writer happened to meet a Wall Street friend.

"It is no news to you, I presume, that William J. Bryan is to be Secretary of State, is it"? asked my friend.

"It is", was my answer.

"Well, President-elect Wilson has offered the portfolio to Bryan and there is the devil to pay about it. But Bryan will accept", said my informant.

I called up Mr. McCombs at his New York office. I told him of my information. He answered: "Don't believe all you hear in Wall Street. Most people go broke on that. There is no chance of Bryan's appointment. The President-elect knows, as well as I do, that Bryan did his best to deprive him of the nomination and sought to appropriate it for himself. I am going to Princeton to see the Governor this afternoon. I shall call you up this evening and give you the facts".

About 10 P. M. McCombs did call me. He said: "I regret to say that your informant was right. The President-elect, in his desire to start his administration without friction with any factions of his party, has offered the Secretaryship of State to Mr. Bryan. I have made as vehement a protest as I can, and shall continue to do so until the very hour of the nominations. I have, in detail, reminded the President-elect of the plot engineered by Bryan at the Baltimore convention to prevent the Governor's nomination and secure his own. I shall ask every true friend of the President-elect to unite with me in insisting that

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Bryan shall not be intrusted with any confidential place under the administration. I have cordially renewed my recommendation that Richard Olney, who was Secretary of State under Grover Cleveland, is the ideal man to handle foreign affairs. I shall persist in this".

During this memorable interview with the President-elect, Governor Wilson asked Mr. McCombs if he and his associates would strenuously oppose the appointment of William G. McAdoo for Secretary of the Treasury.

"We shall content ourselves with filing our objections", replied Mr. McCombs. "We know McAdoo. We do not consider him a friend of your friends, or of yours. He is for McAdoo. That's all! Had his advice been accepted at Baltimore, you would not have been the convention nominee".

"Would you personally resent McAdoo's appointment"? asked the President-elect.

"Not personally, but for your own sake", was McCombs' reply.

Mr. McCombs learned that the President-elect was considering Lindley M. Garrison, of New Jersey, for Secretary of War. He commended this, but warmly recommended Colonel John T. McGraw, National Committeeman from West Virginia, for Garrison's assistant. As a second choice, Mr. McCombs suggested General "Bibb" Graves, of Alabama. McGraw had been one of the original Wilson boosters. General Graves, despite the fact that his state delegation was pledged to and fought to the finish for the

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nomination of Oscar W. Underwood, contended as hard as he could for Wilson's selection.

For Attorney General, McCombs argued earnestly for the naming of Robert L. Henry, of Texas. He was Chairman of the Rules Committee of the House of Representatives and had charge of the Wilson parliamentary programme at the Baltimore convention.

But the President-elect had already promised Colonel House to appoint Albert S. Burleson, of Texas, Postmaster General. He pleaded that he could not choose two members of the cabinet from Texas. McCombs admitted that this would be unfair to other states. So Henry was eliminated and Burleson agreed upon as the Texas member.

The final conference of the cabinet makers was held on the night of the last day in February at the home of Colonel House in New York. There were present the President-elect, Colonel House, Chairman McCombs, and others.

The session was protracted until almost daylight. Colonel House fought for the appointment of Bryan as Secretary of State. McCombs renewed his attack upon the Nebraskan, declaring: "He has opposed you, Governor, from the day you became a candidate for the Presidency. He regards himself as the only American fit to be President. You are in his way. He will, if appointed, seek to build up, out of patronage, a machine to plague you. I beg of you, again, do not take this man into your confidence".

The President-elect was obdurate. He persisted

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that Bryan must be placated, and that the party wing of which he was leader would become an administration auxiliary if the man from Lincoln was made Secretary of State. Governor Wilson also laid stress upon the point that even if Bryan was out for mischief, he could accomplish less in the State than in any other department.

Disgusted, and still admonishing Wilson that he was risking ruin for himself and his administration, McCombs reluctantly withdrew his open opposition to Bryan.

To the very last he fought McAdoo for Secretary of the Treasury and Tumulty for Presidential Secretary. He, however, cheerfully acquiesced in the election of Franklin K. Lane as Secretary of the Interior, and David Houston for Secretary of Agriculture. McCombs at first questioned whether Josephus Daniels possessed the ability to fill the Secretaryship of the Navy, a post so admirably administered by William C. Whitney, Benjamin F. Tracy and others who had built up America's sea armada.

But Daniels had rendered valuable service in the campaign. Southern Democrats appeared to be behind him. Then, too, Daniels had been loyal to McCombs when the plot was brewing to remove him as National Chairman and substitute McAdoo.

McCombs was astounded when informed that the President-elect had chosen William C. Redfield for another New York member of the cabinet and assigned to the Secretaryship of Commerce. Redfield, McCombs maintained, was without any following at all.

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He was in disfavor with Democrats of his home county of Kings. He had been a frequent caller at headquarters during the campaign, and had "annoyed" the managers constantly, persisting in interrupting their work by dissertations on the tariff. The President-elect, however, stuck to Redfield.

XVII

INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

McCOMBS DECLINES ALL OFFERS OF PLACE UNDER WILSON — TREATED AS A “RANK OUTSIDER” AT INAUGURATION — CANNOT PASS BRYAN-McADOO-TUMULTY TROCHA — REPUBLICAN MANAGER FRANK H. HITCHCOCK, “DOWN AND OUT”, COMMISERATES WITH McCOMBS — WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT McCOMBS IS “PATRONAGE DISTRIBUTOR” — McADOO IS REAL DISPENSER.

THREE DAYS before inauguration, March 4, 1912, Mr. McCombs publicly announced that he would not accept any office within the gift of the President. At a reception in his honor given by the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., March 1, he was introduced as a “man who can have anything he wants under the Wilson administration”.

Mr. McCombs smiled. In response, he said: “I accept this introduction instead of the cabinet place for which you boys have so generously supported me and other honors you have sought to confer. I shall take no official place under this administration. I consider myself amply rewarded because I have been identified with the battle which terminated in the election of Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States”.

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Newspaper correspondents were astonished at this. They had picked McCombs for almost every desirable place the President had to bestow. They thronged about McCombs and asked if he was serious.

"I certainly am. There is nothing of the office-seeker about me. I shall retain the National Chairmanship, however, and do all in my power to strengthen the administration and party with the people".

McCombs' announcement seemed to confirm reports that he and the President-elect had quarrelled over the distribution of offices. The newspaper men rushed telegrams all over the country to that effect.

Mr. McCombs felt like, and was treated by jealous rivals, as a "rank outsider", at the inauguration of President Wilson in 1913. William J. Bryan, William G. McAdoo, Joseph P. Tumulty and A. Mitchell Palmer constituted themselves a bodyguard about the new executive which Mr. McCombs was too modest to try to break through.

Early in the morning of March 4, Mr. McCombs, merely as a citizen, courteously called upon the President, at the latter's hotel. He was lost in the multitude assembled in and about the Presidential suite. He did not attempt to force his way in.

Mr. Bryan, who had been appointed Secretary of State; Mr. McAdoo, who had been appointed Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Tumulty, who was named for Secretary to the President, and Mr. Palmer, who afterward became Attorney General, saw to it that McCombs had no chance to get a word in private with

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the man he had helped much more than they had to send to the White House.

After being closeted with the President an hour, Mr. Bryan came out. He told newspaper men that it had been decided to offer the French Ambassadorship to Mr. McCombs.

The veriest novice in politics knew that McCombs could not afford and would not accept the post.

Just as Mr. McCombs was leaving the Presidential quarters he was told by a third party of the tender. A smile of derision played upon his face. Frowning, he said: "I cannot take a place which would cost me a hundred thousand dollars a year to maintain".

It was exasperating enough to have the rumor of the tender come through a comparative stranger. It was the more galling that the official news should emanate from a man against whom he had warned the President, but who had been taken into the Presidential family.

Mr. Wilson had hardly been sworn in than Mr. McCombs spied, in the crowd at the rear, Frank H. Hitchcock. Hitchcock had been Chairman of the Republican National Committee from 1907 to 1912 and Postmaster General under President Taft. He had just lost his job.

"One touch of nature makes the whole world kin". So thought McCombs as he greeted Hitchcock. With a sadness and sympathy that Hitchcock will never forget, McCombs said:

"I wonder, Frank, if I don't feel and look quite as miserable as you do"?

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"I'm sorry for you, old man. Let's go downtown and have some lunch", replied Hitchcock, as he linked his arm in McCombs' and led him to his limousine. The Democratic and Republican Warwicks drove to a hotel. For an hour or more they discussed their respective predicaments.

"Well, Bill! At least I had a chief who was grateful, though the man you picked defeated him", said Hitchcock, commiseratingly.

The men rehearsed their disappointments until they heard the bands blaring on their way down from the Capitol. They joined a party on the reviewing stand, opposite the White House, to witness the return of the parade escorting the new President.

March 5, the day after President Wilson's inauguration, Chairman McCombs called the National Committee together. Rumor had it that William G. McAdoo, jubilant over his elevation to the Secretaryship of the Treasury, and Joseph P. Tumulty, angered by McCombs' opposition to his appointment as Secretary to the President, planned to supplant the Chairman and substitute one of their own clique.

McCombs learned of this the night before. He conferred with Henry Morgenthau, smarting under the refusal of the President to make him his Secretary of the Treasury; Committee Treasurer Rollo Wells, Homer S. Cummings, of Connecticut; Clark Howell, of Georgia, and others. He discovered that enough votes were available to prevent consummation of any McAdoo-Tumulty plot.

When the Committee met, members flocked about

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McCombs, pledged their support and denounced as an outrage the refusal of the President even to consider their recommendations for office and his persistent declination to testify publicly to Mr. McCombs' wonderful achievements in nominating and electing him.

McCombs expressed his gratitude for the devotion of his associates. He was much touched when a resolution was offered and adopted tendering the gratitude of the Committee for his great accomplishments, and pledging undying affection and loyalty to him for the future.

Chairman McCombs returned his appreciation and added: "It will be a great delight to carry on the work of the Committee and to join with you in broadening its scope. I do not believe that, after an election, whether it results in victory or defeat, a committee should be dormant until a few months before another election. We should be in thorough co-operation all the time. I don't know how to get along without organization. My mind runs in that channel. We have the best body of fighting Democrats in the country. In order to assure a continuation of what we have accomplished, we must continue an organized army. Unless we do, we are going to meet an organized army on the other side. That will be dangerous.

"It will be a great delight to receive suggestions and advice from Committeemen. Two years from now, when we meet strong opposition, we can maintain ourselves in a Congress and reorganize for the Presidential battle of 1916".

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This speech was vociferously applauded.

Clark Howell offered a resolution empowering Chairman McCombs to name a committee to take charge of the Senatorial campaigns in Illinois and New Hampshire. The Chairman chose Homer S. Cummings, of Connecticut, as McCombs' Vice Chairman; Rollo Wells, of Missouri, Treasurer, and Thomas J. Pence to take charge of Washington Headquarters. The McAdoo-Tumulty group uttered not a public peep against McCombs at this meeting.

Commenting on the foregoing, Mr. McCombs wrote this memorandum for his book:

"I contemplated resigning as Chairman on the 5th of March, 1913. I was making every preparation for it. Before the Committee meeting, I told some of my most intimate friends on the Committee of my purpose. It went the rounds. Their answer to me was:

"'You have just laid down plans for the cohesion and the strengthening of the Democratic Party; you have been all through this thing; you know its every corner; you have the complete confidence of the Democracy of America; you must stay and finish the job.'

"I yielded to that argument, much to my regret."

Chairman McCombs remained in Washington for a few days to renew his efforts to place friends. He called frequently at the White House and kept at the President to fulfil his obligations. March 14th a semi-official note from the White House read:

"Mr. McCombs will not accept the Ambassador-

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ship to Paris. He will remain as the head of the Democratic National Committee.

“Second: Mr. McCombs will supervise the distribution of patronage throughout the United States — all the states.

“Third: In New York Senator James A. O’Gorman, who has evinced an inclination to lean toward Tammany in the matter of recommendations, will step aside, and Mr. McCombs, who has never had any connection with Tammany, will recommend the patronage there.”

It was also announced: “Under the agreement reached, Mr. McCombs’ word will be final with the President. This does not mean, however, that Mr. McCombs and the President will not confer with Senators and Representatives. On the contrary, there will be many such conferences. The best men will get the places. Where there is a number of applicants, the recommendations of Senators and Representatives will be followed.

“The President’s action in deciding to accept Mr. McCombs’ recommendations means that the independent and Progressive Democrats in New York will fare just as well as the Tammany men. Senator O’Gorman is satisfied with the arrangement. He and Chairman McCombs will work together in New York with the understanding that all recommendations must be passed upon by McCombs.”

Despite this compact, the President failed to fulfil any part of it.

Popular wrath at the refusal of the President to

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manifest the slightest gratitude for his Warwick's prodigious accomplishments in his behalf became nation-wide. Even Wilson administration organs attacked the President for his alleged declination to show some appreciation of what McCombs had done for him. The President renewed his offer to Mr. McCombs for a foreign mission.

The moment this became known, enemies of the administration shouted:

"Wilson and McAdoo plan to drive McCombs out of the country and thus lay hold on the party organization he has in his grip"!

However this may have been, President Wilson, soon after his inauguration and shutting McCombs and his friends out of his official family, formally tendered to Mr. McCombs the Ambassadorship to France a second time. It came in the form of a brief note. Mr. McCombs received it while prostrated by illness in New York. He felt that the honor offered required an answer in person. He was about to go direct to Washington when his physician directed that he remain in bed. Mr. McCombs therefore deputized his law partner, Frederick R. Ryan, to carry his answer to the President.

Mr. Ryan went to the White House, and was there courteously received by Mr. Tumulty. It was necessary to await the President's convenience, he being extremely busy that morning. After a delay of about three hours, the President met Mr. Ryan in the office of the Executive Secretary. Mr. Ryan explained briefly his mission to the President, stating the reasons

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actuating Mr. McCombs in declining the Ambassadorship. On learning that Mr. McCombs was ill, the President asked: "Is he following the advice of his physician"? Mr. Ryan replied that he believed he was. The President then said: "If that is so, it is the first time in his life that Mr. McCombs ever followed anybody's advice". With that statement he turned abruptly and went back to his office.

Shortly thereafter Mr. McCombs talked the matter over with the President, and on March 21, 1913, issued the following statement in connection therewith:

"To-day I communicated to the President my final decision as to the very great honor he has done me in tendering me the Ambassadorship to France, with assurances of my profound appreciation. No public position within his gift could be more attractive to me personally. In view of its very great dignity and importance, I have naturally studied the matter with much care.

"After reconsidering the tender, the prime motives which were in my mind before have impelled me to decline. The acceptance of the post would involve greater sacrifices than I should make. I do not feel that I can afford to leave my lifework — practice of the law. I feel compelled to devote myself to my personal affairs, and at the same time I will lend any assistance in my power that will contribute to the success of the Democratic Administration and the Democratic Party".

The President issued this comment:

"I am very sorry indeed that Mr. McCombs cannot

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accept the appointment to France. I was particularly anxious that he should. My admiration for his abilities, my knowledge of his singular capacity for grasping complex situations, my confidence in his tact and resourcefulness, as well as my affection for him and the intimate relations that of course exist between us, combine to make my disappointment very great indeed. But I, of course, appreciate the force of the reasons he gives. He would have accepted at an unreasonable sacrifice. I could not further press the offer upon him”.

Simultaneously the President issued this memorandum:

“It is a great pity that the country has to ask such sacrifices of those who are invited to serve abroad — a service which every year becomes more exacting and more important. The sacrifice of time, of means and of opportunity at home is very serious for any but men of large means and leisure, and the diplomatic service is unnecessarily hampered”.

Mr. McCombs was later informed by the President during a short interview that he had offered the Ambassadorship to Great Britain to Richard Olney, who had been recommended by Mr. McCombs for Secretary of State. Mr. Olney declined. Then the mission was offered to Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University. He, too, declined. Then William H. Sharp took the post.

XVIII

COLONEL HOUSE — THE “INTRIGUER”

TRIES TO BARGAIN WITH MCCOMBS TO DISCARD WILSON FOR BRYAN AND “WE’LL CONTROL THE UNITED STATES” — OFFER FURIOUSLY REJECTED — THOUGH OPPOSED TO WILSON’S NOMINATION, THE “COLONEL” NAMES WHOM HE PLEASES FOR OFFICE — “FED ON WILSON’S PASSION FOR GREATNESS AND SAID ‘NO’! OR ‘YES’! AS REQUIRED” — HOW HE MUDDLED THINGS FOR THE PRESIDENT — MORGENTHAU, BARUCH AND ELKUS PORTRAYED.

[EDITOR’S NOTE — Mr. McCombs takes up his narrative again, devoting nearly an entire chapter to Colonel House.]

DURING the pre-convention months, once a week, whenever possible, Governor Wilson came to my apartment, the Royalton, in West 44th Street, to talk over matters in general. I always made it a point, in view of his lack of knowledge of men in public or political life, or men who might be of assistance, to have him meet them there.

It is to be understood that Governor Wilson spent his life exclusively in an academic atmosphere. I dare say that even when he went to Washington as President he did not know seventy-five men in public life. Indeed, I think this is no exaggeration.

The meetings at the Royalton had this advantage: I could select the men that I knew might be attracted

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to him, and those whom I knew would at once dislike him intensely. In the case of the latter, I must confess that I kept them away from him and drew the picture myself.

During November, Governor Wilson was to be in town. I asked Colonel House if he would care to meet him. Mr. House, of course, accepted with pleasure. In a few minutes he arrived from his hotel. I presented him. The conversation ran along conventional lines. It did not touch any subject involving public affairs, much less the Presidency.

Other gentlemen came, who had an appointment, and Colonel House retired.

Late in December, the Colonel called up and asked me if I would care to present an invitation to Governor Wilson to dine with a Professor Houston, who had been President of the University at Austin, Texas, but who was then President of the University at St. Louis.

Mr. House said, incidentally, that Mr. Houston had made a special study of the tariff, and that the two might meet on common ground on that issue, especially since the Governor was to make his tariff speech on January 3, 1912.

The dinner passed off quite pleasantly. There was general conversation. President Houston intimated a desire to discuss the tariff. Governor Wilson caromed off the issue and there was nothing further heard of that. The conversation was then resumed along conventional lines, Colonel House not participating.

I went later to see Colonel House on the very prac-

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OF THE UNITED STATES



EDWARD M. HOUSE

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tical matter of his contribution. He said he could make none, then disappeared.

However, during the spring of 1912 I was invited by Colonel House to become a week-end guest at Beverly, Massachusetts. I accepted the invitation and moreover had a very pleasant time.

The Texas situation was discussed. I told him that it was all “sewed up” and that Colonel Ball, of Austin, had the matter thoroughly in hand. The Colonel then made it known to me that he, too, had been writing some letters.

I can positively state that Colonel House had nothing to do with carrying the State of Texas in the primaries for Woodrow Wilson, except, as he told me himself, he had written a few letters. I think no responsible person who took part in that difficult primary would contradict me for an instant.

But returning to the Beverly week-ends: As I was getting in my cab to go for my train one day, Colonel House came out with me. He said: “You know, Mr. McCombs, that Woodrow Wilson cannot be nominated. I think I can do something with Bryan, and if you will turn the present forces of Woodrow Wilson to Senator Culberson of Texas, you and I will control the United States for the next four years”.

I tried to be as polite as possible inasmuch as I was a departing guest. But I said that I had told Governor Wilson that I would be with him until the end. No such combination as the Colonel suggested was possible in the convention.

Senator Culberson was unfortunately a sick man.

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For that reason he was losing his grip on the public. In addition, he came from the wrong state. I felt sure that if Mr. Bryan had anything in his mind at all about the convention it would be his own candidacy.

I left House, feeling that he was a puny intriguer, but bold enough to assert an absurdity when it might possibly be to his advantage. I think when this Beverly conversation is analyzed in the light of subsequent events, much may be augured of what happened in Washington during Mr. Wilson's incumbency as President.

Colonel House took no further interest. I never saw nor heard of him again until some one told me, shortly before the Baltimore convention, that he had sailed for Europe for an indefinite stay.

Contrary to other published statements, and my associates in the Baltimore convention will bear me out, Colonel House had nothing whatever to do with that convention or its processes.

On his return from abroad, the Colonel came to me, and said he would like a letter from me of presentation to the Presidential nominee. I thereupon wrote one for him to Governor Wilson, but in the confusion of his mail probably he did not have a chance to answer it. Colonel House came to me ten days later, much perturbed. He asked if I would give him a letter of presentation which he would take by hand to Sea Girt. It was a small courtesy. I knew that the Governor's business was such that he might not be able to see him for days. But Colonel House persisted. I wrote to the Governor saying that this letter presented Colonel

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House, whom he perhaps remembered as having met at my apartment, and at dinner at Colonel House's home in New York when Professor Houston and I were present.

Colonel House took the letter and expressed profuse thanks. I heard nothing of it for some time. I noticed about the third week before the Presidential campaign closed that Colonel House was around headquarters every afternoon, trying to meet everybody. Furthermore, he was anxious that I should go riding through the park with him, but I never did.

In some way or other, which I can never tell, I became suspicious that House was at that time intriguing. I paid no special attention to it because I could not imagine that he could be helpful or hurtful to anyone.

The election took place. I did not see anything more of Colonel House. He had been merely a passing incident to me because I had been in the large business of putting a big operation through.

About December 15, 1912, the President-elect went to the Waldorf-Astoria prior to sailing for Bermuda. I called to pay my respects and wish him a pleasant journey.

I found House there, seated with him alone. The President-elect and I had fifteen or twenty minutes' general conversation. House sat silently, in a bowed position, his hands crossed over his chest. He never took his eyes off the President-elect. With servile alacrity he agreed with every word the President-elect uttered.

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After this session I left the President-elect, and he went to his boat bound for Bermuda.

I could not but wonder at the presence of House. . . . Why, above all men, should *he* be there? His manner was nothing more or less than that of a dignified flunky who was only permitted to sit down and say "Yes" or "No" to the President-elect, as the case might require.

As I walked down the corridor to the elevator, I wondered very much where House fitted in. I kept wondering about him as I went down the elevator. As I passed out of the hotel, I felt I had the psychology of it, when I remembered that James R. Keene told me about the great horse Sysonby: that in order to keep him quiet, his trainers always kept a kitten in the stall with him. Very often, too, the kitten was taken as far as the track when the horse was to race.

Nobody seemed to know that House was becoming influential. But it was only about the time of the inauguration that I found out that he had a power with Wilson. Of course, it is well known that he put Bryan, Burleson, McReynolds and Houston into the Cabinet. This he did out of hand.

It became clear to me that if House, an unknown, had this much power, in the end the organized Democracy of America was to receive a severe shock. There is no question that House was responsible for most of the large appointments of the Wilson administration and for grievous mistakes in that regard.

It is absolutely sure also, that his hand was evident

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in some of the great mistakes in Wilson's executive politics, as well as his legislative suggestions.

I have made faithful inquiry and have yet failed to get a view from a single impartial man who knew House that he did not exactly conform to the impression which I took away with me on the first evening at the Gotham in New York.

House has been called by many “a man of mystery”. Such is far from the case. In my mind, in the first instance, we must take count of the analogy of Sysonby. In the second place, House did the thing which any newspaper man will tell you can be done,—created an air of mystery about himself by being with the President, and always refusing to talk.

House no doubt fed to the limit on Mr. Wilson's all-absorbing passion for the appearance of greatness. I say it, without reserve, that a practical man would not keep House about him fifteen minutes.

But House likes publicity. He likes to create, through his atmosphere of mystery, a conviction of greatness. The egotistical book called the “Real Colonel House” reveals this characteristic of House. That book was written, at the instance of House, by a newspaper man. I am told by the editor who published it that House personally revised the proofs and wrote most of what is quoted of him in that volume. If one can stand the reading of it without nausea in the light of the above facts, one can indeed understand the “Real Colonel House”.

In February, 1913, House appeared at my apartment. “Now”, said he, “we must all fix this thing up.

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I will call McAdoo right up here. He will arrive in twenty minutes. I know where he lives, and you and he can have the selections of posts in the Cabinet with the exception of one”.

I quickly realized who the one was — Bryan.

House continued:

“Now if we fix this thing up among us, McAdoo and you and I will control the United States for the next four years”.

I was so enraged at the thought that I answered him in far from drawing-room language and asked him to get out of my apartment as quickly as possible.

Subsequent events prove that House was right, for later nothing that House or McAdoo desired was turned down. They delivered vast volumes of patronage throughout the United States, and by this they high-handedly offended and overruled Congressmen and Senators.

I have been told by hundreds of truthful men that when they wanted anything done at Washington, it was essential to get the approval of Mr. House first. I have seen this system in operation. It is well known that McAdoo practically had his way in everything, and that the other members of the Cabinet need not have been there at all.

No man I have ever asked about House has said that he had any intelligence. When persons have visited him he has rubbed his hands like a girl, using a soft, low voice. His only answer to any question has been a “We will see”!

It was early in February, 1913, that Colonel House

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arranged that "Captain" Bill McDonald be dispatched to Princeton as the special bodyguard of the President-elect. This amused me intensely. "Captain" Bill was an old withered up man, since dead, who had at some time acquired, under the skill of an artist, the reputation of a "Gun Fighter".

The "Captain" brought two guns down. He walked up and down the quiet streets of Princeton proclaiming himself as the bodyguard of Wilson and the greatest "Gun Fighter" in the world. It then became clear to me that Wilson liked "Opera Bouffé", and the little publicity this would bring. It also appeared that House was getting very close to the President.

Another man who, in making Wilson, rose himself to fame was Bernard M. Baruch. He was the strongest character that developed during the administration. For many years prior to Wilson's election Baruch was engaged in speculation on the New York Stock Exchange. The only place or position he held was that of Trustee of the College of the City of New York. It was there that I first met him.

Baruch was absorbed in money making. I came to know him very well at the board meetings of the college. In our talks I often urged him to try to keep his millions, taken merely from speculation, and not lose them as had every man I had known. To this point I cited the case of Mr. James R. Keene.

I have told how I introduced him to Mr. Wilson. His first public work was on the Preparedness Committee of New York under Mayor John Purroy Mitchel. In this he was an active factor. He then

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went to Washington and became a member of the Defense League, an unofficial body, of which he was made Chairman. Later the President made him Chairman of the War Board.

Baruch is one of the most pleasant men to meet in the world. But his dominating idea is quick turns for profits. The President constantly pushed him on until he was a real power in Washington.

In 1911, Rabbi Stephen Wise, who had always been an ardent follower of Mr. Wilson, thought he might interest Henry Morgenthau in the cause. After meeting Governor Wilson, and after his speech for the revocation of the Russian Treaty, Mr. Morgenthau agreed to underwrite Governor Wilson's campaign for \$20,000 — \$5,000 a month. In the very "weak" days of April and May, Mr. Morgenthau became "very" weak, but I held him to his pledge. I made him Chairman of the Finance Committee later on this agreement. I told Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Abram I. Elkus that I would make either of them Chairman of the Finance Committee, if the other would give his endorsement, including mine, for some public office, if he desired one.

Elkus and Morgenthau consulted. Morgenthau was agreed upon. Nevertheless, Elkus came to headquarters on important work and served in a very efficacious manner.

Morgenthau, on the other hand, proved a disappointment. When I found a deficit and the \$640,000 budget, I called in Morgenthau and Rollo Wells, the Treasurer. I had already signed a note for \$200,000.

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I passed it to Morgenthau for execution. His pallor was such that I thought we would need a physician. He begged for time to see some of his friends. Thereupon I ended the conversation. What I wanted was to get Morgenthau on his toes in the matter of contributions. He succeeded in collecting about \$50,000 from somewhere in about two days. Elkus contributed something like \$20,000 himself.

Morgenthau, early in January, 1912, came to me before breakfast one morning, and said he was a candidate for Secretary of the Treasury. I asked him what had become of Mr. Elkus. He was to have the first choice. "Oh", he said, "Abie is ineligible"!

In the early part of the summer of 1913, Mr. Morgenthau came to see me while I was ill at my hotel in Paris. His first words, accompanied by violent gesticulations, were that he had been insulted; that the President had offered him the Ambassadorship to Turkey, and that he wouldn't take it if he knew that the four walls in which we were should crush him to death.

I said: "Henry, these walls are pretty thick. You had better go back to Washington and take the place".

He did.

As for Mr. Elkus, he waited for many months without an appointment. He then succeeded Morgenthau as Ambassador to Turkey. At the beginning of the War he came back with a most excellent record. He was one of the few men, also, who appreciated the fact that having been an Ambassador in the foreign service does not necessitate writing a book, or lecturing, or engaging in moving pictures.

PART II

ANALYSIS, RETROSPECT — OPINIONS

XIX

THE COST OF VANITY

“STAND-PATTER” ALDRICH PROVOKED THE 1912 REPUBLICAN REVOLT — “ROOSEVELT LOST THROUGH BAD TACTICS — WILSON WON BECAUSE SICK PARTIES CLUTCHED EACH OTHER’S THROATS — WILSON LOST THROUGH LUST FOR POWER, WHICH MADE HIM THE JOKE OF THE WORLD POWERS — MEDDLING, MUDDLING AND COLOSSAL VANITY — BRUTAL IN VICTORY — COWARDLY IN DEFEAT”.

[EDITOR’S NOTE — The McCombs narrative is resumed in this chapter.]

THE SUCCESS of Wilson was due not only to good campaign work, but to a series of circumstances in the Republican ranks and to the Roosevelt-Taft split. The following, in brief, shows the state of affairs:

The Republicans had reached the zenith of their power in the time of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich, of Rhode Island. His power became so supreme that the younger and disobedient members of the Senate had no chance whatever. Mr. Aldrich, no doubt, believed that the Republican Party could remain in power as long as it desired by “standing pat”; admitting no progressive legislation whatever, but grinding along with its group control.

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The first sign of explosion appeared in the failure to recognize in any way the strength of the younger members and excluding them from participation. Senator Robert L. LaFollette, of Wisconsin, was the first to pry up the lid. Then many members of the party followed the same process. It proved that the power of the old leaders was passing fast, although they did not know it.

There sprang up a Progressive group which, to my mind, did not mean at the beginning anything except opposition to the control in the Senate. Young leaders developed. They voiced their views against the powers that be, and by 1911 this protest had spread all over the country.

President Taft was sitting by, in a kind of way trying to please everybody and inevitably pleasing nobody. However, the bold crowd of "Stand-Patters" made up their minds that they would see it out and demonstrate their control of the party by renominating President Taft in 1912.

The so-called "Progressives", first led by Mr. LaFollette and later and finally by Theodore Roosevelt, began a most vigorous campaign for the nomination. They produced almost, but not quite, enough strength. Thereupon, in another convention, the voice of protest was raised like a clap of thunder by Theodore Roosevelt as the Progressive nominee.

I have always believed that had Roosevelt not stayed in his rooms in Chicago in 1912 while the Republican nominations were going on, and had he appeared with all his tremendous vigor in the conven-

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tion, he could have overthrown the opposition and could have been the nominee. Mr. Roosevelt was a great judge of politics. But as a tactician he was a tremendous failure. Nobody in the Republican convention was very strong for Taft. It was a convention dominated by elderly men who could have been swept over as ten pins if vigor and force had been applied.

Then came the Baltimore Democratic Convention. There was bitter fighting, struggling and manouevring from the first until the last. No contest could have been staged that was more virulent, more soul-searching, more acrimonious at times. There was a struggle of strong men, each stripped to his waist to support his own particular candidate.

The Wilson nomination was made. As one, the whole convention like magic came together for the nominee. Leaders and rank and filers worked for him throughout the campaign, believing that the moment had come when the Democratic Party might get together and again become a constructive, fighting organization. As I have shown elsewhere, after Mr. Wilson was elected he set about to destroy the purposes of these men and to make them victims of his own vanity and love of power.

But to return to the Republican Party. It was sick; it was tired and disconsolate. The campaign centered about Roosevelt alone. There was no time to form an organization. Unfortunately for him, those closest by him were not organizers. The Progressive Party was sick also, sick of the Republican

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Party, groping about, holding up its hands to Roosevelt as the possible saviour.

It can be seen that Wilson had opposed to him the Republican Party that was politically sick, and the Progressive Party, unorganized and relying upon the strength of one man protesting against things as they were.

I must say of Mr. Roosevelt that he premised many of our national necessities. Although his platform was loosely joined, it pointed to things which the American people must do, and some of which they have done.

Mr. Wilson's strength lay primarily in the fact that he had as his opponents two sick parties at each other's throats. While the Democratic Party had no particular enthusiasm for him, the leaders had a vigorous desire to come back into power. And they worked. It was not Mr. Wilson's personality. In that campaign it amounted to very little. It was primarily the fact that the Republican Parties had disintegrated into factions and schisms.

Prior to the '16 campaign, President Wilson had made much more progress with the rank and file of this party.

He made no friends and many enemies. He took a detached view of everything. He sat at Sea Girt, assuming the best. But the War was on. The idea of not changing parties in the middle of the stream and the slogan, "He kept us out of War", was abroad. So he came back to power, with very little to spare, and with no kindness of feeling from the American people.

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As I write this (1919), Mr. Wilson is alone in the midst of a most convulsive situation. He has proven himself utterly unfit to deal with it.

Wilson's visit abroad, which consumed seven months, resulted in this: A wonderful welcome whereby it was arranged that he should sleep in the palaces of kings, where his exceeding vanity from the beginning was catered to.

The crowds in Milan and other cities of Italy, told that he was their saviour, wildly acclaimed him. They threw flowers. He threw kisses. This parade was soon over. His Fourteen Points, which he solemnly asserted would go into the League of Nations, had disappeared.

President Wilson told the foreign potentates "that the American people were with him". Europeans have some knowledge of America. They knew the Americans were not with Wilson.

Wilson took over to France with him on the commission men who would do his bidding. There was the ever present "Little Colonel House". There was Henry T. White, an aged man who has long since retired from the active affairs of the world. There was General Tasker T. Bliss, also an aged man, who had never figured in diplomacy. Finally, there was Secretary of State Lansing, who, according to his own testimony before the Senate Committee, was not apprised of many of the vital parts of the proposed covenant until they were actually agreed to by Wilson.

It was Wilson who proposed to give Shantung to

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Japan, which would set up for Japan a most powerful enemy against us in any future war.

He said he did not know anything about the existing secret treaty prior to 1916, when it had been published all over Europe. At this writing he is the joke of every power in the world. He came back somewhat more willing to see people. He is in trouble (August 21, 1919).

It is the usual Wilson. He allowed his pockets to be picked by the Powers of Europe while masses were throwing bouquets at him and he kisses to them. The transformation has come.

I have said, and repeat, that Wilson is the most remorseless, the most tyrannical man when he gets the smell of power. In possible defeat no one that the earth has ever produced can excel his speed in retirement.

As I write these observations, there lies before me Colonel Henry Watterson's analysis of President Wilson's continuous performance at Paris. I cannot improve upon it, so I reproduce it:

"The Herald, March 31, 1919.

"MR. WILSON A PUNISHMENT FOR SOME NATIONAL SIN, IS VIEW OF COLONEL WATTERSON.

"PRESIDENT'S 'MEDIocre MIND AND COLOSSAL VANITY' WILL RESULT IN SETTING EUROPE AFIRE BY MID-SUMMER, EDITOR DECLARES — 'HIS MISSION TO MAKE TROUBLE WHEREVER HE APPEARS'

[Special Despatch to the Herald.]

"MIAMI, FLA., Sunday — In response to the Herald's

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inquiry 'What of the President's continuous performance in Europe?' Mr. Henry Watterson, detained in Miami by a recent indisposition, replied:—'I think the events helped along by the President himself, will verify my forecast that he is not merely a candidate for a third term in the White House but that for a nomination to such he holds all the winning cards in his hands.'

"'You mean that he controls the Democratic machine?'

"'Why, yes', he answered, 'if you care to put it that way. The Democratic party so called, he long ago abolished, having previously much debauched it. Nothing of it survives, except the tattered label, and he holds that betwixt his thumb and forefingers. I am inclined to believe, however, that he has eliminated the United States from his immediate activities as an established conquest and is now giving his mighty thought to the sublimation of the world'.

"'That suggestion, Mr. Watterson', interrupted the reporter, 'would seem to require elaboration, if not explanation'.

"'Mr. Wilson', the editor resumed. 'like most of those whose ambitions outrun their talents, has become the victim of contingencies he has himself raised up. He has been caught by the foreign lure. He sails the blue of the empyrean. The scion of a race of religious fanatics and rustic scholars, his commonplace mind grew to be overtrained, and he reached manhood already a dangerous intellectual adventurer.

"'Such characters seem strangely favored by fortune. The powers of evil delight in exhibiting them. Within less than a decade, advanced from a university professor to the chief magistracy, Woodrow Wilson has so thrust himself into the affairs of his own land, and other lands, as to be at this moment the most conspicuous figure at the forefront.

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“A virtuous, right minded man thus situated would emulate the humility of a Washington and the humanity of a Lincoln. Mr. Wilson sees nothing but himself and his personal exaltation—lives for nothing except his own advantage—seeks nothing save power and authority, the concrete things of rulership represented by the regal splendors and feudal glories which though somewhat frazzled and faded still go on about him. He is too clever not to set up for a prophet. Thus the League of Peace and the Religion of the Uplift. The once famous faker, the ‘Immortal J. N.’, as he called himself, must turn over with envy in his grave and the bones of Mother Eddy grow sick with the thought of lost opportunities.

“‘Don’t you think, Mr. Watterson,’ I asked, ‘that Mr. Wilson is doing more good than harm on the other side’?

“‘If I were phrase making or word splitting’ he replied, ‘I might say that he deserves impeachment for going at all. It is the old story of meddle and muddle. The world is full of it. As a consequence of his maladroitness Europe will find itself the middle of the coming summer in flames. Then we shall have him alone again urging intervention. It has been his mission in life to make trouble wherever he appeared. When the great Jehovah interjected such a sinister spirit into our affairs it must have been to punish us for our manifold delinquencies as a nation and a people.

“‘We should steer clear of European complications. Never has there been a time when the admonitions of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe carried greater weight. Mr. Wilson’s mediocre mind and colossal vanity have already carried him far to sea. It is ours to look to it that he does not carry the country to the shipwreck of its institutions’”.

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Mr. Wilson's ideas of the functions of the Executive changed after entering the public service. I have turned to my notebook which sets out the lectures of Professor Wilson at Princeton when I was a student under him. One of the points most pressed was that of the co-ordinate powers of the President, the Supreme Court and the Congress.

He lectured long and often upon the very distinct functions of these three bodies, and disparaged anything that might tend to disrupt the balance of power among the three bodies as set out in the Constitution,—or, rather, the system of checks and balances.

When I came out of Princeton I was much imbued with that idea. I did remember, however, reading Thomas Jefferson's works.

Maybe the smell of power of Princeton and the complete dominance of a very few men, members of the Legislature in New Jersey, completely changed his ideas. I often think that a man's conception of his duties is much affected by his powers. Those powers sometimes have little regard for the Constitution, the statutes and the common law.

Mr. Wilson went to the White House a supreme ruler in his own heart. He dared not take about him strong men, for strong men might disagree with him, and in the end his conception as well as his practice might disappear.

The working out of Wilson's administrations has shown that no man who had creative ideas or constructive ability could long survive the Wilson contact. I suspect that was the predominant reason of Mr.

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Bryan's leaving the Cabinet. I know that this was the reason for the resignation of the able Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War.

I think that Attorney General McReynolds, who had a testy sort of mind, with no particular vision, used his remaining spirit of independence and was glad to go on the Supreme Court for that reason. Of course, there must be included the high reason that any lawyer would accept a nomination to that august tribunal. But it was not the august tribunal which brought the matter about. It was because McReynolds did not always agree with President Wilson. Yet that was no reason for throwing him out of the Cabinet. But there was a place on the Supreme Court then.

It became early apparent that Wilson was not only going to regard himself as the President of the country, but as the Premier of the Congress. He said, I recall, during my college days, that, after all, the English system of government was the best, and that idea never left him.

But we must assume that he forgot that there is no provision in our Constitution for a Premier who goes out of office immediately after the majority of Parliament has passed adversely upon an issue that he has proposed, and that a general election is then declared; that thus the people are closely in touch with the government because the Parliament, as the present Premier, must always more directly than our President represent the wishes of the people.

But Mr. Wilson was President of the United States under a written Constitution. He had his functions

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definitely outlined. He could not fall if his policy or the policies of the majority in Congress failed of support. Whatever act the Congress adopted, and whatever act he committed short of an impeachment proceeding, was valid, and he must stay for the period of his election.

It was late in his administration after he had arrived from the Peace Conference, and it was during that conference that he proclaimed himself Premier of the United States and of the Congress,—the most audacious proclamation that was ever emitted from the mouth of a President of the United States. He must stay in his place until the time of election expires. He could not fall, and constitutionally he could not act indirectly, as he did from the beginning of his administration as Premier.

A man who has the Wilson conscience and technique can override a Congress and make it obedient to his will. He can, as in Wilson's case, propose legislation direct from the White House and force it through.

From the beginning, President Wilson proposed legislation in final form to the Congress and it was passed. These bills were called administration bills—that is, bills proposed by the President or Premier. The force that put them through in the early stages was the desire which was then prevalent to make the party “harmonious”—and then there was patronage to be distributed. The Congress went along and accepted bills known as administration bills, and when anyone opposed them the President chopped his head

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off, whether by ignoring him or opposing him in subsequent elections.

Wilson was in a high stage of exultation then. He was the schoolmaster who could make the student do anything he desired or be punished.

Congressional bills went along until the Panama Toll Bill was proposed. Mr. Wilson would not even explain why the Panama Toll Bill was necessary, and has not to this day. He said it was for a high purpose, and those thinking Senators who finally opposed it were called the "Wilful Twelve",—an admirable Wilsonian coinage.

As the Congress became more supine to him, and had accepted him as the Premier who could not fall, I was reminded that when he became Governor of New Jersey he proclaimed himself "Leader of the Party". This was unprecedented, as far as I am informed, in history.

He meant what he said. He meant that he must control the Legislature, and, as far as possible, the courts.

When he got to Washington, he proclaimed himself the "Leader of the Party in the United States". This, I am sure, no other President ever did or ever dared think of doing. For how can one man, having coordinate power with two other equally important powers in the government, proclaim himself the party leader, and how can he, by the same implication, express the intention of making the party malleable to his will? But this thing was done.

From the very beginning President Wilson took a

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complete assignment of the National Congress. Few members were allowed even to see him. He consulted with few leaders in either branch of Congress, and that was on the rarest occasions. Generally, it was to inform them that such and such was a bill that was to be introduced and passed.

The only consultation ever had, so far as any person ever knew, was with the "mysterious" House and with his son-in-law, William G. McAdoo.

Mr. Wilson was a historian. He preached constantly the preservation of constitutional rights and the maintenance of the system of checks and balances which Mr. Roosevelt actually had not. I know leaders in the party who could do this work with some degree of boldness, but who would always keep their minds on the Constitution and not on themselves.

It was within a very few months after his election that I discovered that Mr. Wilson sought merely to advance himself; that he had lost sight of the new problems confronting him, and dealt only with those which might advance him. I knew within six months that his high purpose was to abolish the Democratic Party, make it supine to his will, and to consider nothing except through the eyes of one who was drunk for power.

The idea of "serving" that ran all through his speeches disgusted me, because it was apparent that he meant in fact serving himself. The reader of current events since 1913 ought to be aware of this fact.

I suppose that President Wilson has not been much more truculent to labor than the average President or

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Member of Congress. He has had more opportunities to be so.

In 1916 the Adamson Law was demanded of Congress by President Wilson. This was a political venture for the railroad employees. The Presidential election was coming on. It was passed. It was passed in the interest of the President's re-election.

In that year I was the nominee of the Democratic Party for the United States Senate. After the campaign had warmed up, I talked to the New York State leaders. I knew they would tell me the absolute truth. I concluded that, far from any good effect that the Adamson Law would accomplish, it was distinctly bad.

After speaking at a railroad town, the other speakers being Secretary Lane and Secretary Baker, and the Democratic nominee for Governor, Judge Samuel Seabury, I felt there was nothing of comfort in the Adamson Law. It was the coldest meeting I ever addressed. Afterward Judge Seabury, who had been on the bench for ten years or more, came into my state-room on the train. He said: "I may now address you as the next member of the United States Senate by 100,000". I got up, closed the door, and said to Judge Seabury: "Now, let's be good sports. You and I are both beaten by 150,000. The Adamson Law is not going to help; it is going to hurt".

However, I do not believe labor *en masse* can be controlled. At the very beginning of the Presidential campaign of 1912, at the first meeting of the Campaign Committee, one member asked, how are we going to handle the Church Question. I said: "We

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are not going to handle it". "How are we going to handle the Labor Question"? I said: "That question, too, we will not handle. There may be a general sentiment running through Churches, or running through Labor, but in neither case can any party ever hope to control it as a mass. It is an impossibility".

XX

McCOMBS A "SOCIAL LION"

GETS APPENDICITIS AND A BRIDE — FETED IN LONDON AND PARIS — REFUSES PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONERSHIP AND STATE CHAIRMANSHIP — FRAMES PARTY PLATFORMS AND IS NOMINATED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DELEGATE — ATTACKS ROOSEVELT AS A BOLTER — OFFERS SERVICES AS PARTY PEACE-MAKER — BACKS GLYNN FOR GOVERNOR AND GERARD FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR.

IN 1913 Mr. McCombs became a social lion in London and Paris, recovered from an operation for appendicitis, and brought to America a bride. All this happened within less than five months.

In June, Mr. McCombs went abroad. Though he sought to keep his presence unknown, desiring complete rest, he was deluged with invitations to dinners, luncheons, suppers and other functions by royalty, statesmen and clubmen.

Frederick Townsend Martin, who was Mr. McCombs' companion, described his visit as a "social joy ride". William Gillette, dean of London clubdom, pronounced Mr. McCombs as a "wonderful social sensation, who conquers everything with silence and smiles, exhibiting the suavity and restraint the English admire as mannerisms".

McCOMBS A SOCIAL LION

Mr. McCombs was frequently guest of honor at the exclusive Marlborough and Bachelor Clubs, inside which few Americans could penetrate. He was much in the company of Count Kinsky, the Duke of Manchester, Sir Herbert Tree, Lord Ingestra, Lord Athlumney, the Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz and Gustav Harvel, the aviator.

Too much social effort lowered Mr. McCombs' resistance, and while in Paris he was stricken with appendicitis. On July 8th he was operated on successfully by Doctor DuBouche, the famous French surgeon. The night before the operation McCombs gave a dinner to James W. Gerard, then Ambassador to Germany, Archibald White, Perry Belmont, and Martin W. Littleton. They, with the Ambassador to Paris, Myron T. Herrick, saw to it that McCombs had the very best of care. The patient was out of the hospital in ten days and plunged again into society.

Mr. McCombs' state of mind at this time is admirably shown by the following letter to his favorite sister, Corinne:

“Paris, July 17, 1913

“My darling sweetheart sister:—

I got your sweet letter and loved every word of it. It found me just getting over the operation for appendicitis (which finally had to come although I fought it hard). After all, I think it improved me. The wound is quite healed but I lost strength somewhat.

I am going to Baden Baden, Germany, to-morrow for a rest cure of three weeks. Then probably up into Switzerland in the mountains. I shall try to be in New York in September but I doubt it. October is more likely.

MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT

I waded through fire to make Wilson President, and now that he is there, I am paying a terrible penalty of shattered health. I know you are aware of what I went through. I would not do it again for the whole earth.

I left New York because my health and my spirits would not stand it a day longer. I simply had to do it to live. Ever since I have been here I have been ill, making as brave a fight as possible to restore myself. I am glad to say my health has improved but I am *heart-sick* and I would give anything to see you. Returning to America now would merely mean getting into the cruel grind again and I can't stand it for some months to come.

I have many friends here who look after me as best they can. The circle of *real* friends is however very narrow. Unhappily, we have to find that out as we go. *You know how I was tricked and duped when I was ill.* However, that is a closed chapter and I shall try to forget it. My address is always c/o Munroe & Co. 7 Rue Scribe, Paris. Letters will be forwarded. Lyons arrives in Paris to-morrow. I felt I must have someone. Let the boys and Ethel know how I am. I shall write you N. Y. c/o Ethel.

With all my love,

BRO. FRANK"

Americans generally and official Washington were astounded November 7, 1913, to read of Mr. McCombs' marriage to Miss Dorothy Williams, daughter of Colonel John R. Williams, U. S. A., and sister of Mrs. Joseph Leiter. The ceremony was performed within the shadow of Buckingham Palace, at the quaint little Roman Catholic Chapel of St. Peter and St. Edward, by the Rev. Father Bernard Vaughn. Among the witnesses were the American Ambassador

Paris July 17/13

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forwarded. Syms arrives in Paris
tomorrow. I feel I must have some one.
Let the boys & Ethel know how I am.

I shall write you My. of Ethel.

With all my love
Bro Frank.

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to London, William H. Page, and Mrs. Page; the Ambassador to Paris, Myron T. Herrick, Lord Derby, the Earl of Suffolk, who married Margaret Hyde Leiter, of Chicago; the Earl and Countess of Craven, and Right Hon. Henry Chaplin. Charles W. Halsey, a Princeton classmate, was Mr. McCombs' best man.

Mr. McCombs was much amused that he had surprised his bachelor friends by suddenly becoming a benedict. Explaining, he said: "I met Miss Williams at the inauguration of President Wilson. We were engaged for several months, and our marriage was necessarily delayed by my attack of appendicitis".

Mr. and Mrs. McCombs returned to America early in November, 1913.

January 11, 1914, Mr. McCombs visited Governor Martin H. Glynn at Albany. He received two offers from the Governor. One was a Public Service Commissionership. The other was the Chairmanship of the Democratic State Committee, carrying with it the management of Governor Glynn's campaign for reelection.

Mr. McCombs declined both because he said he could not afford to abandon his law practice. Moreover, his acceptance of the State Chairmanship would mean his retirement as National Chairman. He purposed to retain that place for his full term, regardless of the Wilson-McAdoo-Tumulty plot to supplant him.

Months after, McCombs' intimates asserted that the Glynn offers were all a part of the White House conspiracy to oust him from the National Chairmanship. Though Glynn failed to inveigle McCombs into the

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Wilson trap, Glynn was chosen by the President to preside over the National Convention which renominated him in 1916, and later was awarded a lucrative place on the Federal Industrial Board.

“Maybe Governor Glynn, for whom I have a sincere affection, was unaware of what Wilson and McAdoo were trying to do to me”, observed Mr. McCombs; “but I was not caught. I visited the Governor at his request to advise him about the fall State Campaign. In tendering the Public Service Commissionership and State Chairmanship, I believe he had no ulterior motive. Anyway, I took neither, but I did do all I could to secure the Governor’s renomination and re-election”.

The Democratic State Convention of 1914 unanimously chose Mr. McCombs Chairman of its Platform Committee. It also named him as a candidate for member of the Constitutional Convention of 1915.

Mr. McCombs drew one of the briefest, but most comprehensive, declarations of principles on record. Its keynote was protection of the direct nominations law against the assaults of machine bosses. It urged anew the submission of the unanimous suffrage proposition to popular vote; declared for a short ballot, home rule, biennial legislative sessions, and challenged political adversaries to cite a single instance of maladministration or malfeasance in the state administration headed by Governor Martin H. Glynn.

Arguing for harmony, the renomination of Governor Glynn, and the adoption of the platform draft, Mr. McCombs said:

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“The Democratic Party is unreservedly committed to the principle of direct primaries. The purpose of the law is to give every voter a fair and equal chance to secure the nomination of his choice. The law is contrary to the spirit or use of oppressive power which may be exercised by those holding political office or leadership. I am assured no attempt will be made by Democrats to repeal this law. They will do all they can to perfect it.

“Those who refuse to support candidates named at Democratic primaries are not Democrats. If there be differences before or after the primaries, I offer Democrats my undivided service”.

The reference to bolters was aimed at an organization formed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, later Assistant Secretary of the Navy and candidate for Vice President, and John A. Hennessey, to defeat the regularly selected ticket. Roosevelt ran at the primaries against James W. Gerard, who was supported by Mr. McCombs for United States Senator, and was unmercifully drubbed. Hennessey ran against Glynn for Governor, also supported by Mr. McCombs, and was overwhelmingly defeated.

Mr. McCombs devoted himself night and day to the campaign to keep New York Democratic. Scandals which had resulted in the impeachment of Governor William Sulzer in 1913 proved too heavy a load. The Democrats lost to Charles S. Whitman (Republican), who was elected Governor, and James W. Wadsworth, Jr. (Republican), who became United States Senator.

XXI

McCOMBS RETIRES AS CHAIRMAN

QUITS NATIONAL COMMITTEE—DEFEATS ALL McADOO-BURLESON-TUMULTY PLOTS TO OUST HIM — WILSON COTERIE CONSPIRES FOUR YEARS TO SUPPLANT THE PRESIDENT-MAKER — McCOMBS WINS FIGHT FOR 1916 CONVENTION CITY AND VOLUNTARILY STEPS OUT IN FORMAL NOTICE TO THE PRESIDENT — WILSON'S "GREATEST REGRETS".

[EDITOR'S NOTE—The editor has written this chapter from Mr. McCombs' notes.]

A McADOO - BURLESON - TUMULTY cabal plotted four years to oust Mr. McCombs as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Though apparently inspired by the benediction of the President himself, the conspiracy to overthrow him forcibly was thwarted. Mr. McCombs, backed by a large majority of his fellow-Committeemen, stuck to his post for the full term for which he was elected. In a pert note to the President, personally, he asked to be relieved after his successor was chosen at the National Convention of 1916. He then gladly retired.

As already hinted, the White House coterie sought McCombs' scalp even upon the eve of Wilson's first inauguration, but were unsuccessful. Taking their



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DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE BEFORE WHITE HOUSE, 1916

No. 1. Wm. F. McCombs No. 2. President Wilson

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cue from the President's refusal to honor any recommendation Chairman McCombs made in behalf of the National Committee, the Wilson group, almost from month to month, sought to oust McCombs and name a substitute "next the throne". Repeated polls of the National Committee, however, revealed a big majority for McCombs. Many stood by McCombs because they were angered by the President's persistent rejection of the merest suggestion as to patronage or policy presented by them through their Chairman. They were boldly and coldly informed that "McCombs' O. K. does not go with W. W. See McAdoo, Tumulty or Joe Daniels"!

Any National Committeeman suspected of so much as sympathizing with McCombs was denied the slightest consideration, and any who dared make a request through McCombs was blacklisted.

For upwards of three years, few, if any, avowed McCombs devotees could get the appointment of even his village postmaster. Meantime, McAdoo was constructing a well-formed and powerful machine through the Treasury.

Albert S. Burleson, who deserted McCombs the instant he became Postmaster General, filled his offices with ardent Wilson-McAdoo satellites. Daniels used the Navy Department as an adjunct to the Wilson dynasty. Even Cabinet officers, except perhaps Secretary of War Lindley D. Garrison, seemed allied with the President to exclude McCombs and his friends.

In December, 1915, however, the plot to depose McCombs was resumed in earnest. Willis J. Abbott,

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in a special to the *New York American*, exposed it. Here is what that able journalist wrote on the eve of the Democratic National Committee meeting of December 7, 1915:

“The Democratic National Committee will meet here next Tuesday to fix the time and place of the next National Convention.

“Four cities are contestants for the honor — San Francisco, St. Louis, Dallas and Chicago.

“There is lively interest in a topic not specified in the call, but which, nevertheless, is likely to engross the attention of the Committee.

“That is the effort to force the retirement of Chairman William F. McCombs and the substitution for him of Committeeman Fred B. Lynch, of Minnesota.

“This project is purely an administration move.

“At the White House this will be gravely denied; but men in the closest relation to the President do not hesitate to admit their participation in the war upon McCombs.

“Before the combination now arrayed against the Chairman, the record of his effective work for Mr. Wilson’s nomination both before and at the Baltimore convention is likely to be displayed in vain.

“Mr. Wilson, who permitted the sidetracking of McCombs during the campaign, and thrust him into comparative obscurity in the first flush of victory, is now determined upon his complete obliteration from politics.

“Of course, such action as the enforced retirement of a National Chairman of the National Committee

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between campaigns is without precedent, in the Democratic, or any other party.

“Viewed dispassionately, it would seem merely the expression of a private grudge, for between conventions the Chairman of a National Committee is without authority or any useful function. In theory, at least, the Committee is free from interest in any particular candidate for the nomination, and exists for the sole purpose of arranging a convention which shall be free for all.”

“This, however, is not the view of the Wilson forces. They want the Committee reorganized and made a fighting force for the President’s renomination. An official closely identified with the political side of the administration said to-day:

“‘We must get rid of McCombs, because, while he controls the Committee, we can’t begin the campaign for the President’s nomination. We can’t raise a dollar while he is at the head of things. He has antagonized many of our strongest supporters, and we are absolutely blocked by his continued control.’

“All of which is well enough if the National Committee is to be regarded merely as a Wilson machine. But the effort to make it one has arrayed against the administration plan many members who care little for McCombs, but will show their resentment against the administration by fighting for his continuance in office.

“Mr. McCombs expresses a confidence in the outcome which his friends do not share, and which perhaps, at heart, he does not feel. That any effort to depose him at this meeting will result in a nasty fight,

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and a serious injury to the party, few doubt. It might be shrewdly seized upon by Bryan to widen the split he is planning to make in the party.

“But there can be no doubt of the power of Wilson to force his earliest and perhaps most efficient champion out, if he so desires. The only question is whether prudence will lead the President to put a curb on his followers who are now proclaiming their purpose to force the issue next Tuesday”.

But the Wilson-McAdoo plot to put Chairman McCombs out did not succeed. A majority of the National Committee would not tolerate such a suggestion. They denounced it long before the Committee met at Washington, December 7th, for the ostensible task of selecting the date and place for the National Convention of 1916.

Weeks before the Committee got together McCombs had a big majority pledged not only to his retention as Chairman, but to vote with him to send the convention to St. Louis. He reached Washington two days in advance of the Committee meeting. He found the Wilson-McAdoo group split among three men who had been suggested for his successor. They were Frederick B. Lynch, of Minnesota; Vance McCormick, of Pennsylvania, and Henry Morgenthau, of New York. McCombs made it his job to keep them split.

The Lynch coterie had lined up behind Chicago as the Convention City. Some of the McCormick men were for St. Louis, some for Chicago, and some behind Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson to send the

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President-maker to Dallas, Texas. As for Morgenthau, there seemed to be no votes for him at all.

McCombs clinched a renewed grip on the party's national machine by inducing the Committee to select St. Louis for the convention.

The President, hearing that the anti-McCombs movement had proved abortive, ordered the fight to cease.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — Mr. McCombs here resumed his story.]

The National Committee, as was customary, met the first week of January, 1916, to make preliminary arrangements for the convention to come. There were many present. After attending to our business we were informed that we were invited to the White House to luncheon the next day.

Of the many luncheons I ever attended, this was the most curious. Many of the Committee did not desire to go. They told me so. I advised them it was proper under the circumstances to go, notwithstanding their individual feeling. And with this spirit I went.

I never attended such a funereal function in my life. Every Committeeman seemed embarrassed and ill at ease. The meal was eaten almost in silence.

I, of course, was put on the President's right. Homer S. Cummings was on his left. We could pump no language out of the President. Therefore, we turned to our neighbors. One Committeeman, seated at some distance, handed in a note behind the others to me with these words on it:

“This looks like the ‘Last Supper’”.

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When we had consumed the wines set before us, everybody was anxious to go.

We had to comply when it was suggested that our picture be taken. So we went out behind the White House, where a member of the Committee said to me, "I wonder if he wants our finger prints too"! After the picture was taken, everybody moved away from the White House and took a fresh breath of air.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — The Editor again resumes from notes.]

Having secured from his colleagues the vote of confidence he desired, McCombs planned to quit of his own accord.

April 24, 1916, he served formal notice that he desired no identification with the movement to violate the Baltimore platform pledge by naming the President for a second term.

Mr. McCombs wrote President Wilson:

"My dear Mr. President:

"I have just formed a new partnership for the practice of law which will become effective the first of May. The change will necessitate my devoting substantially all my time to my profession. My political activities must be largely curtailed. My arrangements, however, will justify my proceeding through to the end of the convention at St. Louis.

"In view of the party precedent that the nominee for the Presidency is requested to indicate his preference for the chairmanship of the National Committee, and in view of the unity of sentiment for your renomination, I am writing you at the earliest moment to let you know that I could not, under any circumstances, assume the leadership of the coming Democratic campaign. I am

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happy in the thought, however, that there are hosts of able and true men who can readily take my place.

"The Democratic organization is loyal to your policies and your purposes. We feel assured of a triumphant result for you and for the party nominees in November. For fifteen years, now, I have been in the active service of the party, and it is with a keen feeling of regret that my activities are of necessity to be more limited. If within the limits of my time I can be of assistance, be assured that I am always available,

"With assurance of high regard,

"Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. McCOMBS"

The President replied:

"My dear McCombs:

"I have your letter apprising me of your inability to retain the chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee for the approaching campaign.

"I fully appreciate the necessity you feel yourself to be under to resign after the convention shall have been held in June; I know that you would not have reached such a decision had not your new business obligations made it unavoidable. I do not feel at liberty, therefore, to urge you to make the sacrifice that a retention of the chairmanship would in the circumstances involve.

"You have made many and great sacrifices already for the party and I know that I am speaking the sentiment of all loyal Democrats when I express the very deep appreciation I have felt of the great services you have ungrudgingly rendered.

"I am sure that the greatest regrets will be felt at your retirement, and that a host of friends will join me in the hope that your new business connections will bring you continued abundant success.

"With best wishes,

"Sincerely yours,

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XXII

“WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916”!

McCOMBS REFUSES TO BE A PARTY TO THE PRESIDENT'S VIOLATION OF HIS ONE-TERM PLEDGE — “YOU KNOW I DO NOT OPPOSE A THIRD TERM”, SAYS WILSON TO McCOMBS, WHEN ASKED TO FULFIL HIS PARAMOUNT PRE-ELECTION PROMISE — HOW McCOMBS SAVED VICE PRESIDENT MARSHALL HIS RENOMINATION — BALKS PALMER AND BAKER, WHO SEEK TO SUPPLANT THE HOOSIER.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — This chapter is compiled by the Editor.]

AN INSPIRED editorial in the *New York Sun* of April 26, 1916, is illuminating as to the reason for Mr. McCombs' retirement as Democratic National Chairman. It read:

“From the Democratic Text Book of 1912, prepared under the direction of Mr. William F. McCombs and widely circulated by him among the voters of the United States, we extract this campaign pledge, or promise, prominently displayed on page 14:

“TERM OF PRESIDENT

“DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM.

“We favor a single Presidential term, and to that end we urge the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution making the President of the United States ineligible for re-election, and we pledge the candidate of this convention to this principle”.

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“The candidate pledged to the single term principle by the Baltimore convention and pledged again by Mr. McCombs’ committee when it exhibited the foregoing declaration as a reason for voting for him, was Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey. Mr. McCombs had perhaps done more than any other friend of Dr. Wilson (with the possible exception of Colonel George Harvey and ex-Senator James Smith, Jr.) to prepare the way for his nomination on this single-term platform. When the campaign opened Mr. McCombs, in his dual capacity as chairman of both the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Campaign Committee, at once took undisputed first place among the promoters of Dr. Wilson’s political fortunes. Mr. McKinley scarcely owed more to Mark Hanna.

“In asking the fellow citizens to vote for Woodrow Wilson as a candidate pledged to the one term principle by the platform of his party, Mr. William F. McCombs took pains to make it clear to everybody that the candidate accepted the platform. He caused to be printed on page 343 of the Campaign Text Book this passage from Dr. Wilson’s speech of acceptance:

“What is the meaning of our platform, and what is our responsibility under it? What are our duty and our purpose? The platform is meant to show that we know what the nation is thinking about; what it is most concerned about, what it wishes corrected, and what it desires to see attempted that is new and constructive and intended for its long future. But

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for us it is a very practical document. We are now about to ask the people of the United States to adopt our platform; we are about to ask them to intrust us with office and power and the guidance of their affairs. They will wish to know what sort of men we are and of what definite purpose; what translation of action and of policy we intend to give to the general terms of the platform which the convention at Baltimore put forth, should we be elected'.

"Mr. McCombs went further and drew a striking contrast between Woodrow Wilson, pledged to the principle of a single term and to be depended upon to respect the platform and keep the pledge if elected, and Theodore Roosevelt, one of his competitors for the votes of the people. On pages 304 and 305 of the Text Book Mr. McCombs exhibited Colonel Roosevelt as a person willing to feed his own ambition even by the violation of a distinct pledge not to be a candidate again:

"'On March 4, next, I shall have served three and one-half years, constituting my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination'.

"'To newspaper correspondents who asked him if he might not be a candidate in 1912, Theodore Roosevelt, with his characteristic emphasis, replied that not in 1912, in 1916 nor in any other year would he again be a candidate for the Presidency; and that "under no circumstances" was meant for all time.

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“Theodore Roosevelt gave his solemn word that he would not again be a candidate for or accept another nomination for the Presidency, and he has now broken that promise under circumstances created by himself and his hero worshiping admirers’.

“Thus, Mr. William F. McCombs kept before the country during the campaign of four years ago the picture of Woodrow Wilson, pledged by his platform to the single term principle and squarely accepting that platform when he accepted the nomination; and also the picture of Theodore Roosevelt, shamelessly violating a voluntary pledge of his own not to be a candidate or accept a nomination for a third term. With this choice before them the people voted; and they gave just 2,173,538 more votes for Mr. McCombs’ pledged single term candidate than the candidate pledged by Colonel Roosevelt not to seek or accept under any circumstances, a third term.

“Now, Mr. William F. McCombs is an extremely conscientious gentleman. His sense of personal honor and personal responsibility for those whose promises he has indorsed is vigilant and alert. He is almost meticulous in his solicitude for the fulfilment of campaign obligations. He must perceive as clearly as any other man in the United States the immorality involved in the acceptance by President Wilson of a nomination for a second term.

“Is any other explanation needed to account for Mr. McCombs’ withdrawal from the active political support of the man for whom he has done so much? He conducted Governor Wilson’s canvass for the

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Democratic nomination for President. Under conditions of enormous difficulty he put his candidate through Baltimore even in the presence of Mr. Bryan's overshadowing prestige with the delegates. He saw the single term pledge recorded. He used that pledge with skill and success to accomplish his candidate's election. He emphasized for the information of the voters the contrast between the trustworthiness of a man like Wilson, who could be depended upon to keep his party's pledges, who had at the very outset of the campaign denounced 'the use of the organization of a great party to serve the personal aims and ambitions of any individual', and the untrustworthiness of a man who was running for a third term in violation of his pledge.

"How could Mr. McCombs, in self-respect and simple decency, begin under these circumstances a second campaign for Dr. Wilson's election and again ask his fellow citizens to give credit to platform pledges made in Dr. Wilson's behalf?

"We do not believe that Mr. McCombs could be influenced to become again the devoted and disinterested engineer of Dr. Wilson's political fortunes by any such sophistry as seems to have taken possession of the President's mind. It is impossible to imagine so level headed a person as Mr. McCombs sharing the delusion that the office for which Dr. Wilson is to run a second time is a higher and greater office than that of President of the United States. Nobody knows better than Mr. McCombs that there is no such thing as a Chief Executive of Humanity, any more than

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there is a Chief Magistrate of Gratitude, or of Loyalty, or of Sincerity, or of any other beautiful and desirable abstract quality.”

That Mr. Wilson dreamed of a third, if not a lifetime, is demonstrated by a note Mr. McCombs prepared for this book. Here it is:

In the Summer of 1912, I suggested that Governor Wilson go into some of the large cities and make pleasant speeches like those of the pre-nomination days, raising no particular contest with the candidates against him as Roosevelt and Taft. I thought they were doing an excellent job of chewing each other's ears off. I did, however, suggest that he speak on the Third Term in the case of Roosevelt.

Governor Wilson turned to me and said: “McCombs, you know I do not oppose a Third Term, and I do not care to discuss it”. Wilson was certainly looking far ahead, as he had been at Baltimore.

Mr. McCombs formally retired as Chairman of the National Committee at the Convention of 1916. He knew that, controlled as it was by the White House clique, President Wilson's renomination would be forced. His job was, however, to prevent the Wilson-McAdoo group from denying a similar compliment to Vice President Thomas R. Marshall. He succeeded.

When Chairman McCombs reached St. Louis, he found the Wilson-McAdoo coterie split for the Vice Presidency between A. Mitchell Palmer, of Pennsylvania, the then Alien Custodian, and Newton B. Baker, of Ohio, Secretary of War. He lined up Thomas T. Taggart, of Indiana, Charles F. Murphy,

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of New York, Roger C. Sullivan, of Illinois, and Governor James M. Cox, of Ohio, for Marshall. This combination smashed the anti-Marshall plot.

In his meagre notes of the St. Louis Convention, Mr. McCombs wrote: Everybody was saying, "Wilson kept us out of war" and "To h—I with the rest of the platform"!

The McAdoo cabal pushed A. Mitchell Palmer for the Vice Presidency, with Secretary of War Baker as second in the string.

[EDITOR'S NOTE — Mr. McCombs writes the following text.]

Mr. Baker was special messenger to the Convention for certain things that I did not know about, and did not care about. That Convention was going to nominate Wilson and Marshall, although it was generally understood that President Wilson did not like Mr. Marshall very much. Throughout his administration, he gave him slight consideration. I think Mr. Marshall took this too lightly.

I had rumors, some weeks before the Convention that Mr. Baker was to be a candidate for Vice President. The larger leaders, I know, were very much opposed to him. They were very much offended by what they thought was Mr. Wilson's idea of getting a candidate more to his liking as Vice President. It was understood that he wanted Baker because it was thought that Baker never made a move without Wilson's direction. Furthermore, Baker used classical English.

I saw the lickspittles of the White House tugging

“WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916”!

at the lapels of the leaders. The Baker boom first came to my headquarters as Chairman. I had received many telegrams about it. I saw no reason for changing the order of things. In my mind, at that very time Marshall was superior to Wilson. If there were to be any succession by fate, we could not go very far wrong with Marshall. So I said to a gentleman who claimed to come from the White House, that it was customary for the candidate for Vice Presidency to have the delegation from his own state with him. He had better see Judge A., one of the leaders of the Ohio delegation, who was close by.

Then I said: “Now, I suggest that you go and discuss this matter with Ohio and Judge A. Go in and see him”.

He left. I called up Judge A. and told him the facts. He said: “I’m glad you have given me the privilege of trimming our little Secretary”. So Judge A. received the Baker envoy and told him that he did not think he could get Ohio. The man went to a number of other delegations. Judge A. knew how to be busier at a Convention than did this man. So the boom of Baker died aborning.

President Wilson’s first term had been saved from debacle by the declaration of the European War in 1914. This was pretty generally conceded among all the Democrats. Of course, the minds of the American people were centered upon one question: namely, keeping out of that terrible conflagration. They thought that Wilson having been President for one term should be re-elected for the second. Therefore,

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the successful campaign of 1916, which might have gone the other way, had Mr. Hughes been a bit more thoughtful and diplomatic in his treatment of Hiram Johnson in California.

I recall going to the Republican Chicago Convention after making arrangements for the St. Louis Convention. The Chicago Convention was a week before the Democratic Convention at St. Louis. I wanted to see the forces operating there. I learned from a very confidential source that Hughes would be the nominee. The rest was parade.

I went into a hotel and met some friends among the Republican leaders. They, in a jocular way at luncheon, said: "Your convention is settled, now, what shall we do"?

"Well", I replied, "I know exactly what you're going to do. You're going to take the man with whiskers from New York. Now I'm going to tell you, since you're utterly tied up, what you ought to do. You should name Harding or Burton, of Ohio.

"You have had a little factional trouble out there and Ohio will go for Wilson, unless you patch it up. If things go on as they are, Wilson will carry Ohio. If you nominate Harding or Burton, you will carry Ohio, and the next President will be a Republican".

My guess was correct, as many of those disappointed friends whom I met there, have since told me.

Mr. McCombs' prophecy was fulfilled. Neither Warren G. Harding nor any other Ohio Republican was nominated for the Presidency in 1916. Charles Evans Hughes, of New York, was, but he lost Ohio

“WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916”!

and Wilson was re-elected. Four years later Mr. Harding was nominated. He carried the country by the unprecedented plurality of seven millions.

XXIII

DRAFTED FOR THE SENATE

WILSON RUNS CONWAY AGAINST McCOMBS, BUT McCOMBS SWEEPS THE PRIMARIES — WILSON'S "CONGRATULATIONS" — McCOMBS' REPLY — WRATH OF "CROWN PRINCE" — McADOO-WILSON HANDICAP SO GREAT THAT CALDER WINS AT THE GENERAL ELECTION — McCOMBS ASSAILS "PAP HUNTERS" AND "BLANK-CHECK PROFITEERS".

[EDITOR'S NOTE—This chapter is compiled from Mr. McCombs' notes.]

MR. McCOMBS was "drafted" for the New York State United States Senate Democratic nomination in 1916. The movement was originally conceived by admirers who sincerely desired to voice their protest against the ungracious treatment Mr. McCombs received from President Wilson. They knew that Wilson, who had been renominated, could not carry New York. They hoped that, even if Mr. McCombs failed of election, he would run so far ahead of the President that he could eventually claim vindication.

An unofficial State convention was called for Saratoga, August 12th. Long before that date, anti-Wilson leaders were apprised that the President planned to name William G. McAdoo for the seat

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held by James A. O'Gorman. This provoked much resentment.

The McAdoo project died of inanition. Then William Church Osborn and Thomas F. Conway vied with one another for the indorsement of the administration. Both Osborn and Conway had much money. Osborn had been a student at Princeton and was the leader of Putnam County. Conway had been Lieutenant Governor and controlled the organization in Clinton and other northern tier counties.

Samuel Seabury, former Justice of the Court of Appeals, had been picked by the President for Governor. Charles F. Murphy and his associates reluctantly accepted Seabury, despite his frequent and numerous verbal attacks upon them. They made no violent objection, even when Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, hurriedly came from Washington and announced that the President would insist upon Seabury's nomination as the most likely means of aiding the Presidential ticket to capture New York's electoral vote. But these leaders drew the line at Osborn, Conway, or any other Senatorial aspirant picked by Wilson.

On the afternoon before the Convention met, there was an informal conference at the Saratoga Race Track club house. There participated, National Committeeman Norman E. Mack, Charles F. Murphy, John H. McCooley, William H. Kelley, William H. Fitzpatrick, Mr. McCombs and others. All urged McCombs to take the Senatorial nomination.

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"Neither Wilson nor any other Democrat can carry this state this year"! he stated.

"Wilson can't, but you might", the leaders replied. "Just think what sport you can have with Woodrow in the Senate", laughed one.

"I don't mind being slaughtered for the sake of the party — I am used to that. But I beg to be spared for a while", pleaded McCombs.

The leaders finally compelled McCombs to submit to the trial. He was the overwhelming choice of the convention. Osborn was eliminated as a dangerous rival with an exposure of his written approval of the late Mayor John Purroy Mitchel's "wire tapping" campaign, which so infuriated the Roman Catholic clergy. Conway received a few northern New York votes.

Though the convention was all but unanimous for McCombs, the Wilson-McAdoo faction declined to accept its verdict, and got behind Conway as a Federal Administration candidate at the September primaries.

The administration's attitude was expressed in the editorial columns of the *New York Sun*, August 29, 1912, thus:

"The Wilson-McAdoo crowd will have nothing to do with McCombs. They look upon his selection as a direct slap at the Wilson administration, which they will not condone".

An answer came from the *New York World*, supposedly friendly to the President:

"There is no better representative of the Young Democracy of New York than William F. McCombs.

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He is qualified in all respects for the United States Senatorship”.

The *New York Times* reproduced an editorial eulogy of McCombs printed a few days after he had secured the nomination of Wilson for the Presidency in 1912. Under the caption “Young Democrats” the *Times* said:

“It is of the happiest augury for the Democratic Party that young men are coming to the fore to take part in its work and its councils. Everywhere words of praise are bestowed upon W. F. McCombs of this city, who, as an active and skilful manager of Governor Wilson’s campaign, showed that he knew how to make friends without making enemies”.

The *Brooklyn Times* (Republican), under date of August 20, 1915, printed this tribute:

“The nomination of McCombs is one of recognition for the manager of the victory for Wilson in 1912. He shared with Colonel Harvey and others the fate of most of the ladders upon which the President has climbed to his present eminence”.

The *Philadelphia Inquirer* (Republican) said September 1, 1916:

“William F. McCombs has decided to enter the race as the Democratic candidate for United States Senator from New York. He has had some experience working for others, notably Woodrow Wilson.

“Now McCombs made the grievous error of entering the race without consulting the President, and in consequence has brought down upon himself the wrath of the crown prince” (William G. McAdoo).

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Despite the bitter opposition of the Federal machine headed by President Wilson and McAdoo, his son-in-law and Secretary of the Treasury, McCombs swept the state at the Democratic primaries, September 19, 1916. He defeated Thomas F. Conway, the Wilson-McAdoo favorite, by over 40,000 plurality. Conway carried a few counties near the Canadian border.

Two days after he had defeated Conway at the primaries, Mr. McCombs was amazed to receive this wire from the President:

"Asbury Park, N. J.
Sept. 21, 1916

"WM. F. McCOMBS:

"I congratulate you most warmly on your nomination by the Democrats of New York for the United States Senatorship. A united body of Progressive voters will be behind you.

WOODROW WILSON"

Mr. McCombs sent this reply to the President's telegram:

"PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON, Shadow Lawn, Long Branch, N. J.:

"I thank you sincerely for your telegram of congratulations. Aside from my personal friendship, which prompts me to wish you every success in the coming election, I am certain that the masterly way in which you have administered the affairs of our Nation, keeping us free from war and giving us an unprecedented prosperity, deserves an unmistakable vote of confidence from the American people.

W. F. McCOMBS"

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McCombs had that very day read this analysis of conditions in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*:

“William F. McCombs, as the Tammany candidate for United States Senator for the Democratic nomination, wins in a walk. He has an enormous majority over Thomas F. Conway, presumed to have the support of the Wilson Administration. It might be supposed that the President would help the man who managed his successful campaign in 1912. But the Wilson personality is a difficult thing to understand, as those who have dared to think for themselves can testify”.

McCombs found himself pitted against William M. Calder (Republican) of Brooklyn. Calder had for years been a member of the House of Representatives. He adopted the Samuel J. Tilden “personal contact” method of campaign. By sending personal autographed signature letters and free seeds and documents to practically every man and woman in the state, Mr. Calder’s name had become a household word. Calder, however, antagonized many. He had cultivated the habit of being a “band-wagon jumper”, and, like other great men, he too often changed his mind.

Having all but pledged himself to support James W. Wadsworth, Jr., for the Senate in 1914, Calder suddenly did all he could to defeat him.

In 1916, at the eleventh hour, a Roosevelt-Barnes, heretofore unheard-of combine, was formed to beat Calder. But ten days prior to the primaries Colonel Robert Bacon entered the field. Not until the day

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after the primaries was it definitely known whether Bacon or Calder won the nomination. Calder nosed Bacon out by barely 8,000. But for a 25,000 Calder majority in Brooklyn, Bacon would have proved the victor.

The Wadsworth-Calder and Bacon-Calder quarrels gave McCombs some hope of success. He began a most aggressive state-wide campaign, and was on the stump night and day. His speeches were brief but fetching, particularly to young men.

Before the Brooklyn Young Democratic Club, September 21st, he made a hit with this: "The difference between a Republican and a Democratic administration is that the Republicans serve the people two months every four years. The remainder of the time they hand the country over to the management of a board of directors for the benefit of 'Big Business'. The Democrats, on the other hand, are on the job for the people 365 days in the year"!

"You said something, Mac"!! roared a group of admirers.

Every Democratic newspaper in the country displayed the McCombs speech and commended it editorially as a platform by itself.

Mr. McCombs was mightily pleased to find in the *New York Sun* the following day this paragraph: "Mr. McCombs has experienced every phase of the progressive ingratitude with which it is the President's custom to reward personal and political service. It is to Mr. McCombs that Woodrow Wilson happens to be more deeply indebted for his political and personal

fortune than any man living, with the possible exception of former Senator James Smith, Jr., and, of course, Colonel George Harvey”.

The *Sun* gave a complimentary summary of Mr. McCombs' speech the night before.

Mr. McCombs made Freedom of the Seas one of the paramount issues. Day after day, and night after night, he incessantly kept hammering this idea into the ears of voters: “We must seriously and sincerely insist that our commerce and communication throughout the world, through channels of trade, shall be maintained inviolate and untrammelled. We cannot, with dignity, tolerate any discrimination”.

Hoping to get a few more votes for himself, President Wilson said a few kind words for McCombs in a Madison Square Garden speech a few days before election.

Mr. McCombs, in his final speech of the campaign, said:

“I do not think that you expect a very long address from me. I think that you came here, as I came here, to hear the next President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson. For the past two and a half months I have gone over this state speaking about Democratic peace and prosperity. In the meantime I have been reading the papers carefully to see what issues Mr. Hughes would develop; and as an American citizen I think I have a right to complain of Mr. Hughes. There are Republicans in the audience, and I want to call your attention to a few facts.

“The immortal Abraham Lincoln had a programme.

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He developed it. He argued it. And the American people twice made him President of the United States. The soldier statesman, Grant, a Republican, had a programme, Mr. Chairman. He developed it. He argued it. And the serious thinking people of this American Republic made him President of the United States. The martyred McKinley had a programme. He presented it. He argued it. He seriously insisted upon it. He was elected President of these United States. So our Mr. Roosevelt. So our Mr. Taft. And however much we may have disagreed with them in principle, they were elected by your votes, and, I think, my friends, you as Americans are entitled to insist upon a programme being presented to you. They have no right to insist upon your voting for people who merely want to get into office.

“Do you know what they are doing? They want you to fill in a blank check and let them make out the amount after election. Can you, my friends, can you Republicans be insulted in that way? This election involves a very homely question. Are you going to maintain that which you have? For to hold is just as important as to have. Or are you going to fly to those agencies of which you know naught? That is your question to-night. Let me call your attention to the fact in the few brief moments that I am going to address you that the Democratic Party is a party of performance, of promise. For example, for 100 years the question of child labor, the question of industrial freedom for children, was agitated in this country; and a particular bill which the Democratic Party put

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on the statute books lay in the pigeonholes in the Senate and the House through three Republican Administrations. The Democratic Party has released little children from industrial slavery.

"I call your attention to the fact that the Republican Party has taken up this issue and that issue and the other and dropped them with equal celerity during this campaign. It reminds me of the story in 'Alice in Wonderland', that charming little book, where the girl mounted seven horses at the same time and simultaneously rode off in seven different directions.

"Mr. Hughes a week ago, as I saw in a paper, I think in Buffalo, where I was speaking, said he was going to cut loose. In these last two weeks I have continued to wonder, Mr. Chairman, what Mr. Hughes was going to cut loose from. Theodore Roosevelt, who snorts flame and preaches war and who thus far has made up most of the spoken opinions for Mr. Hughes? No, not yet. Mr. Taft, who has agreed with President Wilson in all of his foreign policies, in substance? He cannot do that. Special privilege? Will he cut loose from that? One rarely cuts loose from one's angel. Then my Republican opponent, Mr. Calder, should cut loose with something.

"They have said a great deal about Americanism in this campaign. That is not an issue. Every man, no matter where he was born, no matter of what descent, if he is an American citizen, is for America.

"I would like to address you further upon this issue of Americanism. I shall leave this thought with you as I go: Let us make Americanism practical. Let us

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see that the flag is respected in every port in all the world. Let us see that every pound of American freight, every American communication, every American life, is safe under this flag”.

With all Mr. McCombs' popularity and real value, the handicap created by Wilson's Presidential candidacy was too great for him. He was defeated by Calder by 839,314 to 603,933. McCombs ran nearly 20,000 ahead of Samuel Seabury and received within a few thousand votes as many as the entire National ticket.

XXIV

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WILSON'S GREETING ON RETURN FROM PARIS — McCOMBS FOILS BARUCH AND CHADBOURNE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO MAKE McADOO PRESIDENT — USES EDWARDS TO CONSOLIDATE EASTERN STATES — SOLIDIFIES ANTI-THIRD TERM FORCES — DESTROYS WILSON DYNASTY AT SAN FRANCISCO.

JULY 9, 1919, President Wilson returned to New York from his first commutation trip to Paris to appeal to the people of the United States to back his policy at the Peace Conference. Mr. McCombs was ill at his room at the Waldorf-Astoria. He sent for the writer. I found him looking out of the window of his bed chamber. Fifth Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street were packed with a multitude of men, women and children. They were awaiting the arrival of the President. The President, standing in an auto and bowing right and left, soon appeared. The crowd gave him a chilly greeting. McCombs leaned so far out upon the window sill that I cautioned him to be careful. He answered:

"I'm all right. But look at the Great Humanitarian — the man who said he was going to make the world safe for Democracy! He's gone! Remember

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the receptions he got here in 1912 and 1916? They surpassed those of Bryan in 1896 and 1900. Wilson has shot his bolt. The people have found him out.

“Keep your eyes and ears open and you will soon agree with me that Wilson is done for”, he continued. “The voters repudiated him by over a million plurality when they elected a Republican Congress last Fall. He has become a joke and the cat’s-paw of England and Japan at Paris. He will try for a renomination and be beaten at that. Then he will put up McAdoo, the crown prince, and he will be thrown down”.

This prophecy was recalled when both Wilson and McAdoo were overwhelmed at the San Francisco Convention.

McCombs and his friends were very busy just about this time. They knew that, first of all, they had to defeat Wilson for a third term; second, they had to prevent Wilson from forcing the nomination of any man to “keep the Presidency in the family”. That meant the elimination, not only of McAdoo, but A. Mitchell Palmer, Wilson’s Attorney General; Meredith, Wilson’s Secretary of Agriculture, or any one of a half dozen dark horses the President might determine to groom.

It was decided to secure a round-up at the Democratic National Executive Committee meeting at Atlantic City, September 24, 1919. It was called for the ostensible purpose of raising money to cancel a deficit in the Committee treasury; to guarantee an adequate fund for the Presidential campaign of 1920, and to organize the women who had been given

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the right in many states to vote for National candidates.

President Wilson was at the time touring the country, beseeching the people to swallow his League of Nations covenant, "without the crossing of a T or the dotting of an I". McCombs, who was quite ill, did not attend the Atlantic City meeting. But as in 1912 he worked the telephone from his sick-room, so did he in 1919 keep in touch with and manipulate wires into the National Executive Committee meeting.

There was hardly an hour day and night during the four days' session that McCombs was not in communication with Executive Committeemen Fred B. Lynch, of Minnesota; Wilbur W. Marsh, of Iowa; Norman E. Mack, of New York, and other opponents of Wilson and McAdoo.

Mr. McCombs scented an intrigue first to pledge the Committee for a Wilson third term, and second, to make McAdoo Wilson's legatee, and again to make Attorney General Palmer a third of the string of candidates to perpetuate the Wilson régime.

McCombs had information that Bernard M. Baruch and Thomas L. Chadbourne were engineering the McAdoo campaign. Baruch had become convinced that the renomination of Wilson was impossible, and that McAdoo was the most available man among the administration cabal. McAdoo had been instrumental in placing Baruch upon the War Industries Board and in sending him as a special envoy to the Paris Peace Conference.

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McCombs warned Lynch, Marsh, Mack and others that Baruch and Chadbourne plotted to capture the Committee for McAdoo. His admonition seemed prophetic when, September 26th, at an executive session, Baruch and Chadbourne, neither a member of the Committee, appeared and boldly urged McAdoo's claims. The two expressed very great sympathy that the Committee was bankrupt. They generously offered to make good the entire deficit. "And", announced Mr. Baruch, "we are prepared to underwrite the next Presidential campaign for at least ten millions, if the proper candidate is selected".

A majority of the Committee had practically pledged themselves to Attorney General Palmer for the Presidential nomination. He was a fellow-Committeeman. Loyalty to a comrade influenced many to resent the intrusion of the McAdoo emissaries with offers of gold.

The Baruch-Chadbourne tender was, therefore, rejected, though the Committee treasury was empty.

McCombs 'phoned in from New York that if the McAdoo-Baruch-Chadbourne terms were accepted he would expose the whole conspiracy. This clinched the repudiation of the Baruch-Chadbourne offer.

On the final day of the Committee session, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, suddenly rushed to Atlantic City. He whispered that as a result of Wilson's physical collapse, resulting in the abandonment of his League of Nations speaking tour, the President must be considered impossible as a candidate for renomination. The McAdoo and Palmer

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cliques thereupon resumed their raids. But the Committee adjourned without indorsing either candidate.

McCombs denounced the Baruch-Chadbourne ten million dollar offer as a part of a conspiracy to buy the Presidential nomination. He saw to it that the endeavor was submitted to the Kenyon United States Senate Committee investigating Presidential campaign expenses. Practically every member of the Democratic National Executive Committee was grilled about the tender. The Kenyon Committee recommended the enactment of laws prohibiting the use of scandalously large sums of money in Presidential primaries and elections.

Mr. McCombs, during the Fall and Winter of 1919, made several country-wide tours. This object was to solidify the anti-Wilson and anti-McAdoo forces. He threw the administration into confusion in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and other states. Then he returned to New York and devoted himself to unifying his home state against a continuance of the Wilson-McAdoo empire.

In the Spring of 1920, Mr. McCombs was the man behind the organization of the Edward I. Edwards Presidential League. It was formed for the purpose primarily of consolidating New York, New Jersey and other Eastern State Democrats against Wilson and McAdoo, but ultimately to promote the candidacy of the Governor of New Jersey for the Presidency.

Early in April, and again in May, McCombs conferred with Charles F. Murphy, Thomas T. Taggart, Norman E. Mack, Edward H. Moore, George Bren-

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nan, and other anti-Wilson-anti-McAdoo men, at French Lick Springs, Indiana. It was agreed to support Governor James M. Cox, of Ohio, as the likeliest to defeat Wilson, McAdoo, or Palmer. New York, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and other states represented in the group, controlled a third of the delegates to the National Convention. Plans were laid at these conferences to go after the other third, and thus insure the nomination of Cox.

In July, 1920, the Wilson machine was wrecked by the nomination of Governor Cox at San Francisco. At the close of the convention, Mr. McCombs, a jubilant smile upon his face, stood upon the platform. Hundreds of delegates were shrieking their joy over the nomination of Governor James M. Cox, of Ohio, for the Presidency. They were all celebrating the defeat of the mighty machine erected to keep indefinitely the United States Government in the hands of the Wilson-McAdoo oligarchy.

Mr. McCombs said: "I have lived to see Woodrow Wilson deprived of his ambition to be Emperor of the World; balked in his desire to become President a third time; thwarted in his plan to make his dynasty perpetual through the nomination of his son-in-law, William G. McAdoo, as his heir, and thoroughly discredited at home and abroad".

The events leading up to this political cataclysm came as the result of an incessant nation-wide manoeuvring. Publicly, the active principals were Charles F. Murphy and Norman E. Mack, of New York; Thomas T. Taggart, of Indiana; Edmund H.

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Moore, of Ohio; George Brennan, of Illinois; Governor Edward I. Edwards, of New Jersey, and James A. Reed, of Missouri. Its silent promoter was William F. McCombs.

XXV

WILSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS McCOMBS

McCOMBS MADE NO PROMISES OF OFFICE — SULLIVAN, WOOD,
REED AND OTHERS SUFFER FROM PRESIDENT'S ILL-WILL —
McCOMBS' SUGGESTIONS FOR CABINET APPOINTMENTS IGNORED
BECAUSE MADE BY HIM — DENIED A SEAT BECAUSE "YOU
ARE A POLITICIAN".

[Mr. McCombs here resumes his narrative.]

THE REASONS for the hostile attitude taken by President Wilson toward me have been much discussed. He always gave out matters of this kind through the faithful Tumulty. The first reason assigned was that I had made many promises to obtain his election, and for that reason he could not fulfil them. I can say, however, most emphatically, there were no promises made. I challenge any of the lick-spittles who have infested Washington for the last few years to prove anything else. I deplore the innocence of Mr. Wilson, if innocence it was, that he should have given any credence to contrary reports.

As I have said before, the men of the organization throughout the country were somewhat concerned, after the incident of James Smith, Jr., of New Jersey,

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with respect to what would become of them if Wilson were nominated and elected.

On the night when Roger C. Sullivan, of Illinois, agreed to come over to Woodrow Wilson at the Baltimore Convention of 1912, he asked me whether his organization would be attacked by Wilson. I said: "The best way to answer that is by a direct telephone to Wilson himself". I called up in Mr. Sullivan's presence, putting the question squarely. The answer received was: "By no means. No. I like Sullivan". Mr. Sullivan was in the room at the time. Fifteen minutes later I asked Frederick B. Lynch, of Minnesota, to ask Mr. Wilson over the telephone the same question. He received the same answer.

Mr. Sullivan, I am told, was never allowed to be directly instrumental in the nomination of a single candidate for office. In 1914, when he was running for the Senate, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Vrooman made a campaign in Sullivan's state against him. Mr. Wilson refused to write a letter of approval, as he had done for other candidates in close states. Senator Robert L. Owen, of Oklahoma, also spoke unimpeded against Mr. Sullivan over Illinois. Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson had been through the state and made some confidential and apparently pleasing utterances of the leaders, but never came out for Mr. Sullivan. Even Secretary of Agriculture David Houston went through the state expressing himself privately against Mr. Sullivan, and would never be interviewed by anyone.

All this was despite the fact that but for the 58

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votes of the State of Illinois in the Baltimore Convention Mr. Wilson could not have been nominated!

Mr. Sullivan asked me to come to Illinois and make a speech for him. I did so. I spoke at Chicago and offered to speak over the southern part of the state, but this Mr. Sullivan believed was unnecessary. He thought his election was assured.

A similar situation developed in Maryland. There was some support for Wilson in the Maryland delegation, but it was not very strong. Senator John W. Smith not only dominated the delegation completely, at the Baltimore Convention, but I am creditably informed, had his alliances in Virginia, West Virginia and Tennessee. He was powerful in these four states. I thought that should we get his support we could loosen in a way the States of Virginia, West Virginia and Tennessee.

Senator Saulsbury and I called on Senator Smith on a Sunday afternoon before the Wilson nomination. We stated the case for Wilson as we had so many times previously presented it. We argued the matter out with Senator Smith, first, on the ground of Mr. Wilson's radicalism; second, whether Mr. Wilson would be inclined to wreck the leadership of his party in any state. Senator Saulsbury was a very close friend of Senator Smith; in fact, they are related.

After a long talk I suggested to Senator Saulsbury that he should call up Governor Wilson and tell him what he and I were discussing with Senator Smith. The answers from Mr. Wilson were that his record showed that he was not a radical, and, in so far as dis-

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rupting organizations was concerned, that had not been his practice and it would not be his practice in the future. At that time he called attention to his appointment of organization men generally while he was Governor of New Jersey. On this score, however, it may well be said that he was not Governor very long before his National campaign was started. At any rate, the right answer was given to Senator Smith. After the expiration of a half hour I called up Governor Wilson and propounded the same questions which Senator Saulsbury had asked, and received the same answer. This was sufficient assurance to Senator Smith, and, in my opinion, not only gained the support of Maryland, but carried with it the support of Virginia, West Virginia and Tennessee.

This is what happened: Senator Smith was not allowed to have or to pass upon a single appointment for two years. He became a Wilson outcast. Mr. Wilson, openly and in the press, supported the primary candidacy of Mr. William Marbury for the next Senatorial primary against Senator Smith. It was not until after two years that little things from the White House trickled Senator Smith's way.

The pledge made to Michigan was of the most harmless variety. That state we expected, quite naturally, to be for Harmon. Mr. Wood, the National Committeeman from Michigan and a director somewhat in that state, with his state associates, decided that they would go to the convention without endorsing anyone. We made a brisk contest in Michigan and received a few votes. The whole delegation was not against us,

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except indirectly. That was because of an attack made on Mr. Wood by a young man whom I unfortunately sent into Michigan. I immediately sent to Mr. Wood a letter of apology which smoothed out the situation. I remember early on the Sunday morning of the Baltimore Convention going to Mr. Wood at his apartment and covering the entire situation with him. He said that he had no ambition personally, but that Mr. Wilson's reputation for ingratitude and casting aside those who had been useful to him was a rather large obstacle to overcome. I spent an hour or two in conversation with him. He said: "Whose recommendation do you think ought to have the greatest weight in Michigan if we should nominate and elect Wilson"? I said: "Naturally, the National Committeeman, the Chairman of the State Committee, and such Democratic members of the lower House as there might be, should have first consideration". (There was no chance for the election of any Democratic Senator in Michigan.) Mr. Wood then said: "I am going to take your word about the man, and I am not going to take any chances on Clark or Bryan". There and then we had the entire State of Michigan.

There was but one other statement in this connection which I made and which I must record, but which had not the slightest influence on the convention. Charles F. Murphy asked me if I thought Wilson would set about to break up the organization in any state, including his. I said "No", on the record of the talk with Senator Smith and the general talks I had had with Mr. Wilson himself.

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Mr. Murphy had a wonderful chance when Mr. Champ Clark's vote grew less and less. If, after the attack on certain members of his delegation and on New York in general, he had instantly voted his delegation for Mr. Wilson, the convention would surely have conceived an alliance with Mr. Murphy and Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson's Western following would have left him in an instant, and Wilson would have found his chances at the bottom of the sea.

I did not expect to have any influence on Mr. Murphy, nor did I ever expect him to vote his delegation except to make the nomination unanimous, which was done by the able and admirable John J. Fitzgerald, of Brooklyn.

There were no tradings in the convention so far as Wilson was concerned. There was just what I have told my readers: a systematic appeal not only to the leaders, but to the people as far as possible by mail, on the record of Mr. Wilson as Governor of New Jersey. Then there was the impinging of forces of each of the candidates against the other, of which we succeeded in taking advantage at the time. When it was all over the Democrats were lined up unanimously for the choice. They had not won in twenty years or more. They had been compelled to take up "ism" after "ism" under the unquestioned leadership of Bryan. They did not know a great deal about Wilson's mind, but they had read much of him and were enthusiastic for victory. The results obtained did not proceed from pledges or promises made by me, and no

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such paltry excuse can serve as a justification of Mr. Wilson's conduct.

While on this topic my mind naturally adverts to Senator James A. Reed, of Missouri.

He was the ablest supporter that Mr. Clark had and the most bitter opponent of Governor Wilson before and at the convention. I felt after the convention that if we took Senator Reed we would get one of the most valuable possible assets. With much persuasion I induced Mr. Wilson to accept Senator Reed. I then approached the Senator and said to him: "Senator, the President and I want you to be with us. We want you to come into the campaign with both feet. Woodrow Wilson is the nominee. You are a Democrat and an able one. Everything before the nomination at Baltimore is forgotten. In fact, nothing ever happened before the adjournment at Baltimore". He took my hand and said: "We must win. I am as much for Woodrow Wilson as you are. Tell me where to work".

I shall never forget Senator Reed's appearance at headquarters. A tall, well-formed man, with aggressiveness in every feature, I knew that when he started out on a principle his advocacy would never cease until he had completely lost or completely won. There is no man in public life whose fearlessness and ability I have more admired; at the same time, personally, with his friends, he has the gentleness of a lamb. During the campaign I cannot think of a person who did more for Woodrow Wilson than Senator Reed, the same

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man who has been spat upon from the White House to this day.

I was anxious that the President start out with a Cabinet of marked ability. I had, prior to December 29, 1912, suggested about fifty men of the highest type that I knew in America. I had a feeling that these suggestions rather bored Governor Wilson. He didn't ask who a single one of these men was, although I am sure at that time he did not know fifteen men of Cabinet size in America. I soon found that the men suggested by me were foreclosed for life, and for the reason that I submitted their names to the President. Like Senator Reed, there were many men of great calibre in the Democratic Party who were desirous of entering the public service. Mr. Wilson did not know them. It was an obligation of honor, on my part at least, to present their names. I continued doing this, however, up to the time of the inauguration, always believing that the selection of some of these men would certainly at the outset give confidence to the Wilson Administration, and always feeling that I was doing my duty, and that the President would eventually realize this. In this latter belief I was disappointed.

In my own case, the attitude of Mr. Wilson was early apparent. On the 29th day of December, which is Mr. Wilson's birthday, he was invited to be the guest of Staunton, Virginia, his birthplace. An invitation to be present was also extended to me. Although I was in wretched physical condition, I felt I must go under any circumstances. I was on the train that went from New York and stopped at

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Princeton to take on the Governor. I greeted him cordially and had a few moments' conversation with him. I then went to my own compartment to rest. About noon a messenger came and said that the Governor wanted to see me. "McCombs," he said, "I don't want to put you in the Cabinet because you are a politician. I think you would fit excellently in diplomacy". I said: "Mr. Wilson, I am not seeking a position in your Cabinet, nor can I take a position in diplomacy". He then asked me which of all the posts in the world I considered best. Innocently enough, I said "France". Whereupon he said: "I would like you to go to France, or, if you would care for it, London or Berlin or the Governorship of the Philippines". I told the President-elect that I had exhausted my personal fortune to such a degree that I could not afford to keep up the post of Ambassador to any of these countries for any length of time without financial ruin. He said: "I will put a bill through Congress that will give all the posts \$17,800 extra for maintenance". I said: "Governor, that is a mere pittance for any of these posts. I cannot afford it. I must get back now to New York and gather my things together and resume my practice, which I have totally neglected for two years".

The idea of my impoverishment did not impress him much. He resented palpably my refusal to go to any of these posts. I could tell this from a peculiar showing of white in his eyes and the lengthening of his jaw. My own feeling was to get off at Washington and go back to New York, but I had accepted the invitation


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to go to Staunton, and I went. Shortly after this Colonel House appeared and urged that I take Paris or London, stating there would be a great investment even though I spent everything I had and borrowed the money to go.

I felt that I had already invested sufficiently in Mr. Wilson, and declined further hazard in that field.

END





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